Emmanuel Alloa

This article defends the thesis that the reflection which Ricœur conducts on the notion of testimony is not one research topic among others, but forms one of the keys to understanding the Ricœurian project as such. The notion of testimony enables one to get beyond the polarity of description and ascription, in order to return to the question of the real. Through an examination of the quadruple grammar of testimony that Ricœur proposes and its context in the dialogue with historiography and theology, the article advances the thesis that with testimony, we broach the limit point of hermeneutics, a “non-interpretable” at the heart of interpretation. This “non-interpretable” acquires a quasi-transcendental status, because it allows interpretation to broach the thing it is dealing with and not another interpretation. Lastly, it will be important to show how Ricœur’s thought on testimony also reflects an ethics: this ethics prohibits treating the testimony as a mere source, referring to a positivity, but as a trace, within an experience, which as such is unrepeatable.

Webrova vznemirljiva teza iz dela Protestanska etika in duh kapitalizma, ki sprva izgleda tako neverjetno, je bila od svoje prve objave deležna številnih kritik, spodbijajo pa jo vse do danes. Ena izmed številnih kritik, pa ostaja še posebej nepopustljiva: če je duh samoodpovedovanja primeren za kapitalistično podjetništvo, pa ekonomije ne poganjajo samo podjetniki; ekonomija potrebuje tudi potrošnike, ki so pripravljeni kupiti več od tega, kar predstavlja njihove dejanske potrebe. Po Benjaminu je kapitalizem religija brez dogme ali teologije in ni nič drugega kot čisti kult. Kot takšen sestoji v nenehnem slavljenju vernika, ki svojo vero udejanja skozi porabo in potrošnjo. V nadaljevanju bi rad izpostavil tezo, da nam vzporejanje dveh momentov krize – krize Druge svetovne vojne in krize 2008 –, omogoča na novo osvetliti Webrovo slavno tezo o asketski naravi kapitalizma, ter podal novo razlago tega, zakaj investicijski kapitalizem in potrošniški kapitalizem sploh nista protislovna, temveč konec koncev popolnoma sovpadata. Med drugo svetovno vojno sta namreč vladi Združenih držav Amerike in Kanade izdali niz propagandnih plakatov, katerih cilj je bil zmanjšati porabo in preusmeriti finančne sile gospodinjstev v prid skupnega vojnega napora. Mnogi od teh plakatov, ki so jih naredili nekateri najbolj zviti oglaševalci tistega časa, so črpali iz najgloblje zakoreninjenih načel puritanizma Nove Anglije: dolžnosti samoomejevanja. Sporočilo je bilo v naslednjem: vaši prihranki bodo odrešljivi ob koncu vojne, to pa le malce premesti Calvinovo perspektivo varčevanja, ki omogočajo odrešitev v času ob koncu sveta. Danes bi bilo dobro, če bi premislili eshatološke implikacije teh prerokov, ki predpisujejo najboljše obnašanje ob dogodku konca krize.

En philosophie, l'impossible a un nom : c'est, depuis Kant, la "chose en soi". La notion n'a pas bonne presse. A peine introduite, elle a connu un discrédit durable. Curieuse idée en effet que celle d'une réalité reconnue comme inconnaissable sans être pour cela impensable. Et pourtant, la chose en soi résiste et ne cesse de revenir sous diverses dénominations : "matière", "facticité", "résistance", "inconstructible", etc. Aujourd'hui encore, son idée hante les débats, du côté de la philosophie comme des sciences de la nature ou de l'anthropologie, chez les métaphysiciens comme chez les philosophes les plus réalistes. Il fallait donc la traiter pour de bon : c'est chose faite avec cette compilation, qui regroupe parmi les plus grands noms de la philosophie contemporaine afin de régler cette question qui touche à l'absolu, donc à toute pensée.

This book critically engages with the idea of transparency whose ubiquitous demand stands in stark contrast to its lack of conceptual clarity. The book carefully examines this notion in its own right, traces its emergence in Early Modernity and analyzes its omnipresence in contemporary rhetoric. Today, transparency has become a catchword outplaying other Enlightenment values like empowerment, sincerity and the notion of a public sphere. In a suspicious manner, transparency is entangled in the discourses on power, surveillance, and self-exposure. Bringing together prominent scholars from the emerging field of Critical Transparency Studies, the book offers a map of the various sites at which transparency has become virulent and connects the dots between past and present. By studying its appearances in today’s hyper-mediated economies of information and by linking it back to its historical roots, the book analyzes transparency and its discontents, and scrutinizes the reasons why it has become the imperative of a supposedly post-ideological age.

When translating phantasia as ‘imagination’, one commits a dangerous anachronism: interpreting the Greek concept from the vantage point of a modern, post-Kantian framework which sees imagination as a faculty mediating between sensibility and reasoning. A close reading of the Aristotelian sources shows why phantasia cannot be identifi ed as a distinct faculty, but rather designates a transversal power common to all psychic acts. The article argues that a more adequate translation of phantasia would be ‘visualization’.

Si les analyses merleau-pontiennes sont aujourd’hui fréquemment utilisées dans les études postcoloniales, notamment les analyses du corps, on n’a toujours pas prêté suffisamment attention à l’importance qu’eut pour sa pensée la confrontation avec la réalité du colonialisme, au fil de divers voyages vers la moitié des années 1950. Dans l’article, il s’agit en particulier de faire émerger le rôle exemplaire qu’au pu avoir la confrontation avec la réalité de Madagascar, en 1957, et ses effets en retour sur un certain nombre de catégories philosophiques et politiques. Outre la reconstruction historique des circonstances de ce voyage, l’article se focalise sur trois notions centrales dont cette « épreuve de l’étranger » aura permis de faire apparaître la nature dialectique : les notions d’altérité, d’universalité, et d’autodétermination. L’altérité n’est plus une relation frontale, mais résulte d’une expérience de « décentrement » ; l’universalité doit être problématisée, en direction d’un « universel latéral » tandis que l’idée même de l’autodétermination soulève des questionnements autant politiques qu’ontologiques : dans la lutte pour une indépendance immédiate des colonies, Merleau-Ponty soupçonne le spectre d’une pensée libérale qui masque les liens de dépendance qui persistent sous d’autres formes. If Merleau-Pontian analyses – notably the analyses of the body – are, today, frequently used in post-colonial studies, sufficient attention was not always paid to the importance that the confrontation with the reality of colonialism had for his thought in the course of various travels during the mid-1950’s. This article is concerned, in particular, with shedding light on the exemplary role that the confrontation with the reality of Madagascar in 1957 could have had, and its effects in return on quite a number of philosophical and political categories. More than a historical reconstruction of the circumstances of that journey, the article focuses on three central notions whose dialectical nature is made apparent by this “experience of the foreign”: the notions of alterity, universality, and self-determination. Alterity is no longer a frontal relation, but results from an experience of “decentering,” universality must be problematized in the direction of a “lateral universality,” and the very idea of self-determination raises questions as much political as ontological. In the struggle for an immediate independence for the colonies, Merleau-Ponty senses the specter of a liberal thought that conceals the relations of dependence that persist in other forms. Se oggi le riflessioni merleau-pontiane, in particolare sul corpo, sono utilizzate di frequente negli studi postcoloniali, non si è mai prestata sufficiente attenzione all’importanza che ebbe, per il pensiero di Merleau-Ponty, il confronto con la realtà del colonialismo nel corso dei diversi viaggi effettuati dal filosofo verso la metà degli anni ’50. In quest’articolo ci proponiamo di far emergere il ruolo esemplare che poté avere il confronto con la realtà del Madagascar nel 1957 e le sue ripercussioni su un certo numero di categorie filosofiche e politiche. Oltre che sulla ricostruzione storica delle circostanze di questo viaggio, l’articolo si concentra su tre nozioni di cui questa esperienza avrebbe permesso di far apparire la natura dialettica: le nozioni di alterità, di universalità e di autodeterminazione. L’alterità non è più una relazione frontale, bensì risulta da un’esperienza di “decentramento”; l’universalità deve essere problematizzata nella direzione di un “universale laterale”, mentre l’idea stessa di autodeterminazione solleva un interrogarsi tanto politico che ontologico: nella lotta per un’indipendenza immediata delle colonie, Merleau-Ponty intravvede infatti lo spettro di un pensiero liberale volto a mascherare i legami di dipendenza per farli così persistere sotto altre forme.

La priorité que la phénoménologie classique accorde à la première personne se voit déplacée de différentes manières par les penseurs post-phénoménologiques, dont Jacques Derrida. L’article a pour but d’indiquer la fonction stratégique qu’occupe dans la pensée derridienne la figure du témoin, que ce soit en tant que tiers qui déstabilise la métaphysique de la présence dans ses premiers écrits mais surtout, comme figure spéculative dans l’œuvre tardive, entre foi et savoir. Des remarques dispersées de Derrida sur le témoignage, on peut dégager une petite grammaire du témoignage, avec ses trois paradoxes constitutifs: la substituabilité de l’insubstituable, la fondation de l’infondable, la répétition de l’irrépétible. En faisant apparaître la logique constitutive du témoignage, Derrida indique comment la figure du témoin en appelle à une complication de la phénoménologie, qu’on peut résumer par la notion de remédiation.

For a long time, Gilbert Simondon’s work was known only as either a philosophy restricted to the problem of technology or as an inspirational source for Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. As Simondon’s thinking is now finally in the process of being recognized in its own right as one of the most original philosophies of the twentieth century, this also entails that some critical work needs to be done to disentangle it from an all too hasty identification with Deleuzian categories. While both Simondon and Deleuze have made crucial contributions towards a theory of differential individuation that significantly diverges from other authors associated with French poststructuralism insofar as they insist on the dynamic and vital dimension of difference, they also differ on crucial points. Whereas Simondon sees the process of becoming as transductive amplification, Deleuze theorizes it as intensifying involution, leading to two notably distinct concepts of difference.

During World War II, both the US and Canadian governments issued a series of propaganda posters aimed at reducing spending and redirecting private households’ financial expenditures into the general war effort. Many of those posters, developed by some of the cleverest advertisers of the time, drew on Puritanism’s most deeply rooted principle: self-restraint. One propaganda poster succinctly exemplifies the underlying logic: as an elegant couple looks up at a gigantic elephant for sale, the caption sternly reminds them to be thrifty: “If you don’t need it … don’t buy it!”.If you don’t need it, don’t buy it. Propaganda Poster WWII. Ottawa...

Depuis la renaissance des études aristotéliciennes avec Werner Jaeger, on a souvent observé la fréquence lexicographique des termes dénotant la médiété et la médiation dans le corpus aristotélicien. Cette récurrence a cependant généralement été traitée comme un effet homonymique, rien ne permettant de relier a priori la médiété éthique, le terme intermédiaire en logique ou encore le milieu perceptif. Et pourtant, le fait qu'Aristote s'interroge lui-même sur cette « plurivocité » du médium peut être lu comme une indication que, sous le couvert d'une apparente homonymie, il y a bien un problème de la médialité qui traverse la pensée du Stagirite. L'article se propose de recenser les figures majeures de cette médialité dans ses déclinaisons éthiques, logiques et aïsthétiques, afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure une relecture du corpus à l'aune de la médialité permet de dépasser l'alternative entre une lecture fonctionnaliste et une lecture naturaliste d'Aristote.

A história intelectual do século XX tem sido escrita ao longo de um cenário que vê, na morte de Merleau-Ponty em 1961, a linha de divisória entre uma geração existencial e fenomenológica e o evento do estruturalismo imediatamente subsequente. A publicação das notas de leitura de Merleau-Ponty sobre o texto A origem da geometria, de Edmund Husserl, tem mostrado quão frágeis são os alicerces desta leitura simplificadora. Na verdade, enquanto a tradução e introdução de Derrida ao texto de Husserl, de 1962, tornavam-se um texto fundamentador para a geração estruturalista, introduzindo uma reflexão sobre a historicidade e a materialidade da idealidade, foi apenas em 1998, com a publicação das notas da conferência de Merleau-Ponty no Collège de France, em 1959, sobre o mesmo tópico, que se tornou claro quão próximo está o primeiro Derrida do último Merleau-Ponty. Assim como Derrida, Merleau-Ponty identificou, na tensão husserliana entre arqueologia e teleologia, o problema básico da fenomenologia, introduzindo a questão da história e a do meio de transmissão cultural. Comparar tais leituras em seu contexto específico não apenas permite um retrato mais complexo dos debates intelectuais da época, mas também mostra como, com a interpretação de Merleau-Ponty sobre A origem da geometria, a "diferença" de Derrida antecede-se e admite outra genealogia.

As Hegel once said, in Byzantium, between homoousis and homoiousis, the difference of one letter could decide the life and death of thousands. As this article seeks to argue, Byzantine thinking was not only attentive to conceptual differences, but also to iconic ones. The iconoclastic controversy (726-842 AD) arose from two different interpretations of the nature of images: whereas iconoclastic philosophy is based on the assumption of a fundamental 'iconic identity', iconophile philosophy defends the idea of'iconic difference'. And while the reception in the Latin West of the controversies over the image as a mere problem of referentiality of the letter explains why its originality has remained underestimated for centuries, reexamining Byzantine visual thinking in the light of today's 'pictorial turn' reveals its striking modernity.

Die elf Beiträge dieses Bandes gehen aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln dem Problem der Verkörperung von Sinn nach: phänomenologische, psychoanalytische und sprachwissenschaftliche Ansätze bilden dabei den Schwerpunkt; sie werden aber durch Studien aus der Literaturtheorie, der politischen Theorie und der Filmwissenschaft ergänzt. Was heißt es – das ist die zentrale Frage –, den Körper als leibliches Medium aufzufassen, welches Sinn nicht nur verkörpert, sondern überhaupt erst entstehen lässt? Gibt es bereits eine Sprache des Leibes diesseits der Ebene ausdrücklicher Rede?

Das 20. Jahrhundert war durch eine radikale Rückbesinnung auf die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen von Sprache gekennzeichnet. Der neuzeitliche Traum einer restlosen Benennung des Weltganzen wird fraglich, wenn ihr Medium – die propositionale Aussagelogik – unter Verdacht gerät. Der Band wirft die brisante Frage auf, ob der für das Jahrhundert prägende linguistic turn nicht so sehr in einer Hinwendung, als vielmehr in einer »Abwendung« vom Sagen besteht, die sich in der Entsagungsgeste von Melvilles Bartleby emblematisch verkörpert. Einzelanalysen zu literarischen Strategien bei Mallarmé, Wittgenstein, Celan, Foucault, Adorno, Derrida, Lévinas u.a.m. führen vor, wie Unterlassen nicht nur ein kritisches, sondern auch stets ein schöpferisches Moment in sich birgt.

“What we have learned from Saussure” affirms Merleau-Ponty “is that, taken singly, signs do not signify anything, and that each one of them does not so much express a meaning as mark a divergence of meaning between itself and other signs.” While it has often been stressed that Merleau-Ponty was arguably among the earliest philosophical readers of Saussure, the real impact of this reading on Merleau-Ponty’s thinking has rarely been assessed in detail. By focusing on the middle period – the years between the publication of the Phenomenology of Perception and the abandonment of the book project The Prose of the World – a special interest in language and its ideality becomes all the more evident. Now this period is crucial for understanding the turn of the later years: similarly to Saussure, who shifted the problem of meaning from a problem of referentiality to an issue of self-differentiation of the linguistic field, Merleau-Ponty shifts his account of perception from a relationship based on sensory subjects and perceived objects to an immanent differentiation of the sensible world. The genesis ofan articulated world can be conceptualized with the experience of children’s language acquisition and the phenomenon of “deflation.” At a certain point in her development, the child interrupts her incessant babbling and learns to shape pauses and silences, which are the precondition for meaningful sounds. Learning how to speak – as it were – would thus be learning how not to speak. The child may only enter a specific language by means of a phonematic restriction; to become a member of a language community is to lose the capacity to speak all languages.

In 20th century thinking, few concepts have provoked as many misunderstandings as Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘Flesh’. Such misunderstandings (of which the article sketches the outline of an archaeology) rest on the initial assumption that the Flesh has to be derived from the body. The article suggests that the dominant readings of the Flesh can be organized along what could respectively be called the scenario of propriety and the scenario of expansion, beyond which a third way comes into view which does not think Flesh as plenitude, but as an interstitial fabric. In this sense, the genesis of the last ontology of the Flesh is neither to be found in Husserl or in a simple anti-Sartrianism, but in a fecund and still underestimated reading of Saussure’s notion of the diacritics. The ontological turn of the last writings can thus only be understood on the grounds of the expressive turn from the intermediate period.

Der Band fragt nach der Kraft der Imagination, die im Reich der Episteme ein besonders schwer zu fassender, nicht immer gern gesehener Gast ist. Wie viel Fantasie braucht die Kunst, vor allem aber das wissenschaftliche Wissen? Wir bearbeiten dieses weite Feld, indem wir nach auslösenden Momenten, bildenden Prozessen und materiellen Substraten fragen. Danach, wie imaginiert wird, und womit: in der Wissenschaft, der Kunst, im Alltag. Bildern kommt die spezifische Rolle operativer Instrumente der Imagination zu, als Relais, als Ruhepunkte, an denen sich kreative Prozesse gleichsam selbstreflexiv manifestieren - aber auch als Impulsgeber, die Betrachtern ermöglichen, ihre Begrenztheit wahrzunehmen und zu überschreiten.

Husserlian phenomenology sets off as a fundamental rejection of those psychologisms and anthropologisms that deduce the structures of appearance from some preexisting essence of man. However, despite a clear rejection of all anthropological foundations of phenomenology, the examples of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty show that the question of man continues to haunt the phenomenological project and constitutes something like a ‘blind spot’. Relating these unspoken tensions to another historical ‘scene’ (the debate between the Sophists and Aristotle), the article argues why phenomenology is to be seen as the endeavor of replying to the initial Protagorean provocation to thinking.

The category of « postmemory » has been invoked by Marianne Hirsch to refer to a traumatic past which is not directly remembered in first person, but is handed down to later generations and is recalled through the mediation of narratives and images which become “prostheses” for a lack of direct memory. But how is it that these prosthetic recollections do not simply substitute for what lacks but seem to shape the very events they are meant to reproduce? How come an event continues to haunt the memories of the present, even when no immediate remembrance of it is left? How to think of an “afterimage” of something that was never seen in the first place? It is only quite recently that the role of prosthetic images has been more widely acknowledged in the construction and creation of memories of collective trauma. The paper will focus on the role of photographic images played in remembrance of the Armenian genocide. It shall be shown how the few pictures that were taken by witnesses of the deportations had an afterlife of their own, being reframed and receiving specific interpretations. In particular, the paper will discuss the case of Armin T. Wegner, a German voluntary serving as Sanitary Officer in the Turkish army who, during his fieldwork in 1915/16 in Anatolia and on the Euphrates in Syria, documented the final stages of deportation, taking pictures of the camps at the desert’s fringes. His photos, which are among the most important visual testimonies of the extermination, only belatedly later made Wegner aware of what he had been witnessing, turning him into a witness après coup and to a defender of the Armenian cause.