Hans-Johann Glock

The Tractatus revolves around the connection between two central topics – the preconditions of symbolic representation and the nature of logic-cum-philosophy. Proper philosophy is an activity, namely of revealing the hidden structures that allow language to represent reality by way of logical analysis. At the same time the main purpose of such logical analysis consists in revealing metaphysical statements to be nonsensical. In the subsequent development of analytic philosophy, these two ideas parted company. The positive aim of revealing the logical form of sentences resulted in a program closely associated with Davidson, namely a theory of meaning for natural languages that yields metaphysical corollaries. The negative aim of overcoming metaphysics ushered in the activity of dissolving conceptual confusions through conceptual rather than logical analysis, propelled by the later Wittgenstein. My presentation pursues these historical lines of influence. But the ultimate aim is a substantive one, namely to establish whether the two projects can be kept apart. With the later Wittgenstein, I criticize the claim that formal calculi constitute the hidden structure of natural languages. But I also contend that the hope of engaging in anti-metaphysical dialectic without relying on logico-conceptual analysis of some kind falls prey to a “myth of mere method”.

My contribution charts the interaction between these two giants of postpositivist analytic philosophy in a historical and exegetical vein. But it also assesses the emerging common ground and the differences from a substantive point of view. Following a brief biographical account of their relation, the first section contends that at the grand‐strategic level Quine and Davidson are united by a “logical pragmatism.” The next section considers their contrasting relations to naturalism. I then turn to more detailed comparisons concerning the philosophy of language. The final section discusses the extent to which Davidson has abandoned empiricism.

Seit Descartes gilt Denken nicht nur als das Vermögen, welches Menschen vor Tieren auszeichnet, sondern auch, als das Merkmal, welches den Bereich des Psychischen bzw. Mentalen von dem des bloß Materiellen unterscheidet. Die Cartesianische Auffassung des Denkens ist allerdings sehr umfassend, da sie außer intellektuellen Fähigkeiten auch Empfindung, Wahrnehmung, Einbildungskraft und Wünsche einschließt. Der etablierte Begriff – sowohl in der Umgangssprache als auch in den Wissenschaften – ist jedoch differenzierter und fällt nicht mit dem des Mentalen oder Geistigen zusammen. Zuerst ist Denken als kognitive Fähigkeit, d. h. eine Fähigkeit zur Gewinnung von Wissen und Information, von konativen oder affektiven Fähigkeiten wie Wünschen und Emotionen zu unterscheiden, d. h. Fähigkeiten des Verlangens und der Betroffenheit. Sodann ist Denken im Gegensatz zu nicht-gerichteten Empfindungen und Stimmungen intentional, d. h. es hat einen bestimmten Gegenstand bzw. Inhalt. Man denkt etwas. Allerdings ist ›Denken‹ »ein weitverzweigter Begriff«. Man muss mindestens vier Fälle unterscheiden

This book addresses three kinds of readers. Academics working inside or outside philosophy should find explanations of key terms and issues in Wittgenstein's work, and be able to find out what impact it might have on their own. At the end of entries, I sometimes indicate briefly what impact it has actually had, but for detailed information one should consult the items listed in the Bibliography of Secondary Sources. Students working on Wittgenstein or related topics (Frege, Russell, philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind) should find an account of major exegetical and substantive problems. Wittgenstein scholars should find a state‐of‐the‐art discussion, as well as some new ideas. I have striven for a comprehensive coverage of the topics, but it is synthetic a priori that I have failed.