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M.m.s.k. Sie

Erasmus University Rotterdam
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  •  Publications
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 More details
  • Erasmus University Rotterdam
    Erasmus School of Philosophy
    Other faculty (Postdoc, Visiting, etc)
Utrecht University
Department for Philosophy and Religious Studies
PhD, 1999
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action
Meta-Ethics
Philosophy, Misc
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action
Meta-Ethics
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy, Misc
  • All publications (35)
  •  46
    Freedom and Blameworthiness
    In A. Van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 113--128. 2000.
    Free Will and Responsibility
  •  84
    Discussion with Harry Frankfurt - Responsibility in Autonomy Undermining Circumstances
    Ethical Perspectives 5 (1): 30-35. 1998.
    In 1969 Prof. Frankfurt has introduced a famous class of counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The principle that states that a person x is only responsible for an action y, if she could have done otherwise than y. In these examples a so called ‘counterfactual intervener’ figures that pre-empts all alternate possibilities counterfactually, that is, without actually intervening. Because this counterfactual intervener only looms passively in the background, x’s moral respons…Read more
    In 1969 Prof. Frankfurt has introduced a famous class of counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The principle that states that a person x is only responsible for an action y, if she could have done otherwise than y. In these examples a so called ‘counterfactual intervener’ figures that pre-empts all alternate possibilities counterfactually, that is, without actually intervening. Because this counterfactual intervener only looms passively in the background, x’s moral responsibility for y is not affected, whereas at the same time — by stipulation — x couldn’t have done otherwise than y. Hence, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities must be false.
    Value TheoryAlternative Possibilities
  •  76
    De realiteit van morele verantwoordelijkheid: waar Sartre en Frankfurt het over eens zijn
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 105 (4): 228-231. 2013.
    Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.
  •  48
    Contentsintroductionmorality in times of naturalising the mind – an overviewpart I: Free will, responsibility and the naturalised mind1. Naturalizing free will – empirical and conceptual issues2. Libet’s experiments and the possibility of free conscious decision3. The effectiveness of intentions – a critique of wegnerpart II: Naturalising ethics? – Metaethical perspectives4. Neuroethics and the rationalism/sentimentalism divide5. Experimental ethics – a critical analysispart III: Naturalised ethics? Empirical perspectives6. Moral soulfulness & moral hypocrisy – is scientific study of moral agency relevant to ethical reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – which values?7. The rationale behind surgery –truth, facts, valuesbiographical notes on the authorsname index (review)
    In Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind, De Gruyter. pp. 165-192. 2014.
    Free Will and Neuroscience
  • Deliberatief bewustzijn, bewuste controle en moreel actorschap
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 101 (2): 128-134. 2009.
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