Alfonso Gómez

: This response to Nikolaus Knoepffler's paper in the same issue of the Journal agrees that if the arguments supporting the first two of the eight human embryonic stem cell research policy options discussed are unsound, as Knoepffler argues, then it seems natural to move to the increasingly permissive options. If the arguments are sound, however, then the more permissive options should be rejected. It is argued that three of the rejected arguments, taken together, constitute very good reasons to hold that a human embryo is endowed with dignity from fertilization onward. Thus, countries that want their public policies to match the moral imperative of respect for human beings should refrain from allowing destructive human embryo research and should devote considerable energy and public funds to research and clinical trials using non-embryonic ("adult") stem cells.

Self-interest theories hold that rationality requires one always to choose what is best for oneself. Where these theories differ is in their accounts of what is best for one. Hedonism is a typical self-interest theory, distinguished from other versions by the claim that what is best for one is what gives one the greatest net balance of pleasure over pain. Gómez-Lobo thinks that Socrates is a self-interest theorist: Socrates believes that “a choice is rational if and only if it is a choice of what is best for the agent”. Gómez-Lobo also thinks that Socrates holds that “something is good for an agent if and only if it is morally right” ; this distinguishes his theory from hedonism and other self-interest theories. Finally, Gómez-Lobo thinks that Plato defends Socrates’ in arguing at Gorgias 506c5-507a3 that “a being is good if and only if it has the order proper to it”: follows from and other Socratic principles. These three claims constitute the “foundations” of Socratic ethics mentioned in Gómez-Lobo’s title.

El trabajo constituye una aproximación conceptual y metodológica para el análisis de la integridad ecológica, como instrumento aplicable a la planificación del territorio y la conservación de la naturaleza a escala de paisaje. Con dicho fin se discuten las acepciones de integridad y conceptos próximos y se presenta un modelo de evaluación que considera la integridad del paisaje como resultado de la interacción de tres índices. El primero (integridad espacial) utiliza métricas de la ecología del paisaje (conectividad y cobertura de áreas naturales y áreas de uso humano) y evalúa la distribución de los fragmentos de los distintos tipos de ecosistemas existentes en el territorio. El segundo, un índice de integridad ecosistémica, se centra en los fragmentos con estructura más próxima a la madurez y valora su distancia numérica a ecosistemas de referencia. Por último, en el área sometida a usos agrícolas, se aplica un índice de coherencia ecológica de los usos del suelo que tiene en los elementos naturales con funciones de conservación. Estos índices son articulados mediante un modelo que facilita una visión simultánea de sus valores, así como su comparación con escenarios teóricos. El modelo permite manejar de forma simultánea variables relevantes que comúnmente se presentan como asociadas a aspectos diferentes de la calidad del entorno. Por sus características y escala intermedia de aplicación puede constituir una herramienta importante para enlazar conceptos y actuaciones, relevantes para la conservación de la naturaleza, pero que suelen manejarse por separado, en concreto la integridad ecosistémica y con la planificación del territorio.

Respect for human embryos is often defended on the basis of the potentiality argument: embryos deserve respect because they already possess potentially the features that in adults are fully actualized. Opponents of this argument challenge it by claiming that if embryos should be respected because they are potentially adults, then gametes should be respected because they are potentially embryos. This article rejects this reductio ad absurdum argument by showing that there are two different types of potentiality involved so that the transitivity of potentiality does not hold up in this case. Respect for embryos does not logically entail respect for gametes.