-
1133Save the children!Analysis 76 (4): 418-422. 2016.In a recent publication Travis Timmerman has claimed that sometimes it is morally permissible to not prevent something bad from happening, even if it is in one’s power to do so without sacrificing anything nearly as important.1 To defend his point, he has proposed a thought experiment and based his claims on putative common-sense morality intuitions. To aid in the subsequent discussion, Timmerman’s case is reproduced as follows.
-
1116Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge.Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3): 302-307. 2016.According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more gene…Read more
-
553Knowledge, Practice, and MeritDiscipline Filosofiche 22 (2): 133-152. 2012.In this paper I discuss the role that knowledge plays with regard to rational action. It has been recently argued that knowledge determines appropriate action. I examine this proposal, consider objections against it, and finally propose a defense of it.
-
785The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of ActionActa Analytica 29 (4): 457-468. 2014.In this paper, I argue against recent versions of justification norms of action and practical deliberation . I demonstrate that these norms yield unacceptable results in deception cases. However, a further modification of justification norms in the light of these results appears to be ad hoc. Hence, I claim, we should reject justification norms of action and practical deliberation.
-
1094On Having Evidence: A Reply to NetaLogos and Episteme 6 (3). 2015.According to one line of thought only propositions can be part of one’s evidence, since only propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence. Ram Neta has challenged this argument. In this paper I respond to Neta’s challenge.
-
966Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=KTheoria 83 (2): 120-137. 2016.In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.
-
Université LavalAssistant Professor
APA Eastern Division
Quebec City, Quebec, Canada
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Meta-Ethics |