C. James

As the expansion of the Internet and the digital formatting of all kinds of creative works move us further into the information age, intellectual property issues have become paramount. Computer programs costing thousands of research dollars are now copied in an instant. People who would recoil at the thought of stealing cars, computers, or VCRs regularly steal software or copy their favorite music from a friend's CD. Since the Web has no national boundaries, these issues are international concerns. The contributors-philosophers, legal theorists, and business scholars, among others-address questions such as: Can abstract ideas be owned? How does the violation of intellectual property rights compare to the violation of physical property rights? Can computer software and other digital information be protected? And how should legal systems accommodate the ownership of intellectual property in an information age? Intellectual Property is a lively examination of these and other issues, and an invaluable resource for librarians, lawyers, businesspeople, and scholars

Según el autor, el antiamericanismo descansa en la idea singular de que algo asociado con los Estados Unidos, algo en el propio corazón de la vida americana, resulta profundamente equivocado y amenazante para el resto del mundo. El artículo penetra en las fuentes históricas de tal idea convertida de algún modo en “paradigma” de la cultura occidental desde el siglo XX, y muestra su vínculo con la fi losofía europea a partir de la Ilustración, así como con la teoría racista y el eurocentrismo de algunos filósofos europeos. El propósito del artículo es develar las peligrosas consecuencias de esta idea que en la actualidad vienen manifestándose, sin que se adviertan claramente sus orígenes.According to the author, anti-Americanism rests on the singular idea that something associated with the United States, something at the core of American life, is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the world. The paper approaches to the historical sources of such idea, which has been changed into a west culture’s “paradigm”, in some way since the 20th. century. The paper shows the relation between this idea and the typical eurocentrism of some european philosophers. The target is to clear the development of this idea and its dangerous consequences at the present time.

Unlike other fields of philosophy, we cannot simply agree to disagree about morality as practiced in politics. At some point, our moral values become policies that those who may not share those values must follow. The way we construct these disagreements and agreements then are vital to the continued functionality of our nation. In this essay, I will examine how John Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Jeffrey Stout construct the concept of justice and apply their thoughts to the dispute surrounding mountain top removal coal mining in Eastern Kentucky. John Rawls believes in a universally applicable, rationally generated form of justice. MacIntyre believes that concepts like justice cannot be constructed meaningfully using rational means alone as all of these concepts are supported by arational traditions. Finally, Jeffrey Stout sees that while we may never discover a rationally indefeasible definition of justice, we must continue to search, carrying with us the virtues of humility and charity

An attempt is made to trace the impact of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche on early twentieth-century North American thinkers. First, I review some contemporary Nietzsche scholarship, with special attention paid to reflections on Nietzsche's view of interpretation. Then, after a theory of Nietzsche's views about interpretation is outlined, this will be used to judge the merit of the interpretations and the appropriations of Nietzsche's thought offered by some early North American commentators. Four thinkers are selected as a representative sampling of this generation, and each of their positions is sketched and critiqued. James Gibbons Huneker represents the individualistic reading of Nietzsche; Emily S. Hamblen exemplifies the social reading of Nietzsche; William Mackintire Salter illustrates the moral understanding of Nietzsche; and George Burman Foster offers a religious approach to Nietzsche's ideas

In this dissertation I explore how Hegel conceives of the practice of religion. Religion for Hegel cannot be the relationship between humans and a transcendent being, since, as I argue, Hegel's God is not a being of the transcendent sort, but reason as Idea and spirit. Nor does Hegel primarily understand religion as feeling or immediate experience of the divine. According to Hegel, religion involves knowledge of the truth in the form of representation, and I discuss the truths that in his view are common to all religions, as well as the principle that he thinks guides the development of the various determinate religions that culminate in Christianity. But, first and foremost, religion for Hegel is cultus or practice in which a person overcomes her own particularity in a radical manner and identifies completely with the universal, objective standpoint. By overcoming her particularity, the person recognizes that her own interests lack absolute value, and she is willing to abandon them entirely for the sake of what the universal requires of her. The highest form of the cultus for Hegel is full participation in Sittlichkeit, or the social and cultural life of modern Protestant Europe. In the cultus, a person achieves freedom, the goal of religion and the highest value in Hegel's philosophy. I argue that freedom for Hegel is independence vis-à-vis the world in both an active and a passive sense. As active, freedom is the autonomy that a person possesses when she acts rationally or follows the ethical norms that are a necessary moment of being free. As passive, freedom is the independence that a person gains when she is no longer attached to her particular interests and is accepting of circumstances in which her desires are not met. But for Hegel the norms of freedom also allow and require that a person continue to engage fully in the world and actively pursue her own particular interests, since such activities play a necessary role in being free. In my.