David Koepsell

Currently, under the law of intellectual property, IP owners may exclude from use or production substances and processes that we would ordinarily consider to be products of nature. This has helped companies monopolize disease genes, and thus diagnostic testing for those diseases, and “biosimilar” products, pharmaceutical materials that mimic biological materials. Extending the current paradigm to the world of synthetic biology and nanotechnology will create further injustices in the delivery of health care to billions of people around the world. As such, I advocate heading this trend off at the pass. Scientists ought to conduct basic research into the building blocks of biology and matter in the open, publishing their results, releasing knowledge into the public domain upstream so that beneficial innovation can be produced without fear of downstream litigation, and so that what ought to remain in the public domain as a matter of right (products of nature) does not become unjustly monopolized.

One of the early, non-financial uses of blockchain technologies around which several startups have developed was to help manage, monetize, and make the sharing of genomic data more private. Because deidentified genomic data are excluded from HIPAA and many other regulatory contexts worldwide—and is already a widely traded commodity for science valued in the hundreds of millions over the past decade—genomic blockchains proved a promising entry point for using the benefits of blockchains for dissemination and remuneration of data. Several models have been tried, and most have touted their abilities to make users the “owners” of the genomic data in ways in which current models fail. This paper will explore the various existing and potential models for genomic blockchains, review some shortcomings and unmet needs, and explain why no technical solution alone will fulfill the promise of genomic data ownership without regulation.

The theory of documentality is a way of describing social reality. Developed by Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris, it says that the world of social objects is a world of documents, fundamentally. Specifically, it attempts to fill in gaps regarding the existence of objects whose dependence precedes traditional, written documents. Borrowing from Derrida, Ferraris concludes that no part of social reality exists outside of texts, while expanding the notion of texts to include inscriptions as memories in minds. Social reality is constructed by “inscriptions” on documents, the most basic of which can be the inscriptions of memories, ideas, and things like promises and intentions on the matter of human brains. In “Beyond Paper,” Barry Smith and I raise some issues that confront the theory of documentality when electronic documents are involved, specifically problems concerning the distinction between fixed inscriptions and dynamic software, as well as the existence of legal entities that are never inscribed at all (like a common law marriage, that can exist even without any agreement among the parties). Here, I consider briefly how extending our discussion of documentality and electronic media is further complicated by web 3.0, or the emerging realm of documents and processes involved in smart contracts and their offspring and consider some implications for the law arising from this new manner of executing code and weaving new layers of social reality.

"Cyberspace" is a term used commonly but without adequate definition. All computer-mediated phenomena may be said to comprise cyberspace. So far, no adequate ontology of cyberspace has been formulated. The law of intellectual property has attempted to fit computer-mediated phenomena into the current legal scheme. Currently, the law of intellectual property distinguishes between the subjects of patent law , and the subject of copyright law . The distinction embodied in the law of intellectual property is invalid and all things which are man-made and intentionally produced are expressive objects. All computer-mediated phenomena are such expressive objects. The law of intellectual property comprises a naive ontology. A common-sense ontology of intellectual property, which must abide by the rules of logic, recognizes that all man-made objects which are intentionally produced are expressive objects and should be afforded the same form on intellectual property protection. The current legal ontology has failed in devising mutually exclusive categories for objects which are of the same type, namely--expressive. A unified ontology would accommodate computer-mediated phenomena without the problems which result from the current naive ontology

Mars One is an ambitious, private plan to begin colonizing Mars using comprehensively screened volunteers who will make a one-way journey to the Red Planet. Its budget will be partially offset by broadcasting the adventure as a reality-TV program, beginning with the training of the astronauts, and ending with their settlement and, presumably, their deaths on the surface of Mars. In essence, the volunteers being sought for the Mars One project are human subjects in an experiment and ought to be treated as such under international provisions for the protection of human subjects or, at the very least, under a concern for the ethical conduct of a potentially groundbreaking project. In this article, I explore the question of whether the volunteers for Mars One are subject to standard protections for human subjects in scientific research, or to broader ethical concerns and protections for unique reasons