C. Mantzavinos

English summary: C. Mantzavinos offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. He shows that both social institutions, defined as the rules of the game, and exchange processes can be analyzed along a common theoretical structure. Mantzavinos's proposal is that a problem-solving model of individual behaviour inspired by the cognitive sciences provides such a unifying theoretical structure. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, the author offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes. His book was first published in English by Cambridge University Press. German description: C. Mantzavinos entwickelt eine Theorie der Entstehung des institutionellen Rahmens einer Gesellschaft und der Funktionsweise von Markten innerhalb dieses Rahmens. Er zeigt, dass sowohl Institutionen, d.h. Spielregeln, als auch Austauschprozesse mit Hilfe einer gemeinsamen theoretischen Struktur analysiert werden konnen. Als gemeinsame vereinheitlichende Struktur schlagt er ein kognitionswissenschaftlich inspiriertes Problemlosungsmodell individuellen Verhaltens vor. Indem er neueste Erkenntnisse aus Okonomik, Soziologie, Politikwissenschaften, Rechtswissenschaft und Anthropologie integriert, entwickelt der Autor eine genuin politische Okonomie, die zeigt, wie soziale Institutionen okonomische Ergebnisse beeinflussen.Das englische Original ist unter dem Titel Individuals, Institutions, and Markets bei Cambridge University Press erschienen.Die Institutionenanalyse hat jungst Fortschritte in der Ausweitung ihrer Domane gemacht und sich Fragen des Wissens und der Kognition zugewandt. Dieses Buch zahlt zu den ersten und einzigen, die dieses wichtige Thema systematisch behandeln. Ausserdem umfasst es sowohl die Diskussion und Analyse dieses Themas als auch die eher traditionelle institutionelle Analyse. Es ist ein Meilenstein und wird als Referenzmass fur kunftige Forschung dienen.Avner Greif, Stanford University.

This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.

Le cercle herméneutique a été utilisé par tous ceux qui ont défendu la thèse de l’autonomie méthodologique des sciences humaines par rapport aux sciences naturelles. Il est généralement perçu comme un problème ontologique ou logique par les Herméneutistes. Le but de cet article est de montrer que le cercle herméneutique n’est ni l’un ni l’autre. Tout indique, plutôt, qu’il fait référence à un phénomène empirique, qui peut être étudié dans le cadre de la psycholinguistique et d’autres disciplines empiriques. Il ne peut pas, par conséquent, être utilisé comme argument pour légitimer la séparation entre les sciences naturelles et les sciences humaines, et ne peut donc pas contribuer à soutenir la thèse de l’autonomie des sciences humaines.

There is a long tradition in the philosophy of the social sciences that emphasizes the meaningfulness of human action. This tradition doubts or even negates the possibility of causal explanations of human action precisely on the basis that human actions have meaning. This paper provides an argument in favour of methodological naturalism in the social sciences. It grants the main argument of the Interpretivists, i.e. that human actions are meaningful, but it shows how a transformation of a “nexus of meaning” into a “causal nexus” can take place, proposing the “successful transformation argument”. Based on previous work presented in my Naturalistic Hermeneutics, Cambridge University Press, 2005 the paper discusses four approaches that describe the “nexus of meaning” connected with a human action based on the motives, the intentions, the reasons, and the rationality of the action respectively. From the standpoint of eachapproach a causal nexus can arise, namely, if the respective motives, intentions, reasons, or the human rationality that are manifest in the different nexuses of meaning exhibit certain invariances. These approaches can be formulated as theories, which explain human action every time that the nexuses of meaning – described with the diverse conceptual apparatuses – can be transformed into causal nexuses. It is shown that explanations based on motives, intentions, reasons, or rationality are possible, as are explanations of human action based on, at least in principle, an unlimited number of other theories.

The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the InstitutionalEvolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to adequately deal with norms. The analysis of competition as an evolutionary process that unfolds within legal rules provides the empirical foundation for the model. The development of the normative dimension involves the elaboration of a comparative approach. Building on those foundations the main features of the Institutional-Evolutionary Model are sketched out and it is shown that its use leads to systematically different outcomes and conclusions than the dominant antitrust ideals.

Individus, institutions et marchés propose une théorie de l'émergence des institutions d'une société et du fonctionnement des marchés au sein de ce cadre institutionnel. L'ouvrage montre que les institutions sociales, définies comme les règles du jeu, ainsi que les processus d'échange, peuvent être analysés dans un cadre théorique commun. Mantzavinos propose comme structure théorique commune un modèle de comportement individuel pour la résolution des problèmes inspiré des sciences cognitives. Par intégration des derniers développements théoriques en économie, sociologie, science politique, droit et anthropologie, Mantzavinos offre une véritable économie politique montrant comment les institutions sociales affectent la réalité économique.

This paper explores the relationship between federalism and individual liberty. It is shown that a complete treatment of the relationship between federalism and individual liberty should consider two countervailing effects. On the one hand, a federalist structure enhances individual liberty by enlarging the choice set of the citizens. On the other hand, however, a federalist system leads to institutional diversity, a fact that per se leads to higher exit costs, which a citizen must bear if he or she decides to change jurisdictions. This effect on individual liberty is a negative one, since a consequence of every increase in the exit costs is a decrease of individual liberty. The optimum range of diversity of jurisdictions is shown to lie where the two effects counterbalance each other.

The hermeneutic circle serves as a standard argument for all those who raise a claim to the autonomy of the human sciences. The proponents of an alternative methodology for the human sciences present the hermeneutic circle either as an ontological problem or as a specific methodological problem in the social sciences and the humanities. In this paper I would like to check the soundness of this argument. I will start with listing and shortly sketching out three variations of the problem. I will then critically discuss these and appeal to alternative solutions and I will close with a short conclusion.

There are three main approaches to scientific explanation in the philosophical literature. The unification approach claims that science explains by fitting the particular facts and events within a general theoretical framework. The mechanistic approach claims that science explains by identifying mechanisms. According to the manipulationist approach an explanation ought to be such that it can be used to answer a “what-if-things-had-been-different question.” The article examines whether these three approaches are compatible or not in the case of the social sciences, and it concludes by defending explanatory pluralism.

In this article, we provide a broad overview of the interplay among cognition, belief systems, and institutions, and how they affect economic performance. We argue that a deeper understanding of institutions’ emergence, their working properties, and their effect on economic and political outcomes should begin from an analysis of cognitive processes. We explore the nature of individual and collective learning, stressing that the issue is not whether agents are perfectly or boundedly rational, but rather how human beings actually reason and choose, individually and in collective settings. We then tie the processes of learning to institutional analysis, providing arguments in favor of what can be characterized as “cognitive institutionalism.” Besides, we show that a full treatment of the phenomenon of path dependence should start at the cognitive level, proceed at the institutional level, and culminate at the economic level.

A philosophical theory of explanation should provide solutions to a series of problems, both descriptive and normative. The aim of this essay is to establish the claim that this can be best done if one theorizes in terms of explanatory games rather than focusing on the explication of the concept of explanation. The position that is adopted is that of an explanatory pluralism and it is elaborated in terms of the rules that incorporate the normative standards that guide the processes of discovery and justification of explanations as well as the modes of their communication, dissemination, and adoption. They constitute the rules of the explanatory game that the participants are playing. The philosophical project consists in describing and normatively appraising the rules that constitute these games.

After providing a brief overview of the economic theory of judicial decisions this paper presents an argument for why not only the economic theory of judicial decisions, but also the rational approach in general, most often fails in explaining decision-making. Work done within the research program of New Institutionalism is presented as a possible alternative. Within this research program judicial activity is conceptualized as the activity of "interpreting the rules of the game", i.e. the institutions that frame the economic and political interaction in a society. Such a conceptualization of judicial interpretation and judicial decision-making would have to depart from rational choice modes of reasoning, and should instead focus on how human beings actually reason, learn and choose drawing from research in cognitive science.

Dieser Aufsatz untersucht das Verhältnis zwischen Föderalismus und individueller Freiheit. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine vollständige Analyse des Verhältnisses zwischen Föderalismus und individueller Freiheit zwei entgegengesetzte Effekte mitberücksichtigen muss. Auf der einen Seite verstärken föderalistische Strukturen die individuelle Freiheit indem sie die Auswahlmöglichkeiten der Bürger erweitern. Auf der anderen Seite führt jedoch ein föderalistisches System zur institutionellen Vielfalt, ein Faktum, das per se zu höheren Abwanderungskosten führt, die ein Bürger tragen muss, wenn er oder sie entscheidet, die Jurisdiktion zu wechseln. Dieser Effekt auf die individuelle Freiheit ist ein negativer, da jede Erhöhung der Abwanderungskosten die Minderung der individuellen Freiheit zur Konsequenz hat. Der optimale Grad der Vielfalt der Jurisdiktionen befindet sich dort, wo die beiden Effekte sich gegenseitig ausgleichen.