David Wasserman

Eva Feder Kittay's Learning from My Daughter: The Value and Care of Disabled Minds is poised to make a major contribution to the disability literature and is likely to spark controversy among disability scholars. The book's central contribution is the articulation of an ethics of care for meeting the “genuine needs” and “legitimate wants” of people with disabilities or chronic illnesses. We applaud Kittay, who is the mother of a woman with cerebral palsy who has multiple physical and intellectual impairments, for sharing her story in such an eloquent, accessible, and personal manner. The question remains, however, as to whether Kittay's normative theory of care captures the ethical obligations that should exist between the carer and the cared‐for. In demanding that the cared‐for include the carer as a participant in all their interactions with others, Kittay conceptualizes what paid caregiving relationships should look like in a way we find misguided.

Disability and enhancement are often treated as opposing concepts. To become disabled in some respect is to move away from those who are enhanced in that same respect; to become enhanced is to move away from the corresponding state of disability. This chapter examines how best to understand the concepts of disability and enhancement in this symmetrical way. After considering various candidates, two types of accounts are identified as the most promising: welfarist accounts and typical-functioning accounts. The authors ultimately defend a complex typical-functioning account as the best way to achieve a symmetrical understanding of disability and enhancement.

This comment argues for increased tolerance of privacy risks in the Internet activity of adults with intellectual disabilities. Excessive caution about such risks denies those individuals not only the great benefits of Internet use but also the difficult but valuable experiences of loss, disappointment, and hurt associated with those risks. A level of risk-aversion appropriate for small children will be disrespectful for adults with intellectual disabilities. To the extent that additional safeguards are justified, they are better achieved through individualized security and privacy settings than through caregiver oversight.

In coming decades, fetal medicine may become a routine part of reproductive care. The measures pregnant women now take to protect fetal health are largely generic, like restricting their diets and using supplements. Relatively few interventions are based on specific conditions revealed by ultrasound or genetic testing. A recent finding, though, may herald a dramatic rise in “personalized” fetal medicine: certain drugs already approved by the Food and Drug Administration can apparently boost neural growth in fetuses with Down syndrome, improving cognitive functioning in the future child. Many more condition‐specific findings are likely in the near future. But as commentators have frequently observed about prenatal testing, technologies that appear to increase reproductive options also complicate and constrain them.

One widely used method for allocating health care resources involves the use of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to rank treatments in terms of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) gained. CEA has been criticized for discriminating against people with disabilities by valuing their lives less than those of non-disabled people. Avoiding discrimination seems to lead to the ’QALY trap’: we cannot value saving lives equally and still value raising quality of life. This paper reviews existing responses to the QALY trap and argues that all are problematic. Instead, we argue that adopting a moderate form of prioritarianism avoids the QALY trap and disability discrimination.

The moral limits on how, and how much, parents may attempt to shape their children depend on what the moral project of parenthood is all about. A great deal has been written in the past forty years on the moral functions of parents and families and the acquisition and character of parental duties and rights. There has also been a great deal of philosophical writing on the use of technologies to create, select, and modify children, with such seminal works as Warnock et al., and Robertson. The two literatures have overlapped...

Dominic Wilkinson, a neonatal physician and medical ethicist, has written a searching, moving, and philosophically sophisticated book about the ethics of life and death decision making in the neonatal intensive care unit. Although I will devote much of this review to criticism, I want to say at the outset that Death or Disability represents interdisciplinary work at its very best. Wilkinson’s exposition is both rich in detail and uncompromising in its ethical analysis. He spares the reader none of the clinical, psychological, and moral complexities and uncertainties of the decisions made daily in the neonatal intensive care unit.I especially recommend this book to moral philosophers and practical ethicists...

Jon Elster reports that in 1940, and again in 1970, the U.S. draft lottery was challenged for falling short of the legally mandated ‘random selection’. On both occasions, the physical mixing of the lots appeared to be incomplete, since the birth dates were clustered in a way that would have been extremely unlikely if the lots were fully mixed. There appears to have been no suspicion on either occasion that the deficiency in the mixing was intended, known, or believed to favor or disfavor any identifiable group. If the selection was non-random in the way charged, Elster asks, was it unfair?

Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu1 warn of our destruction by the cognitively enhanced beings we create. Now, in a fascinating paper, Nicholas Agar2 warns of an even more disturbing prospect: cognitively enhanced beings may be entitled to sacrifice us for their own ends. These post-humans would likely conclude that they had higher moral status than we mere human beings, and we would have good reason to defer to their vastly superior moral knowledge. We would lack even the consolation of moral complaint.I will question both these claims: that we would have good reason to accept the conclusion of cognitively enhanced beings that they had superior moral status, and that they would be likely to reach such a conclusion . I will also question whether, if they were to have higher moral status, it would be wrong to create them, because it would be wrong to create beings with such costly needs.Agar argues that moral truths, including those about moral status, are like mathematical truths in eventually yielding to expert reasoning. This belief in moral enlightenment is extreme even for a moral realist. Michael Smith,3 whom Agar cites, merely adduces the gradual consensus that has emerged about issues that were once the subject of seemingly intractable disagreement: slavery, workers’ and women's rights and democracy. One may agree with Smith about slow, halting, moral progress, …