Hans-Johann Glock

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.

Scott Soames: The Place of Quine in Analytic Philosophy: The essay explains and evaluates Quine's most important and influential views concerning the linguistic theory of the apriori, the prospects for quantified modal logic, the analysis of necessity as analyticity, the conception of meaning as holistic verification, the ontological commitments of theories (including those countenancing abstract objects), the relationship between extension and intension, and his doctrines of the indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. The essay closes by summarizing his lasting contributions to analytic philosophy.

This chapter discusses the main features of Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, both early and late. It also assesses these features for their merits, partly with a view to current debates. The chapter addresses that his radical position is more than a whimsical manifestation of an anti‐scientific ideology: it is supported by arguments deriving from astute observations about the peculiar character of philosophical problems on the one hand, and logico‐semantic ideas on the other. It also describes three tensions in Wittgenstein's account of conceptual elucidation: treating it as a kind of (psycho‐) therapy or propaganda for a particular point of view vs. regarding it as a type of dialectic argument; insisting on it having a purely critical purpose in dissolving philosophical puzzles vs. allowing for a more positive project of conceptual self‐understanding; and rejecting systematic theories vs. envisaging systematic surveys of our conceptual scheme.

Ludwig Wittgenstein crossed the second Styx, from living memory to history, during the years since the present century began. He is recognized today as one of the most original and powerful thinkers of the twentieth century, and his work belongs to the body of literature philosophers will read and interpret afresh in each generation, for as long as the European intellectual tradition survives. He wrote nothing in political philosophy or jurisprudence, very little in ethics, and the only sustained record of his philosophical ideas about religion and art consists in notes taken by students at his lectures. The Tractatus was published in 1921. In this book, Wittgenstein argues that the logical form of a proposition is utterly different from its superficial grammatical form. The greatest obstacles to understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy are not any inherent obscurity in his ideas, but the aphoristic style in which he wrote and the introverted character of his thought.

Several authors have detected profound analogies between Kant and Wittgenstein. Their claims have been contradicted by scholars, such being the agreed penalty for attributions to authorities. Many of the alleged similarities have either been left unsubstantiated at a detailed exegetical level, or have been confined to highly general points. At the same time, the 'scholarly' backlash has tended to ignore the importance of some of these general points, or has focused on very specific issues or purely terminological matters. To advance the debate, I distinguish four different topics: questions of actual influence; parallels at the methodological level; substantial similarities in philosophical logic; substantial similarities in the philosophy of mind. The article concentrates on the second and third topic. Section I argues that the critical conception of philosophy shared by Kant and Wittgenstein is itself due to the fact that they explain the a priori status of necessary propositions by reference to the way we experience or represent reality. Section II shows how the Tractatiis linguistically transforms this 'reflective turn', replacing Kant's preconditions of experience by preconditions of symbolic representation. Section III suggests that this explanation of the a priori involves the idea of an isomorphism between thought and reality, and that both Kant's transcendental idealism and Wittgenstein's early metaphysics of symbolism distort this isomorphism. Wittgenstein later rejected this metaphysics of symbolism, on the grounds that language is autonomous, and section IV detects parallels between that idea and Kant's 'diallelus' argument against the correspondence theory of truth. Finally, I claim that while Wittgenstein is right to insist that all a priori propositions are conceptual, Kant, in calling them synthetic a priori, is right to deny that they simply unpack the concepts involved in the propositions themselves.

summaryThis paper discusses objections against the idea that the meaning of a word is its use. Sct. 1 accepts Rundle's point that ‘meaning’ and ‘use’ are used differently, but insists that this is compatible with holding that use determines meaning, an therefore holds the key to conceptual analysis. Scts. 2–4 rebut three lines of argument which claim that linguistic philosophy goes astray by reading into the meaning of words non‐semantic features of its use: Searle's general speech act fallacy charge, Hacker's use of the Frege‐point against Wittgenstein's account of avowals, and Grice's attack on Wittgenstein's discussion of ‘trying’. Sct. 5 argues that Grice's doctrine of conversational implicature fails to show that the features he disregards are pragmatic rather than semantic. Sct. 6 ends with some suggestions about how use can be related to meaning without being abused.