C. James

Analytic epistemologists, over the last two decades, have been troubled by two vexing and seemingly unrelated problems. First they have been trying to describe the "structure" of justification of our knowledge claims; this enterprise has been called the "foundationalism debate." Secondly though, they have also been trying to formulate precisely the necessary and sufficient conditions for "knowing;" this difficulty has come to be known as the "Gettier Problem." The first project deals with epistemic justification and the second, with the analysis of knowledge. The connections, if there are any, between these two research programs remain most obscure at present. And the silence with which most philosophers greet this question leads one to suppose that perhaps there are no interesting connections after all. I argue, however, that there are strong links between the two projects and that together they point us toward a workable "theory of justification." The foundationalism debate teaches us what makes a belief justified. And the Gettier-related literature is best construed, I contend, as a somewhat confused attempt to show us what kinds of justified beliefs are also likely to be true. We could say then that the foundationalism dispute discloses what makes our beliefs "justified," while the Gettier problem takes our theory of justification somewhat further. Recognizing that a belief can be justified and yet be false, the Gettier literature teaches us how to identify beliefs that are more than merely justified--beliefs that are, shall we say, "completely justified" and therefore especially likely to be true. Consequently, our theory must make a distinction between "justified" and "completely justified" belief and provide us with a model of each. The threading insight that binds the two models and that lies at the heart of the essay is the idea that justification should be understood as an essentially dialectical affair in which one meets the challenges of a critic

This work examines the existential social ontology of Martin Heidegger. The main argument is that there is in Being and Time an extended construction of a concept of social Dasein, and that this concept of social Dasein is employed in hitherto neglected ways in Heidegger's political writings. ;The argument is made primarily through an interpretation which identifies, analyzes and orders into concepts the many references to individuality and sociality in Being and Time and in Heidegger's political writings. ;Part one of the work treats the social ontology of Being and Time. Chapter one sets forth the thesis against the background of the dominant interpretations found in the Heidegger literature, and defines "social Dasein" in terms of Heidegger's own social vocabulary. Chapter two argues that there is a primacy of being-with in understanding, state-of-mind and worldhood itself, as well as in falling and co-Dasein. Chapter three treats Dasein in its individual ways of existing, and ends with some conclusions about selfhood and its relation to social change. Chapter four analyses the relation of individuality and sociality in Dasein's "full authentic historizing," and offers some conclusions about the structure and limits of authentic sociality. ;Part two treats Heidegger's political writings in the light of the concept of social Dasein. Chapter five interprets the " wissenschaftliches Dasein " of the Rectoral address as in fact a mode of social Dasein. Chapter six further traces the development of Heidegger's social ontology in a speech and essay which treat international understanding in terms of the concept of the Dasein of a Volk. ;The conclusion of the work argues that Heidegger's conceptions of the role of wissenschaftliches Dasein in society and of the Volk as an existential feature of Dasein whereby social Dasein is sustained are not only incompatible with Nazi ideas but subversive of them

Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects is known to the Anglo-American philosophical community almost exclusively through Bertrand Russell's criticism of the theory in "On Denoting" and later works, and even though certain recent writers have urged that the interpretive tradition intitated by Russell is importantly in error, no interpretation designed to present Meinongianism as a coherent genuine alternative to the Russellian tradition in semantics has yet been offered. This study contributes to such an alternative interpretation, employing a combination of historical and philosophical arguments. ;The introduction aspires to set the discussion in the broader context of two general approaches to semantics: the atomistic picture of Russell among others, and the holistic picture of Quine, Wittgenstein, and Rorty, among others. The author insinuates that Meinong's views are best understood and defended against the background of a holistic approach. ;The first chapter offers a synoptic view of Russell's Theory of Descriptions. The author argues that throughout his career Russell presupposed the very semantical views he claimed to have found objectionable in Meinong, views here dubbed the Naive Theory of Meaning. The discussion falls into three broad parts: a demonstration of the presence of the Naive Theory in Russell's early Principles of Mathematics; a discussion of the persistence of the Naive Theory in "On Denoting," directed against Russell's claim that that theory was eliminated by the Theory of Descriptions; and an examination of the later entanglement of the Naive Theory with the notion of acquaintance in the writings after "On Denoting." An appendix to the chapter refutes objections and dismisses alternatives to the interpretation offered here. ;The second chapter employs extended exegetical arguments to demonstrate that Meinong's Theory of Objects not only does not embody the Naive Theory of Meaning, but is grounded in an explicit and categorical rejection of that theory. It is explained that Meinong's notion of Aussersein is not, as Russell appeared to suppose, an ontological category, and an alternative is presented on which it appears as an ontologically neutral linguistic category. It is suggested, futhermore, that such an interpretation is consistent with holism and inconsistent with atomism. An appendix to the chapter refutes two carefully selected alternative interpretations of Meinong's theory. ;The third chapter lays down conditions, grounded in the exegesis of the second chapter, that a view must satisfy in order to be called Meinongian. The resulting range of views is clarified and an objection concerning the consequences for quantification theory considered in detail. Though any of several responses to the objection are considered viable, it is argued that the most powerfully is one that involves mirroring as closely as possible the paradigmatic philosophical interpretation of quantification theory that derives from W. V. O. Quine. It is further argued that such mirroring results in an interpretation involving only a small departure from Quinean doctrine, namely the suspension of the classical rule of existential generalization and its replacement with an analogous rule typical of sytems of free logic, and that such an interpretation is suitable for Meinongianism. An appendix to the chapter presents a sketch of a formal model appropriate for the claims made in the body of the chapter

Focuses criticism upon the writings of Kenneth Burke Extensions of the Burkeian System constitutes one of the first projects to meet the requirements Burke has established for his operation benchmark. This volume its origins in the scholarly contributions of Kenneth Burke. All of the authors of the chapters in this volume adopt stances that defer to Burke's initial contributions, ultimately casting their work as extensions of ideas and claims posited by Burke. Yet, all of the authors also make significant departures from positions Burke has articulated. The range of these reactions varies tremendously. Several of the authors cast their positions as augmentations. They offer supplements to Burke's claims that constitute logical additions to Burke's initial observations, but even these authors provide adjustments to the Burkeian system that make a difference in how the system is per­ceived and understood. Other essays are cast in a more challenging mode, arguing explicitly for alternative viewpoints. Displeased with Burke's analysis at a given point for one reason or another, they posit positions different than those advanced by Burke.

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