C. James

From all this some unexpected results become apparent:Labriola is not the father of Italian Eurocommunism, but rather a thorough-going internationalist.Labriola might reasonably be called a Marxist humanist. In the light of his acknowledged dependence on Engels, this would seem directly to challenge the post-Lukács tendency variously to blame Engels for dialectical materialism, the Soviet scholastic spirit, or even Stalin.Croce's critique of Labriola is telling and Gramsci's direct response is ineffective in so far as he simply tries to revindicate Labriola the classical Marxist.It is at least curious that Gramsci attacks primarily Croce, the liberal idealist, rather than Gentile, the fascist idealist. Much of the criticism is that Croce does not go far enough, is not immanentist and historicist enough.This, in turn, suggests that one should look for Gramsci's original contribution and his overriding concern in political philosophy and not at all in metaphysics

In this article I respond to commentaries of my review of latent versus emergent variable models of emotion. I note that Ross Buck’s view of emotion as stated in his commentary largely endorses an emergent variable model. Drawing from Dynamical Systems Theory, Camras frames the emergent variable model as softly-assembled attractor states. This implies that emotions are “fuzzy sets” of indicators that vary in the degree to which they indicate an emergent emotional state. Calvo offers affective computing as a method of evaluating indicators according to their incremental contribution to predicting human emotional responses. This innovative perspective holds a great deal of promise. Ultimately, I hope that this discussion has contributed to the field's understanding of emotion and emotional processes

In the 16th century Bruno asserted that the earth revolves around the sun. This notion violated the Catholic Church's teaching that the earth was the center of the universe, and his suggestion proved he was a heretic. He was promptly burned at the stake. One hundred years later Galileo said the same thing, and provided evidence. He was forced to recant his views, but he gave the world telescopes so that people could learn for themselves. Today, his assertion is held to be fact with little excitement. Many academics live with a myth of protection; that the pursuit of science, conducted ethically and with methodological rigor, is protected from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. Jim Coan's perspective on his experience while an undergraduate student at the University of Washington is important because it sheds light on an unsettling reality; Scientists pursuing unpopular science are no more shielded from attack from scientists and academicians than anyone else. It is particularly worth noting how unpopular science can be attacked in the name of ethics. Although we may be no more enthusiastic about the specific content of the findings than others, ethical academicians and scientists defend unpopular scientific endeavors from attacks leveled on ethical grounds.

In the 16th century Bruno asserted that the earth revolves around the sun. This notion violated the Catholic Church's teaching that the earth was the center of the universe, and his suggestion proved he was a heretic. He was promptly burned at the stake. One hundred years later Galileo said the same thing, and provided evidence. He was forced to recant his views, but he gave the world telescopes so that people could learn for themselves. Today, his assertion is held to be fact with little excitement. Many academics live with a myth of protection; that the pursuit of science, conducted ethically and with methodological rigor, is protected from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. Jim Coan's perspective on his experience while an undergraduate student at the University of Washington is important because it sheds light on an unsettling reality; Scientists pursuing unpopular science are no more shielded from attack from scientists and academicians than anyone else. It is particularly worth noting how unpopular science can be attacked in the name of ethics. Although we may be no more enthusiastic about the specific content of the findings than others, ethical academicians and scientists defend unpopular scientific endeavors from attacks leveled on ethical grounds.

Competing perspectives on the nature of emotion are illustrated with latent and emergent variable models. Latent variable models draw from classical test theory, assuming that the measured indicators of emotion covary by virtue of some common executive, organizing neural circuit or network in the brain. By contrast, emergent variable models draw from a theory-driven, operational definition tradition, positing that emotions do not cause, but rather are caused by, the measured indicators of emotion, assuming no executive neural circuit or network, and requiring no covariation among indicators. I suggest that the emergent variable model may be more compatible with the extant literature on the nature of emotion, especially in the age of affective neuroscience

The major mechanism of repair of damage to DNA involves a conceptually simple process of enzymatic excision and resynthesis of small regions of DNA. In man and other mammals, this process is regulated by several gene loci; up to 15 mutually complementary genes or gene products may be involved. Repair deficiency results in an array of clinical symptoms in skin, central nervous system, and hematopoietic and immune systems, the major example being xeroderma pigmentosum (XP), a disease with a high incidence of cancer. Cloning repair genes by straightforward methods has proved difficult, but we have begun the effort by demonstrating that correction of a human repair deficiency can be achieved by transferring very small fragments of DNA from normal hamsters into XP cells. One of the complementation groups of XP cells (group C) appears to express a change in gene regulation such that these cells repair only a small clustered region of the DNA with high efficiency.

Worries about “the rhetorical presidency” ultimately concern the danger of presidential demagoguery. As such, they echo an important theme of the Founders, who erected several barriers to the emergence of the president as demagogue in chief. In the ancient sources on which the Founders partly drew, the worry was the popular or pseudo‐popular leader who seizes on widespread envies, fears, or hopes in the service of his political career—in contrast to the statesman, who pursues the public good and is, therefore, less interested in how to gain office than in how to use it. Later iterations emphasized the “superstitious,” “prejudiced,” or ideological nature of demagogic appeals. When Woodrow Wilson proposed that the president should seize the public‐policy initiative in the name of the people, he sought to insulate the presidency from charges of demagoguery by arguing that no leader who spoke falsely on behalf of the people could expect to win the office. True adepts of the “progress” of public opinion, hence of the public good, are non‐demagogic by definition. Although one is hard pressed to find an American president who can unambiguously be called demagogic, one does find demagoguery among presidential candidates, especially during their campaigns for party nomination

Often Bertrand Russell defends his view that names differ from descriptions in that names have meaning but descriptions do not by using a “proof.” Recently in this journal it has been debated whether Russell's “proof” fails or not. The familiar objection to Russell's argument is that it is circular or it involves a sense/reference equivocation. Avrum Stroll suggests a novel criticism by making use of a “mirror argument“ which attempts to show that Russell's argument can be used to conclude that "Scott" has no meaning, and that thus the argument proves too much or nothing. Robert Fahrnkopf defends Russell's argument, but, I believe, he does not go far enough in his defense. So it will be useful to carry this debate a few steps further.