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2972Euthyphro’s "Dilemma", Socrates’ Daimonion and Plato’s GodEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1). 2010.In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a "Euthyphro dilemma". By looking at what Plato’s ’Euthyphro’ actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Plato’s intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then explore the place of divine commands and inspiration in Plato’s thought more generally, arguing that Plato sees an important epistemic and practical role for both.
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541Two distinctions that do make a difference: The action/omission distinction and the principle of double effectPhilosophy 77 (2): 211-233. 2002.The paper outlines and explores a possible strategy for defending both the action/omission distinction (AOD) and the principle of double effect (PDE). The strategy is to argue that there are degrees of actionhood, and that we are in general less responsible for what has a lower degree of actionhood, because of that lower degree. Moreover, what we omit generally has a lower degree of actionhood than what we actively do, and what we do under known-but-not-intended descriptions generally has a lowe…Read more
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150Russell, Daniel C. Happiness for Humans.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 228. $65.00Ethics 124 (4): 916-922. 2014.
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22Why God Is Not a ConsequentialistReligious Studies 29 (2). 1993.Can there be a moral philosophy which combines Christianity and consequentialism? John Stuart Mill himself claimed that these positions were, at the least, not mutually exclusive, and quite possibly even congenial to one another; and some recent work by Christian philosophers in America has resurrected this claim. But there is a simple argument to show that consequentialism and orthodox Christianity are not so much as jointly assertible
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141Glory as an Ethical IdeaPhilosophical Investigations 34 (2): 105-134. 2011.There is a gap between what we think and what we think we think about ethics. This gap appears when elements of our ethical reflection and our moral theories contradict each other. It also appears when something that is important in our ethical reflection is sidelined in our moral theories. The gap appears in both ways with the ethical idea glory. The present exploration of this idea is a case study of how far actual ethical reflection diverges from moral theory. This divergence tells against mo…Read more
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82The incompleat projectivist: How to be an objectivist and an attitudinistPhilosophical Quarterly 48 (190): 50-66. 1998.What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical ratio…Read more
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Reading the o: Theaetetus 170c-171cPhronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 51 (2): 109-139. 2006.
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11An outline and discussion of Plato's changing views about the theory of knowledge
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23Reason, Passion, and Action: The Third Condition of the VoluntaryPhilosophy 70 (273). 1995.1. ‘Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office, but to serve and obey them.’ 2.3.3) Unfortunately, Hume uses ‘reason’ to mean ‘discovery of truth or falsehood‘ as well as discovery of logical relations. So suppose we avoid, as Hume I think does not, prejudging the question of how many ingredients are requisite for action, by separating these two claims out: A. Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. B. Reason ) is and ought only…Read more
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102Jonathan Kvanvig: The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (review)Faith and Philosophy 24 (4): 475-479. 2007.
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1The variety of life and the unity of practical wisdomIn Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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49Eudaimonia, Happiness, and the Redemption of UnhappinessPhilosophical Topics 41 (1): 27-52. 2013.In this paper I argue for five theses. The first thesis is that ethicists should think about happiness and unhappiness together, with as much detail and particularity as possible. Thinking about unhappiness will help us get clear about happiness, and distinguish the different things that come under that name. The second is that happiness and unhappiness can both be important positively valuable features of a worthwhile life. The third thesis is that Modern Eudaimonism, the claim that every reaso…Read more
Areas of Interest
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Normative Ethics |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
Applied Ethics |