C. Mantzavinos

This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.

English summary: C. Mantzavinos offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. He shows that both social institutions, defined as the rules of the game, and exchange processes can be analyzed along a common theoretical structure. Mantzavinos's proposal is that a problem-solving model of individual behaviour inspired by the cognitive sciences provides such a unifying theoretical structure. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, the author offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes. His book was first published in English by Cambridge University Press. German description: C. Mantzavinos entwickelt eine Theorie der Entstehung des institutionellen Rahmens einer Gesellschaft und der Funktionsweise von Markten innerhalb dieses Rahmens. Er zeigt, dass sowohl Institutionen, d.h. Spielregeln, als auch Austauschprozesse mit Hilfe einer gemeinsamen theoretischen Struktur analysiert werden konnen. Als gemeinsame vereinheitlichende Struktur schlagt er ein kognitionswissenschaftlich inspiriertes Problemlosungsmodell individuellen Verhaltens vor. Indem er neueste Erkenntnisse aus Okonomik, Soziologie, Politikwissenschaften, Rechtswissenschaft und Anthropologie integriert, entwickelt der Autor eine genuin politische Okonomie, die zeigt, wie soziale Institutionen okonomische Ergebnisse beeinflussen.Das englische Original ist unter dem Titel Individuals, Institutions, and Markets bei Cambridge University Press erschienen.Die Institutionenanalyse hat jungst Fortschritte in der Ausweitung ihrer Domane gemacht und sich Fragen des Wissens und der Kognition zugewandt. Dieses Buch zahlt zu den ersten und einzigen, die dieses wichtige Thema systematisch behandeln. Ausserdem umfasst es sowohl die Diskussion und Analyse dieses Themas als auch die eher traditionelle institutionelle Analyse. Es ist ein Meilenstein und wird als Referenzmass fur kunftige Forschung dienen.Avner Greif, Stanford University.

Le cercle herméneutique a été utilisé par tous ceux qui ont défendu la thèse de l’autonomie méthodologique des sciences humaines par rapport aux sciences naturelles. Il est généralement perçu comme un problème ontologique ou logique par les Herméneutistes. Le but de cet article est de montrer que le cercle herméneutique n’est ni l’un ni l’autre. Tout indique, plutôt, qu’il fait référence à un phénomène empirique, qui peut être étudié dans le cadre de la psycholinguistique et d’autres disciplines empiriques. Il ne peut pas, par conséquent, être utilisé comme argument pour légitimer la séparation entre les sciences naturelles et les sciences humaines, et ne peut donc pas contribuer à soutenir la thèse de l’autonomie des sciences humaines.

There is a long tradition in the philosophy of the social sciences that emphasizes the meaningfulness of human action. This tradition doubts or even negates the possibility of causal explanations of human action precisely on the basis that human actions have meaning. This paper provides an argument in favour of methodological naturalism in the social sciences. It grants the main argument of the Interpretivists, i.e. that human actions are meaningful, but it shows how a transformation of a “nexus of meaning” into a “causal nexus” can take place, proposing the “successful transformation argument”. Based on previous work presented in my Naturalistic Hermeneutics, Cambridge University Press, 2005 the paper discusses four approaches that describe the “nexus of meaning” connected with a human action based on the motives, the intentions, the reasons, and the rationality of the action respectively. From the standpoint of eachapproach a causal nexus can arise, namely, if the respective motives, intentions, reasons, or the human rationality that are manifest in the different nexuses of meaning exhibit certain invariances. These approaches can be formulated as theories, which explain human action every time that the nexuses of meaning – described with the diverse conceptual apparatuses – can be transformed into causal nexuses. It is shown that explanations based on motives, intentions, reasons, or rationality are possible, as are explanations of human action based on, at least in principle, an unlimited number of other theories.

The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the InstitutionalEvolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to adequately deal with norms. The analysis of competition as an evolutionary process that unfolds within legal rules provides the empirical foundation for the model. The development of the normative dimension involves the elaboration of a comparative approach. Building on those foundations the main features of the Institutional-Evolutionary Model are sketched out and it is shown that its use leads to systematically different outcomes and conclusions than the dominant antitrust ideals.