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695There is widespread recognition at universities that a proper understanding of science is needed for all undergraduates. Good jobs are increasingly found in fields related to Science, Technology, Engineering, and Medicine, and science now enters almost all aspects of our daily lives. For these reasons, scientific literacy and an understanding of scientific methodology are a foundational part of any undergraduate education. Recipes for Science provides an accessible introduction to the main conce…Read more
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591First principles in the life sciences: the free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanismSynthese 198 (14). 2021.The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship betwe…Read more
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279Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of MindBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1): 185-220. 2021.Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more ra…Read more
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70Determinants of judgments of explanatory power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical RelevanceFrontiers in Psychology. 2017.Explanation is a central concept in human psychology. Drawing upon philosophical theories of explanation, psychologists have recently begun to examine the relationship between explanation, probability and causality. Our study advances this growing literature in the intersection of psychology and philosophy of science by systematically investigating how judgments of explanatory power are affected by the prior credibility of a potential explanation, the causal framing used to describe the explanat…Read more
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54The question of how judgments of explanatory value inform probabilistic inference is well studied within psychology and philosophy. Less studied are the questions: How does probabilistic information affect judgments of explanatory value? Does probabilistic information take precedence over causal information in determining explanatory judgments? To answer these questions, we conducted two experimental studies. In Study 1, we found that probabilistic information had a negligible impact on explanat…Read more
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90Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected FrameworksBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2). 2015.A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then …Read more
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72Discovering Brain Mechanisms Using Network Analysis and Causal ModelingMinds and Machines 28 (2): 265-286. 2018.Mechanist philosophers have examined several strategies scientists use for discovering causal mechanisms in neuroscience. Findings about the anatomical organization of the brain play a central role in several such strategies. Little attention has been paid, however, to the use of network analysis and causal modeling techniques for mechanism discovery. In particular, mechanist philosophers have not explored whether and how these strategies incorporate information about the anatomical organization…Read more
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90Bayesian cognitive science, predictive brains, and the nativism debateSynthese 1-22. 2017.The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between nativists and empiricists into more productive forms—or so have claimed several philosophers and cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that Bayesianism offers not a vindication …Read more
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26Deep and beautiful. The reward prediction error hypothesis of dopamineStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 45 57-67. 2013.According to the reward-prediction error hypothesis (RPEH) of dopamine, the phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain signals a discrepancy between the predicted and currently experienced reward of a particular event. It can be claimed that this hypothesis is deep, elegant and beautiful, representing one of the largest successes of computational neuroscience. This paper examines this claim, making two contributions to existing literature. First, it draws a comprehensive historical …Read more
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57Deep and beautiful. The reward prediction error hypothesis of dopamineStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 45 (1): 57-67. 2014.According to the reward-prediction error hypothesis of dopamine, the phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain signals a discrepancy between the predicted and currently experienced reward of a particular event. It can be claimed that this hypothesis is deep, elegant and beautiful, representing one of the largest successes of computational neuroscience. This paper examines this claim, making two contributions to existing literature. First, it draws a comprehensive historical account…Read more
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892Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification, and ExplanationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2). 2017.It is often claimed that the greatest value of the Bayesian framework in cognitive science consists in its unifying power. Several Bayesian cognitive scientists assume that unification is obviously linked to explanatory power. But this link is not obvious, as unification in science is a heterogeneous notion, which may have little to do with explanation. While a crucial feature of most adequate explanations in cognitive science is that they reveal aspects of the causal mechanism that produces the…Read more
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4Paul M. Churchland: Plato’s Camera: How the Physical Brain Captures a Landscape of Abstract Universals : MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012, x+289, $35.00, ISBN 9780262016865 (review)Minds and Machines 23 (2): 263-268. 2013.
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102Moving forward (and beyond) the modularity debate: A network perspectivePhilosophy of Science 80 (3): 356-377. 2013.Modularity is one of the most important concepts used to articulate a theory of cognitive architecture. Over the last 30 years, the debate in many areas of the cognitive sciences and in philosophy of psychology about what modules are, and to what extent our cognitive architecture is modular, has made little progress. After providing a diagnosis of this lack of progress, this article suggests a remedy. It argues that the theoretical framework of network science can be brought to bear on the tradi…Read more
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90Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of ExplanationCognitive Science 41 (2): 503-517. 2017.This paper brings together results from the philosophy and the psychology of explanation to argue that there are multiple concepts of explanation in human psychology. Specifically, it is shown that pluralism about explanation coheres with the multiplicity of models of explanation available in the philosophy of science, and it is supported by evidence from the psychology of explanatory judgment. Focusing on the case of a norm of explanatory power, the paper concludes by responding to the worry th…Read more
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91The predictive mind and chess-playing: A reply to ShandAnalysis 74 (4): 603-608. 2014.In a recent Analysis piece, John Shand (2014) argues that the Predictive Theory of Mind provides a unique explanation for why one cannot play chess against oneself. On the basis of this purported explanatory power, Shand concludes that we have an extra reason to believe that PTM is correct. In this reply, we first rectify the claim that one cannot play chess against oneself; then we move on to argue that even if this were the case, Shand’s argument does not give extra weight to the Predictive Th…Read more
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76Explanatory Judgment, Moral Offense and Value-Free ScienceReview of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4): 743-763. 2016.A popular view in philosophy of science contends that scientific reasoning is objective to the extent that the appraisal of scientific hypotheses is not influenced by moral, political, economic, or social values, but only by the available evidence. A large body of results in the psychology of motivated-reasoning has put pressure on the empirical adequacy of this view. The present study extends this body of results by providing direct evidence that the moral offensiveness of a scientific hypothes…Read more
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141Conformorality. A Study on Group Conditioning of Normative JudgmentReview of Philosophy and Psychology (4): 751-764. 2013.How does other people’s opinion affect judgments of norm transgressions? In our study, we used a modification of the famous Asch paradigm to examine conformity in the moral domain. The question we addressed was how peer group opinion alters normative judgments of scenarios involving violations of moral, social, and decency norms. The results indicate that even moral norms are subject to conformity, especially in situations with a high degree of social presence. Interestingly, the degree of confo…Read more
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67Pete Mandik: This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, xiv+246, $34.95, ISBN 978-0-470-67450-5Minds and Machines 24 (3): 373-376. 2014.Pete Mandik’s This is Philosophy of Mind is the latest addition to the “introduction to the philosophy of mind textbook” literature. It is a welcome addition, as Mandik offers readers an encompassing, up-to-date and engagingly written textbook. The objective of This is Philosophy of Mind is to communicate to a wider audience the fascinating and challenging ideas discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is intended as a resource useful for both students taking a course and for anybody els…Read more
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214Models, Mechanisms, and CoherenceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1): 181-212. 2015.Life-science phenomena are often explained by specifying the mechanisms that bring them about. The new mechanistic philosophers have done much to substantiate this claim and to provide us with a better understanding of what mechanisms are and how they explain. Although there is disagreement among current mechanists on various issues, they share a common core position and a seeming commitment to some form of scientific realism. But is such a commitment necessary? Is it the best way to go about me…Read more
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87Explaining social norm compliance. A plea for neural representationsPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2): 217-238. 2014.How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain ne…Read more
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43Bryce Huebner: Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, x+278, $65.00, ISBN 9780199926275Minds and Machines 25 (1): 103-109. 2015.Bryce Huebner’s Macrocognition is a book with a double mission. The first and main mission is “to show that there are cases of collective mentality in our world” . Cases of collective mentality are cases where groups, teams, mobs, firms, colonies or some other collectivities possess cognitive capacities or mental states in the same sense that we individually do. To accomplish this mission, Huebner develops an account of macrocognition, where “the term ‘macrocognition’ is intended as shorthand fo…Read more
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118Why Build a Virtual Brain? Large-scale Neural Simulations as Test-bed for Artificial Computing SystemsIn D. C. Noelle, R. Dale, A. S. Warlaumont, J. Yoshimi, T. Matlock, C. D. Jennings & P. P. Maglio (eds.), Proceedings of the 37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Cognitive Science Society. pp. 429-434. 2015.Despite the impressive amount of financial resources invested in carrying out large-scale brain simulations, it is controversial what the payoffs are of pursuing this project. The present paper argues that in some cases, from designing, building, and running a large-scale neural simulation, scientists acquire useful knowledge about the computational performance of the simulating system, rather than about the neurobiological system represented in the simulation. What this means, why it is not a t…Read more
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3Olaf Sporns: Networks of the Brain: MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011, xi+243, $40.00, ISBN 978-0-262-01469-4 (review)Minds and Machines 23 (2): 259-262. 2013.
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151How Authentic Intentionality can be Enabled: a Neurocomputational Hypothesis (review)Minds and Machines 20 (2): 183-202. 2010.According to John Haugeland, the capacity for “authentic intentionality” depends on a commitment to constitutive standards of objectivity. One of the consequences of Haugeland’s view is that a neurocomputational explanation cannot be adequate to understand “authentic intentionality”. This paper gives grounds to resist such a consequence. It provides the beginning of an account of authentic intentionality in terms of neurocomputational enabling conditions. It argues that the standards, which cons…Read more
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92Explanatory Judgment, Probability, and Abductive InferenceIn A. Papafragou, D. Grodner, D. Mirman & J. C. Trueswell (eds.), Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 432-437) Cognitive Science Society., Cognitive Science Society. pp. 432-437. 2016.Abductive reasoning assigns special status to the explanatory power of a hypothesis. But how do people make explanatory judgments? Our study clarifies this issue by asking: How does the explanatory power of a hypothesis cohere with other cognitive factors? How does probabilistic information affect explanatory judgments? In order to answer these questions, we conducted an experiment with 671 participants. Their task was to make judgments about a potentially explanatory hypothesis and its cognitiv…Read more
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61The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn’s Systematicity ChallengePhilosophical Psychology 29 (3): 476-478. 2016.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
General Philosophy of Science |