University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2001
CV
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
PhilPapers Editorships
Philosophy of Physical Science
  •  299
    The Conventionality of Parastatistics
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4): 929-976. 2015.
    Nature seems to be such that we can describe it accurately with quantum theories of bosons and fermions alone, without resort to parastatistics. This has been seen as a deep mystery: paraparticles make perfect physical sense, so why don’t we see them in nature? We consider one potential answer: every paraparticle theory is physically equivalent to some theory of bosons or fermions, making the absence of paraparticles in our theories a matter of convention rather than a mysterious empirical disco…Read more
  •  226
    Many of the "counterintuitive" features of relativistic quantum field theory have their formal root in the Reeh-Schlieder theorem, which in particular entails that local operations applied to the vacuum state can produce any state of the entire field. It is of great interest then that I.E. Segal and, more recently, G. Fleming (in a paper entitled "Reeh-Schlieder meets Newton-Wigner") have proposed an alternative "Newton-Wigner" localization scheme that avoids the Reeh-Schlieder theorem. In this …Read more
  •  296
    No place for particles in relativistic quantum theories?
    with Rob Clifton
    Philosophy of Science 69 (1): 1-28. 2002.
    David Malament (1996) has recently argued that there can be no relativistic quantum theory of (localizable) particles. We consider and rebut several objections that have been made against the soundness of Malament’s argument. We then consider some further objections that might be made against the generality of Malament’s conclusion, and we supply three no‐go theorems to counter these objections. Finally, we dispel potential worries about the counterintuitive nature of these results by showing th…Read more