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Sophie Grace Chappell

Open University (UK)
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  •  Publications
    136
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 More details
  • Open University (UK)
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Homepage
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Religion
Applied Ethics
1 more
  • All publications (136)
  •  75
    Finite and Infinite Goods (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 19 (3): 373-378. 2002.
    Philosophy of Religion
  •  165
    Book Reviews : The Question of Christian Ethics by Ralph McInerny. Washington: Catholic University of America Press (London: Eurospan). 1993. 74pp. pb. 9.95 (review)
    Studies in Christian Ethics 8 (1): 128-131. 1995.
    Christianity
  •  65
    Critical study
    International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (1): 65-75. 2008.
    Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Miscellaneous
  •  61
    The Philosophy of the Environment
    with Sophie Grace Chappell
    Edinburgh University Press. 2020.
    The essays in this welcome collection put environmental thinking into the broader context of philosophical thought.
    Ethics
  •  54
    Aristotle and Augustine on freedom: two theories of freedom, voluntary action, and akrasia
    St. Martin's Press. 1995.
    AugustineTheories of FreedomAristotle: Voluntary and Involuntary
  •  144
    Reading the peritropê: Theaetetus 170c-171c
    I compare the two main readings of the argument against Protagorean relativism that 'Socrates' presents at Theaetetus 170-171, argue against both of them, and present a third alternative reading.
    Plato: Theaetetus
  •  46
    Plato
    An outline and discussion of Plato's changing views about the theory of knowledge.
    Classical Greek Philosophy
  •  432
    Integrity and Demandingness
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3): 255-265. 2007.
    I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objec…Read more
    I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’.
    Autonomy, MiscDemandingness of ConsequentialismIntegrityAnti-TheoryBernard Williams
  •  1100
    Ethical blind-spots: Why socrates was not a cosmopolitan
    Ratio 23 (1): 17-33. 2010.
    Though Socrates can easily look like a cosmopolitan in moral and political theory, a closer reading of the relevant texts shows that, in the most important sense of the term as we now use it, he turns out – disappointingly, perhaps – not to be. The reasons why not are instructive and important, both for readers of Plato and for political theorists; they have to do with the phenomenon that I shall call ethical blind-spots.
    Socrates
  •  49
    Why Ethics is Hard
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4). 2013.
    I argue that one central resource for ethical thinking, seriously under-explored in contemporary anglophone philosophy, is moral phenomenology, the exploration of the texture and quality of moral experience. Perhaps a barrier that has prevented people from using this resource is that it’s hard to talk about experience. But such knowledge can be communicated, e.g. by poetry and drama. In having such experiences, either in real life or at second-hand through art, we can gain moral knowledge, rathe…Read more
    I argue that one central resource for ethical thinking, seriously under-explored in contemporary anglophone philosophy, is moral phenomenology, the exploration of the texture and quality of moral experience. Perhaps a barrier that has prevented people from using this resource is that it’s hard to talk about experience. But such knowledge can be communicated, e.g. by poetry and drama. In having such experiences, either in real life or at second-hand through art, we can gain moral knowledge, rather as Mary the colour scientist can gain knowledge of colours; such knowledge is a real cognitive gain, but it is not knowledge of the propositional kind that philosophers have usually focused on.
    Value Theory
  •  5
    Brill Online Books and Journals
    with Robert Wardy, Robert Heinaman, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Richard Gaskin, Richard J. Ketchum, Justin Gosling, Bob Sharples, and M. R. Wright
    Phronesis 38 (1). 1993.
    Classical Greek PhilosophyAncient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Misc
  •  26
    Theism, History and Experience
    Philosophy Now 99 13-16. 2013.
  •  212
    Reading Plato’s Theaetetus
    Hackett Pub. Co.. 2004.
    Timothy Chappell’s new translation of the Theaetetus is presented here in short sections of text, each preceded by a summary of the argument and followed by his philosophical commentary on it. Introductory remarks discuss Plato and his works, his use of dialogue, the structure of the Theaetetus, and alternative interpretations of the work as a whole. A glossary and bibliography are provided.
    Plato: Theaetetus
  •  1314
    Moral perception
    Philosophy 83 (4): 421-437. 2008.
    I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and ‘queerness’. I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn and J.L. Mackie. The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains.
    Moral SupervenienceMoral IntuitionismMoral PerceptionPratical Reason, Misc
  •  75
    Festschrift Long - (A.) Nightingale, (D.) Sedley (edd.) Ancient Models of Mind. Studies in Human and Divine Rationality. Pp. x + 250. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Cased, £55, US$95. ISBN: 978-0-521-11355-7 (review)
    The Classical Review 62 (1): 66-69. 2012.
    Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Miscellaneous
  •  94
    Reason, Passion, and Action: The Third Condition of the Voluntary
    Philosophy 70 (273). 1995.
    1. ‘Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office, but to serve and obey them.’ 2.3.3) Unfortunately, Hume uses ‘reason’ to mean ‘discovery of truth or falsehood‘ as well as discovery of logical relations. So suppose we avoid, as Hume I think does not, prejudging the question of how many ingredients are requisite for action, by separating these two claims out: A. Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. B. Reason ) is and ought only…Read more
    1. ‘Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office, but to serve and obey them.’ 2.3.3) Unfortunately, Hume uses ‘reason’ to mean ‘discovery of truth or falsehood‘ as well as discovery of logical relations. So suppose we avoid, as Hume I think does not, prejudging the question of how many ingredients are requisite for action, by separating these two claims out: A. Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. B. Reason ) is and ought only to be the slave of the passions
    Hume: Value TheoryHume: Philosophy of Mind
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