Robert R. Clewis

This study characterizes Kant's understanding of the relation between aesthetic and moral judgment by examining the concept of sublimity in three of Kant's texts: the Beobachtungen uber das Gefuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen, the Bemerkungen in den " Beobachtungen uber das Gefuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen", and the Kritik der Urteilskraft. Part I examines aesthetic and moral judgment in the Observations and the Remarks; Part II characterizes Kant's account in the later or critical period; and Part III contains my English translation of the Remarks.

Can it be consistent to be interested, for moral reasons, in the fact that uninvolved spectators of a regime change are enthusiastic about that change, when the latter is carried out according to means considered immoral or unjust? Yes. In ‘An Old Question Raised Again’ ( The Conflict of the Faculties, 1798), Kant demonstrates a morally based interest in disinterested spectators’ expressions (aesthetic judgments) of enthusiasm for the idea of a republican form of government. This interest is puzzling. Kant's universalizability test supposedly forbids the violent revolutionary means taken to establish the republican constitution. How can the Kantian, if consistent, take an interest in expressions of enthusiasm elicited by these immoral events? In addition to endorsing the familiar means/ends distinction, this article provides a new answer to this question by examining the enthusiasm in which Kant takes an interest: it is a pure aesthetic judgment of enthusiasm, made by a disinterested, impartial spectator. Key Words: aesthetic judgment • enthusiasm • idea • interest • Immanuel Kant • republic • spectator.