•  304
    Craig's second philosophical argument for a beginning of the universe presupposes a dynamic theory of time, a limitation which makes the argument unacceptable for those who do not hold this theory. I argue that the argument can be modified thus: If time is beginning -less, then it would be the case that a person existing and counting as long as time exists would count an actual infinite by counting one element after another successively, but the consequent is metaphysically impossible, hence the…Read more
  •  107
    Reply to Panelists
    Philosophia Christi 21 (1): 49-56. 2019.
    I explain why my model of the Incarnation avoids the problems with alternative models and reply to objections concerning my model’s coherence with scripture, the understanding of personhood and natures, the concrete–abstract distinction, the human soul of Christ, the lack of the unconscious in Christ, and the incompatibility with a strong sense of immutability and simplicity. I conclude that my model stays faithful to scripture and can help to secure unity in the body of Christ concerning the do…Read more
  •  194
    On the Coherence of the Incarnation: The Divine Preconscious Model
    Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 51 (1): 50-63. 2009.
    Many skeptics throughout the centuries have accused the New Testament characterization of the incarnation as being incoherent. The reason is that it appears impossible that any person can exemplify human properties such as ignorance, fatigability, and spatial limitation, as the New Testament testifies of Jesus, while possessing divine properties such as omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence at the same time. This paper proposes a possible model which asserts that at the incarnation, the Log…Read more