-
103Contextualism about 'might' and says-that ascriptionsPhilosophical Studies 164 (2): 485-511. 2013.Contextualism about ‘might’ says that the property that ‘might’ expresses varies from context to context. I argue against contextualism. I focus on problems that contextualism apparently has with attitude ascriptions in which ‘might’ appears in an embedded ‘that’-clause. I argue that contextualists can deal rather easily with many of these problems, but I also argue that serious difficulties remain with collective and quantified says-that ascriptions. Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne atempt to…Read more
-
44Extension, Intension, Character, and beyondIn Gillian Russell Delia Graff Fara (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, Routledge. pp. 9. 2012.This article explains some of the technical terms used in semantic theory and philosophy of language.
-
205IndexicalsIn Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Metaphysics Research Lab. 2014.Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose reference shifts from context to context: some paradigm examples are ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘today’,‘he’, ‘she’, and ‘that’. Two speakers who utter a single sentence that contains an indexical may say different things. For instance, Fred and Wilma say different things when they utter the sentence ‘I am female’. Many philosophers (following David Kaplan 1989a) hold that indexicals have two sorts of meaning. The first sort of meaning is often called ‘charac…Read more
-
125An invariantist theory of 'might' might be rightLinguistics and Philosophy 35 (6): 461-489. 2012.Invariantism about ‘might’ says that ‘might’ semantically expresses the same modal property in every context. This paper presents and defends a version of invariantism. According to it, ‘might’ semantically expresses the same weak modal property in every context. However, speakers who utter sentences containing ‘might’ typically assert propositions concerning stronger types of modality, including epistemic modality. This theory can explain the phenomena that motivate contextualist theories of ep…Read more
-
250Vague, So UntrueNoûs 41 (2). 2007.According to an old and attractive view, vagueness must be eliminated before semantic notions — truth, implication, and so on — may be applied. This view was accepted by Frege, but is rarely defended nowadays.1 This..
-
101Kripke’s RevengePhilosophical Studies 128 (3): 669-682. 2006.Kripke's objections to descriptivism may be modified to apply to Scott Soames's pragmatic account from his book Beyond Rigidity. Further, intuitions about argument-validity threaten any theory in the vicinity of Soames's.
-
141Structured characters and complex demonstrativesPhilosophical Studies 74 (2): 193--219. 1994.A structured character is a semantic value of a certain sort. Like the more familiar Kaplanian characters, structured characters determine the contents of expressions in contexts. But unlike Kaplanian characters, structured characters also have constituent structures. The semantic theories with which most of us are acquainted do not mention structured characters. But I argue in this paper that these familiar semantic theories fail to make obvious distinctions in meaning---distinctions that can b…Read more
-
326Understanding belief reportsPhilosophical Review 107 (4): 555-595. 1998.In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is Russellianism, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concernssubstitution of co-referring names in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context).…Read more
-
475Empty namesNoûs 27 (4): 449-469. 1993.This paper presents a theory of empty names that is consistent with direct-reference theory and Millianism.
-
64Persisting problems for a quantificational theory of complex demonstrativesPhilosophical Studies 141 (2): 243-262. 2008.I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.” King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
-
747Empty names, fictional names, mythical namesNoûs 39 (4). 2005.John Stuart Mill (1843) thought that proper names denote individuals and do not connote attributes. Contemporary Millians agree, in spirit. We hold that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its referent. We also think that the semantic content of a declarative sentence is a Russellian structured proposition whose constituents are the semantic contents of the sentence’s constituents. This proposition is what the sentence semantically expresses. Therefore, we think that sentences contai…Read more
-
133Russellianism and predictionPhilosophical Studies 105 (1). 2001.Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavi…Read more
-
155Illogical, but rationalNoûs 40 (2). 2006.Stephen Schiffer says that Nathan Salmon and I are committed to the special-case consequence. He also says that it is possible for - to be true
-
175Problems for a quantificational theory of complex demonstrativesPhilosophical Studies 140 (3). 2008.This paper presents a number of objections to Jeffrey King's quantificational theory of complex demonstratives. Some of these objections have to do with modality, whereas others concern attitude ascriptions. Various possible replies are considered. The debate between quantificational theorists and direct reference theorists over complex demonstratives is compared with recent debates concerning definite descriptions
-
David F. Austin, What's the Meaning of'This'? A Puzzle about Demonstrative BeliefMinds and Machines 7 297-302. 1997.
-
23Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism by Michael Devitt (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 489-492. 2000.Michael Devitt is dismayed by the current proliferation of competing semantic theories. He is equally dismayed by the lack of prospects for resolving the disputes between them. In this book, he proposes some methods for resolving these disputes. He also advances his own theory of meaning, which he argues is justified by the methodology he proposes.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |