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255Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of AssertionErkenntnis 78 (4): 847-867. 2013.The view that truth is the norm of assertion has fallen out of fashion. The recent trend has been to think that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Objections to the knowledge view proceed almost exclusively by appeal to alleged counterexamples. While it no doubt has a role to play, such a strategy relies on intuitions concerning hypothetical cases, intuitions which might not be shared and which might shift depending on how the relevant cases are fleshed out. In this paper, I reject the knowledg…Read more
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539Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to LittlejohnErkenntnis 80 (6): 1245-1253. 2015.In a paper in this journal, I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful
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95Oughts and thoughts: Rule-following and the normativity of content – Anandi Hattiangadi (review)Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233): 743-745. 2008.No Abstract
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630It’s Not What You Said, It’s the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional ImplicaturesAnalytic Philosophy 54 (3): 364-377. 2013.In this paper, I defend against a number of criticisms an account of slurs, according to which the same semantic content is expressed in the use of a slur as is expressed in the use of its neutral counterpart, while in addition the use of a slur conventionally implicates a negative, derogatory attitude. Along the way, I criticise competing accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of slurs, namely, Hom's 'combinatorial externalism' and Anderson and Lepore's 'prohibitionism'
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25Duncan Pritchard, Adrian Haddock and Alan Millar's The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (review)Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244): 645-648. 2011.
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1081Against Second‐Order ReasonsNoûs 51 (2): 398-420. 2017.A normative reason for a person to? is a consideration which favours?ing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person?s. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to? for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views …Read more
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1096What is the Normativity of Meaning?Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3): 219-238. 2016.There has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I critically examine two competing conceptions of the normativity of meaning, rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle a dispute among propon…Read more
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31Metaepistemology (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2018.Epistemology, like ethics, is normative. Just as ethics addresses questions about how we ought to act, so epistemology addresses questions about how we ought to believe and enquire. We can also ask metanormative questions. What does it mean to claim that someone ought to do or believe something? Do such claims express beliefs about independently existing facts, or only attitudes of approval and disapproval towards certain pieces of conduct? How do putative facts about what people ought to do or …Read more
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48Review: Mark Wilson, Wandering significance: an essay on conceptual behaviour. Oxford University Press, 2006 (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 10 (36). 2006.
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2485Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of ActionIn Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, Oxford University Press. 2014.Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerations—the kind of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decision—to speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, …Read more
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25Mind, Method, and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny – Edited by John Cottingham and Peter Hacker (review)Philosophical Investigations 34 (1): 97-101. 2010.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Aesthetics |
17th/18th Century British Philosophy |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
20th Century Philosophy |
Value Theory |