Henrik Lagerlund

Sixteenth Century philosophy was a unique synthesis of several philosophical frameworks, a blend of old and new, including but not limited to scholasticism, humanism, Neo-Thomism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. It was a century that witnessed culturally and philosophically significant moments whose impact still is felt today—some examples include the emergence of Jesuits, the height of the witchcraze, the Protestant Reformation, the rise of philosophical skepticism, Pietro Pomponazzi’s controversial reexamination of traditional understandings of the soul’s mortality, and the deflation of the metaphysical status of substantial forms. Unlike most historical overviews of this moment in philosophy’s history, The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth Century Philosophy does not simplify this colorful period with the application of the dichotomies traditionally applied to this century, such as the misguidingly clear line once drawn between scholasticism and humanism. The Companion includes essays covering the following astonishingly diverse set of topics: philosophical methodologies of the time, the importance of the discovery of the new world, the rise of classical scholarship, trends in logic and logical theory, Nominalism, Avveroism, Neo-Thomism, the Jesuits, the Reformation, Neo-stoicism, the soul’s immortality, witchcraft, Skepticism, the philosophies of language and science and politics, Cosmology, women’s rights, the nature of the understanding, causality, ethics, freedom of the will, natural law, the emergence of the individual in society, the nature of wisdom, and the love of god. And, throughout, the Companion seeks not to compartmentalize these philosophical matters, but instead to show that close attention paid to their continuity may help reveal both the diversity and the profound coherence of the philosophies that emerged in the sixteenth century

For a long time scholars ignored Anselm of Canterbury’s dialogue, De grammatico. It was not until D. P. Henry’s investigations in the 1960s and 70s that it was seriously studied. He showed that it was an important work, but his interpretation was peculiar. The main point of it was to show that Anselm thought traditional logic inadequate for analyzing logical problems and that he wanted to establish a new language that was better suited for the task. Henry also argued that the logical system of the Polish logician, Lesniewski, best captured Anselm’s new logical language.It is only very recently that his interpretation has been challenged. In a paper from 2000, M. M. Adams argued that De grammatico should be seen as an introduction for students to Aristotle’s Categories . She is much closer to the truth than Henry, but Anselm’s work seems too sophisticated to be an introduction, even though the problem he is dealing with

In this article, the author studies some central concepts in Avicenna's and sī's modal logics as presented in Avicenna's Al-Ish r t wa'l Tan īh t ( Pointers and Reminders ) and in sī's commentary. In this work, Avicenna introduces some remarkable distinctions in order to interpret Aristotle's modal syllogistic in the Prior Analytics . The author outlines a new interpretation of absolute sentences as temporally indefinite sentences and argues on the basis of this that Avicenna seems to subscribe to the Principle of Plenitude. He also shows that he has no valid proof of the modal conversion rules and that he uses some rather ad hoc distinctions to show that Aristotle's modal syllogistic is correct. The author also notes some interesting differences between Avicenna's and sī's approaches to modal logic

The view of substance defended by William Ockham and John Buridan in the fourteenth century differs radically from the traditional Aristotelian or Thomistic view of substance. Their metaphysical position of substance not only influences the development of natural philosophy, it also changes the preconditions for cognition and epistemology. In this paper I examine the implications of this view on Buridan’s epistemology and particularly on the compatibility of his view of substance with his claim that we have simple substance concepts. I conclude that his metaphysics undermines this claim, but I also offer a suggestion for a possible solution to this problem

For a long time scholars ignored Anselm of Canterbury’s dialogue, De grammatico. It was not until D. P. Henry’s investigations in the 1960s and 70s that it was seriously studied. He showed that it was an important work, but his interpretation was peculiar. The main point of it was to show that Anselm thought traditional logic inadequate for analyzing logical problems and that he wanted to establish a new language that was better suited for the task. Henry also argued that the logical system of the Polish logician, Lesniewski, best captured Anselm’s new logical language.It is only very recently that his interpretation has been challenged. In a paper from 2000, M. M. Adams argued that De grammatico should be seen as an introduction for students to Aristotle’s Categories . She is much closer to the truth than Henry, but Anselm’s work seems too sophisticated to be an introduction, even though the problem he is dealing with

: In this paper I argue that the famous problems of dualism between mind (soul) and body, that is, the problems of interaction and unification, concerned philosophers already in a medieval Aristotelian tradition. The problems, although traceable earlier, become particularly visible after William Ockham in the early fourteenth century, and in formulating his own position on the animal and human souls I argue that Buridan realized these problems and laid down the only views on the soul he thought to be possible in an Aristotelian framework. His discussion then sets the stage for the following centuries. In presenting the background to Buridan's discussion I treat Aquinas, Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham

In this article, I present two virtually unknown sixteenth-century views of human freedom, that is, the views of Bartolomaeus de Usingen and Jodocus Trutfetter on the one hand and John Mair on the other. Their views serve as a natural context and partial background to the more famous debate on human freedom between Martin Luther and Erasmus of Rotterdam from 1524–1526. Usingen and Trutfetter were Luther’s philosophy teachers in Erfurt. In a passage from Book III of John Mair’s commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from 1530, he seems to defend a view of human freedom by which we can will evil for the sake of evil. Very few thinkers in the history of philosophy have defended such a view. The most famous medieval thinker to do so is William Ockham. To illustrate how radical this view is, I place him in the historical context of such thinkers as Plato, Augustine, Buridan, and Descartes.