Ingrid Robeyns

An Upper Limit on Wealth? Should (extreme) wealth be seen as an undesirable situation? This question is called for by a number of social developments, but also from theories of justice in political philosophy and from economic ethics. Answering this question requires first and foremost a proper conceptualisation of wealth. In this paper, I propose such a conceptualisation. In addition, two reasons are advocated for an upper limit on wealth, and possible objections are investigated. The paper ends with some suggestions for future philosophical research on an upper limit on wealth.

Having Too Much is the first academic volume devoted to limitarianism: the idea that the use of economic or ecosystem resources should not exceed certain limits. This concept has deep roots in economic and political thought. One can find similar statements of such limits in thinkers such as Plato, Aquinas, and Spinoza. But Having Too Much is the first time in contemporary political philosophy that limitarianism is explored at length and in detail. Bringing together in one place the best writing from key theorists of limitarianism, this book is an essential contribution to political philosophy in general, and theories of distributive justice in particular. Including some of the key published articles as well as new chapters, Having Too Much is necessary reading for scholars and students of political theory and philosophy, as well as anyone interested in questions of distributive justice.

An Upper Limit on Wealth? Should (extreme) wealth be seen as an undesirable situation? This question is called for by a number of social developments, but also from theories of justice in political philosophy and from economic ethics. Answering this question requires first and foremost a proper conceptualisation of wealth. In this paper, I propose such a conceptualisation. In addition, two reasons are advocated for an upper limit on wealth, and possible objections are investigated. The paper ends with some suggestions for future philosophical research on an upper limit on wealth.

This paper proposes a view, called limitarianism, which suggests that there should be upper limits to the amount of income and wealth a person can hold. One argument for limitarianism is that superriches can undermine political equality. The other reason is that it would be better if the surplus money that superrich households have were to be used to meet unmet urgent needs and local and global collective action problems. A particular urgent case of the latter is climate change. The paper discusses one objection to limitarianism, and draws some conclusions for society, as well as for the human development paradigm and the capability approach.

'Tener demasiado' es el primer volumen académico dedicado al limitarismo: la idea de que el uso de los recursos económicos o de los ecosistemas no sobrepasen ciertos límites. Se trata de un concepto profundamente arraigado en el pensamiento económico y político, por lo que es posible encontrar premisas similares en pensadores como Platón, Aquino o Spinoza. No obstante, 'Tener demasiado' es el primer ejemplar en el campo de la filosofía política contemporánea en el que el limitarismo se explora en profundidad y con detalle. Asimismo, este estudio reúne por primera vez los mejores escritos de los principales teóricos del limitarismo, lo que le convierte en una contribución esencial al campo de la filosofía política, en general, y de las teorías sobre la justicia distributiva, en particular. Incluye tanto artículos seminales ya publicados como nuevos capítulos y se presenta como lectura indispensable para académicos y estudiantes de teoría política y filosofía, así como para todos aquellos interesados en cuestiones relacionadas con la justicia distributiva.

Two of the most important theories in contemporary liberal egalitarianism are Ronald Dworkin’s equality of resources and Amartya Sen’s capability approach. Recently Dworkin has claimed that Sen’s capability approach does not provide a genuine alternative to equality of resources. In this article, we provide both an internal and an external critique of Dworkin’s claim. In the first part of the article we develop an internal critique by providing a detailed analysis of Dworkin’s claim. Andrew Williams has contested Dworkin’s claim, but he has failed to convince Dworkin of his objections. We analyze this debate, and offer an argument that, we hope, settles this dispute. In the second part of the article we argue that an analysis beyond the current parameters of the liberal-egalitarian debate points to three significant differences between Dworkin’s and Sen’s egalitarian theories: the degree to which they rely on an ideal-theoretical approach; their ability to judge social structures that are intertwined with people’s social endowments; and their endorsement of a well-defined criterion to demarcate morally relevant from morally irrelevant inequalities. This broader analysis not only reinforces our conclusion that Dworkin’s equality of resources and Sen’s capability approach are genuinely distinct, but it also suggests some more general insights that may be relevant for a better understanding of contemporary egalitarian thinking.