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Cheryl (C.E.) Abbate

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    35
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    1
  •  Events
    4
  •  News and Updates
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  •  Teaching Materials
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 More details
  • University of Nevada, Las Vegas
    Department of Philosophy
    Assistant Professor
University of Colorado, Boulder
PhD, 2019
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Areas of Specialization
Animal Ethics
Animal Cruelty
Animal Rights
Animal Well-Being
Speciesism
Vegetarianism
Animal Experimentation
Animal Captivity
Domestic Animals
Moral Status of Animals
5 more
Areas of Interest
Animal Ethics
Animal Cruelty
Animal Rights
Animal Well-Being
Speciesism
Vegetarianism
Animal Experimentation
Animal Captivity
Domestic Animals
Moral Status of Animals
5 more
  • All publications (35)
  •  260
    Valuing animals as they are—Whether they feel it or not
    European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3): 770-788. 2020.
    Dressing up animals in ridiculous costumes, shaming dogs on the internet, playing Big Buck Hunter at the local tavern, feeding vegan food to cats, and producing and consuming “knockout” animals, what, if anything, do these acts have in common? In this article, I develop two respect-based arguments that explain how these acts are morally problematic, even though they might not always, if ever, affect the experiential welfare of animals. While these acts are not ordinary wrongs, they are animal di…Read more
    Dressing up animals in ridiculous costumes, shaming dogs on the internet, playing Big Buck Hunter at the local tavern, feeding vegan food to cats, and producing and consuming “knockout” animals, what, if anything, do these acts have in common? In this article, I develop two respect-based arguments that explain how these acts are morally problematic, even though they might not always, if ever, affect the experiential welfare of animals. While these acts are not ordinary wrongs, they are animal dignitary wrongs.
    Animal CaptivityAnimal Ethics, MiscAnimal RightsAnimal Well-BeingVegetarianism
  •  1437
    Veganism, (Almost) Harm-Free Animal Flesh, and Nonmaleficence: Navigating Dietary Ethics in an Unjust World
    In Bob Fischer (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Animal Ethics, Routledge. 2019.
    This chapter is written for an audience that is not intimately familiar with the philosophy of animal consumption. It provides an overview of the harms that animals, the environment, and humans endure as a result of industrial animal agriculture, and it concludes with a defense of ostroveganism and a tentative defense of cultured meat.
    SpeciesismApplied Ethics, MiscellaneousDomestic AnimalsVegetarianismAnimal Well-BeingSocial EthicsAn…Read more
    SpeciesismApplied Ethics, MiscellaneousDomestic AnimalsVegetarianismAnimal Well-BeingSocial EthicsAnimal Ethics, MiscPolitical EthicsAnimal RightsTopics in Environmental Ethics
  •  2300
    A Defense of Free-Roaming Cats from a Hedonist Account of Feline Well-being
    Acta Analytica 35 (3): 439-461. 2020.
    There is a widespread belief that for their own safety and for the protection of wildlife, cats should be permanently kept indoors. Against this view, I argue that cat guardians have a duty to provide their feline companions with outdoor access. The argument is based on a sophisticated hedonistic account of animal well-being that acknowledges that the performance of species-normal ethological behavior is especially pleasurable. Territorial behavior, which requires outdoor access, is a feline-nor…Read more
    There is a widespread belief that for their own safety and for the protection of wildlife, cats should be permanently kept indoors. Against this view, I argue that cat guardians have a duty to provide their feline companions with outdoor access. The argument is based on a sophisticated hedonistic account of animal well-being that acknowledges that the performance of species-normal ethological behavior is especially pleasurable. Territorial behavior, which requires outdoor access, is a feline-normal ethological behavior, so when a cat is permanently confined to the indoors, her ability to flourish is impaired. Since cat guardians have a duty not to impair the well-being of their cats, the impairment of cat flourishing via confinement signifies a moral failing. Although some cats assume significant risks and sometimes kill wild animals when roaming outdoors, these important considerations do not imply that all cats should be deprived of the opportunity to access the outdoors. Indeed, they do not, by themselves, imply that any cat should be permanently kept indoors.
    Hedonist Accounts of Well-BeingAnimal Well-BeingAnimal CrueltyDomestic AnimalsAnimal Ethics, MiscHyb…Read more
    Hedonist Accounts of Well-BeingAnimal Well-BeingAnimal CrueltyDomestic AnimalsAnimal Ethics, MiscHybrid Accounts of Well-BeingApplied Ethics, MiscellaneousAnimal RightsEnvironmental Ethics, MiscAnimal CaptivityThe Concept of Well-BeingPhilosophy of Biology, MiscellaneousEvolutionary BiologyEcology and Conservation Biology
  •  1663
    Don’t Demean “Invasives”: Conservation and Wrongful Species Discrimination
    with Bob Fischer
    Animals 871 (9). 2019.
    It is common for conservationists to refer to non-native species that have undesirable impacts on humans as “invasive”. We argue that the classification of any species as “invasive” constitutes wrongful discrimination. Moreover, we argue that its being wrong to categorize a species as invasive is perfectly compatible with it being morally permissible to kill animals—assuming that conservationists “kill equally”. It simply is not compatible with the double standard that conservationists tend to e…Read more
    It is common for conservationists to refer to non-native species that have undesirable impacts on humans as “invasive”. We argue that the classification of any species as “invasive” constitutes wrongful discrimination. Moreover, we argue that its being wrong to categorize a species as invasive is perfectly compatible with it being morally permissible to kill animals—assuming that conservationists “kill equally”. It simply is not compatible with the double standard that conservationists tend to employ in their decisions about who lives and who dies.
    Topics in Environmental EthicsEnvironmental Ethics, MiscConservation EthicsEcosystemsBiodiversityEco…Read more
    Topics in Environmental EthicsEnvironmental Ethics, MiscConservation EthicsEcosystemsBiodiversityEcology and Conservation Biology, MiscAnimal EthicsEnvironmental ValueRights Against DiscriminationDiscrimination, Misc
  •  97
    On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman
    Philosophia 48 (4): 1355-1362. 2020.
    Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered
    Value TheoryKnowledge
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