C. Mantzavinos

_English summary:_ C. Matzavinos advocates the unity of the scientific method and defends it against the claim to autonomy made by the human sciences. He shows how materials that are 'meaningful', more specifically human actions and texts, can be adequately dealt with by the hypothetico-deductive method, the standard method used in the natural sciences. The hermeneutic method is not an alternative method aimed at the understanding and the interpretation of human actions and texts, but it is the same as the hypothetico-deductive method applied to meaningful materials. The central thesis is, thus, that there is no fundamental methodological difference between natural sciences, social sciences and humanities. The English edition of this work was published by Cambridge University Press._ German description:_ C. Mantzavinos stellt dem Autonomieanspruch der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften die These der Einheit der wissenschaftlichen Methode gegenuber. Er zeigt, wie Material, das 'sinnhaft' ist, vor allem menschliche Handlungen und Texte, mit Hilfe der hypothetisch-deduktiven Methode - der gangigen Methode der Naturwissenschaften - erfasst werden kann. Die hermeneutische Methode ist nichts anders als die auf sinnhaftes Material angewendete hypothetisch-deduktive Methode. Sowohl menschliche Handlungen im allgemeinen als auch Ergebnisse solcher Handlungen, vor allem Texte, sind, obwohl sinnhaft, mittels der hypothetisch-deduktiven Methode gut erfassbar. Der Autor zeigt, dass Sinnzusammenhange sehr oft in Wirkungszusammenhange transformierbar sind und daher nomologisch durchleuchtet werden konnen. Auch in denjenigen Fallen, in denen diese Transformation nicht moglich ist, kann man die hypothetisch-deduktive Methode anwenden: Man kann Hypothesen formulieren, die dazu dienen, den entsprechenden Sinnzusammenhang zu rekonstruieren, und dann aufgrund des verfugbaren empirischen Materials uberprufen, welche der angebotenen Hypothesen zutreffend sind. Bei Rekonstruktionen, wie bei der Feststellung von Einzeltatsachen im allgemeinen, fungieren bestimmte singulare deskriptive Aussagen gerade in dem Sinne als Hypothesen, dass man nach Grunden fur ihre Wahrheit sucht. Somit brauchen auch diejenigen Disziplinen, die sich mit wissenschaftlichen Problemen der Rekonstruktion von Sinnzusammenhangen befassen, die Orientierung ihrer Tatigkeit an der Wahrheitsidee nicht zugunsten anderer Ideale und regulativer Ideen zu opfern. Mantzavinos hat eine naturalistische Hermeneutik entwickelt, die in der Lage ist, Sinnprobleme adaquat zu losen. Das Buch ist der wichtigste neuere Beitrag zur Analyse dieser Probleme, den ich bisher gesehen habe. Es ist unentbehrlich fur jedes Seminar uber Probleme der Hermeneutik. Hans Albert, Heidelberg.

Scientific progress has many facets and can be conceptualized in different ways, for example in terms of problem-solving, of truthlikeness or of growth of knowledge. The main claim of the paper is that the most important prerequisite of scientific progress is the institutionalization of competition and criticism. An institutional framework appropriately channeling competition and criticism is the crucial factor determining the direction and rate of scientific progress, independently on how one might wish to conceptualize scientific progress itself. The main intention is to narrow the divide between traditional philosophy of science and the sociological, economic and political view of science that emphasizes the private interests motivating scientists and the subsequent contingent nature of the enterprise. The aim is to show that although science is a social enterprise taking place in historical time and thus is of a contingent nature, it can and in fact does lead to genuine scientific progress—contrary to the claims of certain sociologists of science and other relativists who standardly stress its social nature, but deny its progressive character. I will first deal with the factual issue by way of introducing the main concepts and mechanisms of modern institutional theory and by applying them to the analysis of the cultural phenomenon that we call modern science. I will then turn to the normative issue: what is the appropriate content of the institutional framework, for scientific progress to emerge and be sustained at which level should it be set and by whom? Addressing this problematic is equivalent to conducting a constitutional debate leading to a Constitution of Science.

Zu den zentralen epistemischen Aktivitäten gehören nicht nur Erklärungsbemühungen, die auf die Beantwortung von „Warum?“- Fragen abzielen, sondern auch Interpretationsbemühungen die auf die Beantwortung von „Was ist der Fall?“- Fragen abzielen. Sie sind zwei Arten von epistemischen Problemlösungsaktivitäten, die an unterschiedlichen Erkenntniszielen orientiert sind. Sowohl Erklärungen als auch Interpretationen können vergleichend normativ bewertet werden, indem die gleichen normativen Standards herangezogen werden, welche intersubjektive Verständlichkeit, Überprüfbarkeit von Hypothesen auf empirischer Grundlage und rationale Argumentation umfassen. Natürlich gibt es sehr unterschiedliche Techniken, die in den naturwissenschaftlichen und geisteswissenschaftlichen Disziplinen angewandt werden. Aber es gibt keinen Unterschied im Prinzip zwischen Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften, der eine Dichotomie auf der methodologischen Ebene rechtfertigen kann, wenn man einen vergleichenden Ansatz der normativen Bewertung akzeptiert und prozedurale Rationalität befürwortet.

STUDENT: I thoroughly agree. And here is a set of thoughts. A state exists because it provides individuals with solutions to the twin problems of trust and protection from aggression by individuals of the same society and those of different societies. A state emerges once a society grows bigger and relationships among the members become increasingly impersonal. In cases of larger groups or societies, trust becomes scarce since the discipline of reciprocity and the “shadow of the future” are relatively low.

How can science be protected, by whom and at what level? If science is valued positively as the incubator of the most successful solutions to representational problems of reality as well as the basis of the most effective interventions in the natural and social world, then its constitutional foundations must be protected. This book develops a specific normative outlook on science by introducing the idea of a 'Constitution of Science'. Scientific activities are special kinds of epistemic problem-solving activities unfolding in an institutional context. The scientific enterprise is a social process unfolding within an intricate institutional framework that structures the daily activities of scientists and shapes their outcomes. Those institutions of science which are of the highest generality make up the 'Constitution of Science' and are of fundamental importance for channelling the scientific process effectively.

This book consists of a dialogue between two interlocutors, Pablo and a student, who discuss a great range of issues in social philosophy and political theory, and in particular, the emergence, working properties and economic effects of institutions. It uses the dialogical form to make philosophy more accessible, but also to show how ideas develop through intellectual interaction. The fact that one of the interlocutors is the "student" in a place in the real world makes the dialogue quasi-fictive in character and enables the active engagement of the reader. After all, we are all philosophers and we develop our own philosophy by exchanging views and arguments. The dialogue form is and should remain the principal form of philosophizing, since ideas, like butterflies, do not merely exist – they develop. This is certainly the case in actual philosophical interaction, and it can be the case in written philosophical exposition. Although the dialogue does not presuppose prior acquaintance with the respective philosophical and social scientific literature under discussion in this book, it makes arguments more accessible, and conveys the feeling that there are no definite solutions to philosophical problems.

Scientific progress has many facets and can be conceptualized in different ways, for example in terms of problem-solving, of truthlikeness or of growth of knowledge. The main claim of the paper is that the most important prerequisite of scientific progress is the institutionalization of competition and criticism. An institutional framework appropriately channeling competition and criticism is the crucial factor determining the direction and rate of scientific progress, independently on how one might wish to conceptualize scientific progress itself. The main intention is to narrow the divide between traditional philosophy of science and the sociological, economic and political outlook at science that emphasizes the private interests motivating scientists and the subsequent contingent nature of the enterprise. The aim is to show that although science is a social enterprise taking place in historical time and thus is of a contingent nature, it can and in fact does lead to genuine scientific progress - contrary to the claims of certain sociologists of science and other relativists who standardly stress its social nature, but deny its progressive character. I will first deal with the factual issue by way of introducing the main concepts and mechanisms of modern institutional theory and by applying them to the analysis of the cultural phenomenon that we call modern science. I will then turn to the normative issue: what is the appropriate content of the institutional framework, for scientific progress to emerge and be sustained at which level should it be set and by whom? Addressing this problematic is equivalent to conducting a constitutional debate leading to a Constitution of Science.

Two interlocutors, Philip Pettit and a student, are exchanging views on liberal political and economic philosophy during lunch at Prospect House, the faculty club of Princeton. The dialogue begins with clarifications of the notion of liberty, and, against objections of the student, Pettit introduces and defends his own conception of freedom as non-domination rather than as non-interference. It proceeds with an exchange of arguments regarding the different kinds of institutional settings that entrench liberty and all the other things valued by humans. The interlocutors reach a preliminary consensus that in order to substantiate the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination in concrete institutional realities, two things are required: the establishment of a mixed constitution – so that no single, unconstrained body can exercise lawmaking and other government functions – as well as eternal vigilance on the part of the citizens. The second part of the dialogue deals with a major challenge to the republican political philosophy expressed by the student: the issue of non-domination in markets, which is diagnosed as an important lacuna in republican thought.

This paper articulates and defends three interconnected claims: first, that the debate on the role of values for science misses a crucial dimension, the institutional one; second, that institutions occupy the intermediate level between scientific activities and values and that they are to be systematically integrated into the analysis; third, that the appraisal of the institutions of science with respect to values should be undertaken within the premises of a comparative approach rather than an ideal approach. Hence, I defend the view that the issue be framed in reference to the following question: "What kind of institutional rules should be in place in order for the scientific process to unfold in such a way that the values that we deem more important come to the fore?" Addressing this concern is equivalent to conducting a debate on institutions and their role for science.

A philosophical theory of explanation should provide solutions to a series of problems, both descriptive and normative. The aim of this essay is to establish the claim that this can be best done if one theorizes in terms of explanatory games rather than focusing on the explication of the concept of explanation. The development of the precise meaning of the concept of scientific explanation occupies centre-stage in all contemporary approaches. The alternative position that seems obvious and which is adopted is that of an explanatory pluralism. At every moment of time there is a stock of explanations available in a society proposed by ordinary people “in the wild” or by specialists organized formally or semi-formally within specific organizational structures such as churches, universities, etc. The terms of provision, control, and dissemination of explanations in this collective explanatory enterprise are regulated by the different rules that the participants have come to adopt over time. These rules incorporate the normative standards that guide the processes of discovery and justification of explanations as well as the modes of their communication, dissemination, and adoption. They constitute the rules of the explanatory game that the participants are playing. The philosophical project consists in describing and normatively appraising the rules that constitute these games. This project is fundamentally liberal, in the sense that participants and non-participants to the game alike engage in the critical discussion and revision of the rules or to put it in other terms, the project is fundamentally naturalistic - philosophers and scientists equally take part in it.

We are all philosophers and we develop our own philosophy by exchanging views and arguments. The dialogue form is and should remain the principal form of philosophizing, since ideas, like butterflies, do not merely exist – they develop. This is certainly the case in actual philosophical interaction, and it can be the case in written philosophical exposition. The book consists of a dialogue between two interlocutors, Philip and a student, who discuss about the philosophical theory of explanation. It is situated on Cape Sounion, near Athens where the two interlocutors enjoy the view over the Aegean Sea. An initial exchange of arguments leads to a dialogue unfolding the panorama of the contemporary philosophical theory of explanation. The second part of the dialogue is devoted to an exchange of arguments on explanatory pluralism as a novel approach to the philosophical theory of explanation. Historical cases are discussed as well as the ways in which explanatory progress in science can be attained.

Naturalistic Hermeneutics proposes the position of the unity of the scientific method and defends it against the claim to autonomy of the human sciences. Mantzavinos shows how materials that are 'meaningful', more specifically human actions and texts, can be adequately dealt with by the hypothetico-deductive method, the standard method used in the natural sciences. The hermeneutic method is not an alternative method aimed at the understanding and the interpretation of human actions and texts, but it is the same as the hypothetico-deductive method applied to meaningful materials. The central thesis advocated by Mantzavinos is, thus, that there is no fundamental methodological difference between natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Advanced students and professionals across philosophy, social and political theory, and the humanities will find this a compelling and controversial book.

Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. The book shows that both social institutions, defined as the rules of the game, and exchange processes can be analyzed along a common theoretical structure. Mantzavinos' proposal is that a problem solving model of individual behavior inspired by the cognitive sciences provides such a unifying theoretical structure. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, Mantzavinos offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes