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76Why God is Not a Consequentialist: T. D. J. CHAPPELLReligious Studies 29 (2): 239-243. 1993.Can there be a moral philosophy which combines Christianity and consequentialism? John Stuart Mill himself claimed that these positions were, at the least, not mutually exclusive, and quite possibly even congenial to one another; and some recent work by Christian philosophers in America has resurrected this claim. But there is a simple argument to show that consequentialism and orthodox Christianity are not so much as jointly assertible
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396Ethics Beyond Moral TheoryPhilosophical Investigations 32 (3): 206-243. 2009.I develop an anti-theory view of ethics. Moral theory (Kantian, utilitarian, virtue ethical, etc.) is the dominant approach to ethics among academic philosophers. But moral theory's hunt for a single Master Factor (utility, universalisability, virtue . . .) is implausibly systematising and reductionist. Perhaps scientism drives the approach? But good science always insists on respect for the data, even messy data: I criticise Singer's remarks on infanticide as a clear instance of moral theory fa…Read more
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90I compare the two main readings of the argument against Protagorean relativism that 'Socrates' presents at Theaetetus 170-171, argue against both of them, and present a third alternative reading
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66Philosophy as a humanistic discipline – by Bernard Williamsthe sense of the past – by Bernard WilliamsPhilosophical Investigations 32 (4): 360-371. 2009.The article reviews two books by Bernard Williams including "Philosophy As a Humanistic Discipline" and "The Sense of the Past."
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268Knowledge of PersonsEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (4): 3--28. 2013.What is knowledge of persons, and what is knowing persons like? my answer combines Wittgenstein’s epistemology with levinas’s phenomenology. It says that our knowledge of persons is a hinge proposition for us. And it says that what this knowledge consists in is the experience that levinas calls ”the face to face’: direct and unmediated encounter between persons. As levinas says, for there to be persons at all there has, first, to be a relationship, language, and this same encounter: ”the face to…Read more
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3847Varieties of Knowledge in Plato and AristotleTopoi 31 (2): 175-190. 2012.I develop the relatively familiar idea of a variety of forms of knowledge —not just propositional knowledge but also knowledge -how and experiential knowledge —and show how this variety can be used to make interesting sense of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy, and in particular their ethics. I then add to this threefold analysis of knowledge a less familiar fourth variety, objectual knowledge, and suggest that this is also interesting and important in the understanding of Plato and Aristotle
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26DominionRatio 16 (3). 2003.I distinguish two claims about human ‘dominion’ over nature: (1) Humans have the right to supervise, manage, and direct the rest of nature; (2) Humans have a special value, superior to the rest of nature. I discuss some ways of rejecting either or both claims, and point to some surprising consequences of such rejections. Then I compare the ways in which Aristotelianism and sentientism might try to keep hold of both claims. This produces two surprising and unwelcome results for sentientism, and o…Read more
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11Human Values: New Essays on Ethics and Natural Law. 1st Edition (edited book)Palgrave-Macmillan. 2004.In recent decades, the revival of natural law theory in modern moral philosophy has been an exciting and important development. Human Values brings together an international group of moral philosophers who in various respects share the aims and ideals of natural law ethics. In their diverse ways, these authors make distinctive and original contributions to the continuing project of developing natural law ethics as a comprehensive treatment of modern ethical theory and practice.
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347Integrity and DemandingnessEthical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3): 255-265. 2007.I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objec…Read more
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16Philosophy of the EnvironmentEdinburgh University Press. 2020.Environmental concerns and the complex issues and dilemmas raised by animal rights pose fundamental questions for philosophers. The essays in this welcome collection put environmental thinking into the broader context of philosophical thought. Distinguished contributions from key thinkers, including Mary Midgley, Stephen Clark, J.Baird Callicott, Holmes Rolston, Dale Jamieson and John Haldane, focus on our attitudes to animals and the environment as critically determined by deeper philosophical …Read more
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518Ethical blind-spots: Why socrates was not a cosmopolitanRatio 23 (1): 17-33. 2010.Though Socrates can easily look like a cosmopolitan in moral and political theory, a closer reading of the relevant texts shows that, in the most important sense of the term as we now use it, he turns out – disappointingly, perhaps – not to be. The reasons why not are instructive and important, both for readers of Plato and for political theorists; they have to do with the phenomenon that I shall call ethical blind-spots.
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5EthicsPhilosophical Quarterly 50 (200): 410-412. 1997.In this engaged and engaging survey Piers Benn examines the major currents of ethical theory, concentrating on sound reasoning about morality. Benn's account offers a qualified defence of Aristotelian virtue theory, while bringing out what is distinctive and valuable in a broad range of approaches, such as those of Kant and the Utilitarians. His examples emphasize the ordinary choices of everyday life - gossip, friendship, honesty, sexual relations, work, and self-realization
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108Plato on knowledge in the theaetetusStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article
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66Knowing What to Do: Imagination, Virtue, and Platonism in EthicsOxford University Press. 2013.Timothy Chappell develops a picture of what philosophical ethics can be like, once set aside from conventional moral theory. His question is 'How are we to know what to do?', and the answer he defends is 'By developing our moral imaginations'--a key part of human excellence, which plays many roles in our practical and evaluative lives
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17Why Ethics is HardJournal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4). 2013.I argue that one central resource for ethical thinking, seriously under-explored in contemporary anglophone philosophy, is moral phenomenology, the exploration of the texture and quality of moral experience. Perhaps a barrier that has prevented people from using this resource is that it’s hard to talk about experience. But such knowledge can be communicated, e.g. by poetry and drama. In having such experiences, either in real life or at second-hand through art, we can gain moral knowledge, rathe…Read more
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523Theism in Historical PerspectiveEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1). 2011.I will discuss some familiar problems in the philosophy of religion which arise for theistic belief. I will argue that it may be most worthwhile to focus on a particular sort of theistic belief, capital-T ’Theism’, central to which is a particular conception both of God and of the believer’s relation to God. At the heart of ’Theism’ in this sense is the continuing experience of God, both individual and collective. Compared with the evidence for Theistic belief that is provided by this experienti…Read more
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64Does Protagoras refute himself?Classical Quarterly 45 (02): 333-. 1995.Protagoras believes that all beliefs are true. Since Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true is itself a belief, it follows from Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true that Protagoras' belief is true. But what about the belief that Protagoras' belief is false? Doesn't it follow, by parallel reasoning and not at all trivially, that if all beliefs are true and there is a belief that Protagoras' belief is false, then Protagoras' belief is false?
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19Being Good: An Introduction to EthicsInternational Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2): 262-265. 2002.
Areas of Interest
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Normative Ethics |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
Applied Ethics |