Gabriel Rockhill

The primary objective of this book is to open space for rethinking the relationship between art and politics. It seeks to combat one of the fundamental assumptions that has plagued many of the previous debates on this issue: that art and politics are distinct entities definable in terms of common properties, and that they have privileged points of intersection, which can be determined once and for all in terms of an established formula. This common sense assumption is rooted in a transcendent illusion according to which there are more or less fixed characteristics that unify our terms, concepts, and practices in such a way as to guarantee their meaning. Against this substantialist approach, Radical History & the Politics of Art argues for a praxeological account that begins the other way around by analyzing specific cultural practices without presupposing a conceptual unity behind them. Such an orientation is radically historicist in the sense that it recognizes that all of our practices—be they linguistic, theoretical, aesthetic or political—are historically constituted and that they are necessarily part of a temporal dynamic. Hence the contingent nature of the labels used to classify various practices or even identify ‘practice’ as such. Radical history thereby proposes a significant departure from the extant debates on art and politics by maintaining that there is no ‘art’ or ‘politics’ in general, nor a singular relation between them. There are only historically constituted practices in various conjunctures, some of which have been labeled, through practical acts of denomination, as ‘artistic’ or ‘political.’ Instead of proposing one more response to the oft-repeated question ‘what is the relationship between Art and Politics?’ this book seeks to overcome the presuppositions that plague such a question. It thereby changes the very nature of the investigation by asking: ‘how do the diverse aspects of practices identified as ‘aesthetic’ and ‘political’ overlap, intertwine and sometimes merge in precise socio-historical force fields of action?

This paper explores Michel Foucault’s contribution to rethinking the nature of the present through his examination of the ontology of contemporary reality he locates in Immanuel Kant’s “What Is Enlightenment?” By raising a series of critical questions concerning the epochal thinking that plagues Foucault’s various engagements with this text, the article goes on to argue that the attempt to find a single concept—or question—that appropriately summarizes a given era is an endeavor fraught with methodological problems. Highlighting the limitations of Foucault’s approach in spite of his attempt to rethink modernity as an attitude, the paper concludes by advocating an alternative logic of history that definitively abandons epochal thinking in favor of a topological mapping of historical force fields in which it is recognized that there is no being behind time

"The standard historical image of Jean-Luc Godard is that of a resolute iconoclast breaking with the representational norms and codes of classical cinema in the name of liberating film from the deadening weight of its past. His numerous formal innovations—syncopated montage, unconventional framing, unique experiments with dialogue, etc.—along with his abandonment of traditional narrative and character development, his playful pastiche of genres, his debunking of the representational illusions of cinematic realism, his reflexive preoccupation with film itself and the general dissolution of the distinction between high and low art have created a potent new form of cinema that continues to have far-reaching effects. More experimental than Truffaut, more temerarious than Chabrol, but less fastidious than Resnais, less obtuse and prolix than Rivette, Godard is seen as the bumptious enfant terrible of the Cahiers du cinéma who set the agenda for a new era of modernist filmmaking..."

This article explores the force and limitations of Jacques Rancière’s novel attempt to rethink the relationship between aesthetics and politics. In particular, it unravels the paradoxical threads of the fundamental contradiction between two of his steadfast claims: (1) art and politics are consubstantial, and (2) art and politics never truly merge. In taking Rancière to task on this point, the primary objective of this article is to work through the nuances of his project andforeground the problems inherent therein in order to break with the “talisman complex” and the “ontological illusion” of the politics of aesthetics in the name of a new understanding of the social politicity of artistic practices.

L’objectif principal de cet article est de mettre en évidence l’axiologie métaphilosophique et la logique normative binaire – la valorisation de la différence par rapport à l’identité – qui a dominé « la philosophie de la différence » en France, et qui a trouvé un terrain d’accueil relativement favorable dans « la politique de la différence » en Amérique du Nord. En détaillant une série d’opérations conceptuelles liées à cette axiologie fondamentale, il s’agira de remettre en question la sacralisation de la différence en nous interrogeant notamment sur ses conséquences politiques.

In this interview, Cornelius Castoriadis explains and develops many of the central themes in his later writings on politics and social criticism. In particular, he poignantly articulates his critique of contemporary pseudo-democracy, while advocating a form of democracy founded on collective education and self-government. He also explores how the “insignificance” in the current political arena relates to insignificance in other areas, such as the arts and philosophy, to form the core feature of our Zeitgeist. Finally, he seeks to break through the ideological fog of liberalism and privatization in order to voice a radical appeal for an autonomous, self-limiting society.

Philosopher, c’est, pense-t-on, faire de l’histoire de la philosophie ; c’est lire et interpréter les textes canoniques des grands penseurs de la tradition européenne en suivant l’enchaînement des idées depuis les Grecs anciens. Cette manière de pratiquer la philosophie est devenue tellement naturelle qu’elle en a oublié sa propre historicité. D’où la nécessité de la mettre en évidence en examinant de près ses multiples conséquences. C’est justement un des objectifs de l’analytique des pratiques philosophiques entreprise dans le présent ouvrage. Ce livre propose en même temps une logique historique et herméneutique alternative s’inscrivant en faux contre la philosophie contemporaine, notamment dans ses diverses tentatives de « rupture », plus ou moins superficielles sur le plan pratique. Dans un dialogue avec les sciences humaines et sociales, il reprend à nouveaux frais et d’un tout autre point de vue les trois moments privilégiés de notre histoire de « la » philosophie (le commencement, le tournant moderne, le moment présent). Ne visant pourtant pas à entériner la réduction de la philosophie à une pratique historique et herméneutique, il s’agit avant tout de mettre en lumière la contingence d’une telle détermination afin de déplacer les marges de manœuvre imposées aux penseurs d’aujourd’hui et faire de la place à d’autres pratiques théoriques (qu’elles soient historiques et herméneutiques ou non). Le résultat, c’est une investigation méthodologique dont les enjeux et les conséquences dépassent de loin les limites de la philosophie dans son acceptation traditionnelle. Approximate English Translation: Philosophy, we tend to think, amounts to doing the history of philosophy, to reading and interpreting the canonical texts of the great thinkers of the European tradition, following the sequence of ideas since the ancient Greeks. This way of practicing philosophy has become so natural—at least within the ‘continental’ tradition—that it has forgotten its own historicity. It is for this reason that it is necessary to bring it to light by examining its multiple consequences. This is precisely one of the objectives of the analytic of philosophic practices undertaken in the present work. This book proposes, at the same time, an alternative historical and hermeneutic logic that critically distances itself from contemporary philosophy, particularly in its diverse attempts to propose a “rupture,” which remain more or less superficial at a practical level. In dialogue with the social and human sciences, it reassesses, from an entirely different point of view, the three privileged moments of our supposed history of philosophy (the beginning, the modern turn, the present moment). It does not aim, however, at endorsing the reduction of philosophy to a historical and hermeneutic practice. It is above all a matter of bringing to light the contingency of such a determination in order to displace the margins of maneuverability imposed on thinkers today and to make room for other theoretical practices (if they be historical and hermeneutic or not). The result is a methodological investigation whose stakes and consequences far surpass the limits of philosophy as it is traditionally understood.