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36Valuing Emotions Michael Stocker with Elizabeth Hegeman Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996, xxviii + 353 pp., US $64.95, US$21.95 paper (review)Dialogue 38 (1): 219-. 1999.
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17A Third Front in PhilosophyCommon Knowledge 20 (2): 223-234. 2014.In a colloquium on “lyric philosophy,” this contribution records the efforts of an analytic philosopher to come to grips with questions that Jan Zwicky, who is both a fine poet and a subtle philosopher, has raised about anglophone analytic philosophy. The essay situates Zwicky between the analytic and Continental traditions in philosophy: like the best analytic philosophers, it is argued, she is enamored of clarity, but, like what is best in the Continental tradition, she demands of philosophy a…Read more
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43Love: A Very Short IntroductionOxford University Press. 2015.Do we love someone for their virtue, their beauty, or their moral or other qualities? Are love's characteristic desires altruistic or selfish? Are there duties of love? What do the sciences tell us about love? In this Very Short Introduction, Ronald de Sousa explores the different kinds of love, from affections to romantic love.
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443The Rationality of EmotionMIT Press. 1987.In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.
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22Who Needs Values When We Have Valuing? Comments on Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional FeelingEmotion Review 14 (4): 257-261. 2022.Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 257-261, October 2022. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about t…Read more
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27Emotional Knowledge and the Emotional A Priori: Comments on Rick A. Furtak's Knowing EmotionsJournal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1): 106-112. 2019.In the following comments, I will raise no major objection to Furtak’s main line of argument. My questions are essentially requests for clarification. They focus on three key expressions: first, the “unified” character of emotional agitation and intentionality; second, the unique “mode of cognition” claimed for emotions; and third, the “emotional a priori.”
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110Moral EmotionsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2). 2001.Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions…Read more
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67Kripke on Naming and NecessityCanadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3): 447-464. 1974.Some wag reported the following story: Scholars have recently established that the Iliad and the Odyssey were not, after all, written by Homer. They were actually written by another author, of the same name.The majority of current theories of naming and reference, including ones as divergent in other respects as those of Russell and Searle, would rule this story impossible. They would do so on roughly these grounds: the sense and reference of the name ‘Homer’ is determined, given the absence of …Read more
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73Review of Robert C. Solomon, True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10). 2007.
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56What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (review)Dialogue 38 (4): 908-910. 1999.This pithy book is for any psychologist or philosopher who wants to do psychology in a biologically informed way. Emotions are an object lesson, and the lesson is mostly negative: emotions are no one thing, and most of them are something we know not what.
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Alan Soble, ed., Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical EncyclopediaPhilosophy in Review 27 (3): 223. 2007.
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Emotion. I: Zalta EN, redIn Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
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University of Toronto, St. George CampusDepartment of Philosophy
Institute for the History and Philosophy of ScienceRetired faculty
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Philosophy, Misc |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
Philosophy, Misc |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Emotions |