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142Particularly general and generally particular: language, rules and meaningLogique Et Analyse 53 (209): 77-90. 2010.Semantic generalists and semantic particularists disagree over the role of rules or principles in linguistic competence and in the determination of linguistic meaning, and hence over the importance of the notions of a rule or of a principle in philosophical accounts of language. In this paper, I have argued that the particularist’s case against generalism is far from decisive and that by moderating the claims she makes on behalf of her thesis the generalist can accommodate many of the considerat…Read more
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104Review: A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein (review)Mind 116 (464): 1132-1136. 2007.
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63Meaning- theories and the principle of humanitySouthern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4): 697-716. 2006.In this paper, I briefly outline the notion of a truth-conditional meaning-theory and introduce two prominent problems it faces. The“extensionality problem” arises because not all correct specifications of truth-conditions are meaning-giving. The “explanatory problem”concerns the extent to which truth-conditional meaning-theories can contribute to the task of clarifying the nature of linguistic meaning.The “principle of humanity” is supposed to resolve both issues simultaneously. I argue that it…Read more
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172Languages, language-games, and forms of lifeIn Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein, Wiley-blackwell. 2017.In this paper, after outlining the methodological role Wittgenstein's appeal to language-games is supposed to play, I examine the picture of language which his discussion of such games and their relations to what Wittgenstein calls forms of life suggests. It is a picture according to which language and its employment are inextricably connected to wider contexts—they are embedded in specific natural and social environments, they are tied to purposive activities serving provincial needs, and caugh…Read more
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82Fregean sense and anti-individualismPhilosophical Books 48 (3): 233-240. 2007.The definitive version of this article is published in Philosophical Books 48.3 July 2007 pp. 233-240 by Blackwell Publishing, and is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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12Book Review: Maximilian de Gaynesfordl John McDowell. Polity, 2004 (review)Philosophical Papers 34 (1). 2005.NoAvailable Philosophical Papers Vol.34(1) 2005: 137-142
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255Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of AssertionErkenntnis 78 (4): 847-867. 2013.The view that truth is the norm of assertion has fallen out of fashion. The recent trend has been to think that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Objections to the knowledge view proceed almost exclusively by appeal to alleged counterexamples. While it no doubt has a role to play, such a strategy relies on intuitions concerning hypothetical cases, intuitions which might not be shared and which might shift depending on how the relevant cases are fleshed out. In this paper, I reject the knowledg…Read more
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1508If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to ΦPhilosophical Studies 173 (7): 1873-1895. 2016.In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs about what you ought to do must be true, based in part …Read more
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95Oughts and thoughts: Rule-following and the normativity of content – Anandi Hattiangadi (review)Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233): 743-745. 2008.No Abstract
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537Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to LittlejohnErkenntnis 80 (6): 1245-1253. 2015.In a paper in this journal, I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful
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627It’s Not What You Said, It’s the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional ImplicaturesAnalytic Philosophy 54 (3): 364-377. 2013.In this paper, I defend against a number of criticisms an account of slurs, according to which the same semantic content is expressed in the use of a slur as is expressed in the use of its neutral counterpart, while in addition the use of a slur conventionally implicates a negative, derogatory attitude. Along the way, I criticise competing accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of slurs, namely, Hom's 'combinatorial externalism' and Anderson and Lepore's 'prohibitionism'
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25Duncan Pritchard, Adrian Haddock and Alan Millar's The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (review)Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244): 645-648. 2011.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Aesthetics |
17th/18th Century British Philosophy |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
20th Century Philosophy |
Value Theory |