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Université Laval
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University of Geneva
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2015
APA Eastern Division
Homepage
Quebec City, Quebec, Canada
0000-0003-4760-9027
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Probability
General Philosophy of Science
17th/18th Century Philosophy
1 more
  •  1100
    Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge.
    Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3): 302-307. 2016.
    According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more gene…Read more
    Evidence and Knowledge
  •  544
    Knowledge, Practice, and Merit
    Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2): 133-152. 2012.
    In this paper I discuss the role that knowledge plays with regard to rational action. It has been recently argued that knowledge determines appropriate action. I examine this proposal, consider objections against it, and finally propose a defense of it.
    Epistemic Norms
  •  777
    The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action
    Acta Analytica 29 (4): 457-468. 2014.
    In this paper, I argue against recent versions of justification norms of action and practical deliberation . I demonstrate that these norms yield unacceptable results in deception cases. However, a further modification of justification norms in the light of these results appears to be ad hoc. Hence, I claim, we should reject justification norms of action and practical deliberation.
    Epistemic NormsEpistemic Normativity, Misc
  •  1083
    On Having Evidence: A Reply to Neta
    Logos and Episteme 6 (3). 2015.
    According to one line of thought only propositions can be part of one’s evidence, since only propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence. Ram Neta has challenged this argument. In this paper I respond to Neta’s challenge.
    Evidence and KnowledgeEvidence, Misc
  •  952
    Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K
    Theoria 83 (2): 120-137. 2016.
    In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.
    Evidence and Knowledge