•  212
    A puzzle about other-directed time-bias
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2). 2008.
    Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? 'Sometimes yes, sometimes no'—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
  •  678
    This is about the rights and wrongs of bringing people into existence. In a nutshell: sometimes what matters is not what would have happened to you, but what would have happened to the person who would have been in your position, even if that person never actually exists.
  •  422
    Should We Wish Well to All?
    Philosophical Review 125 (4): 451-472. 2016.
    Some moral theories tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose an interaction with a …Read more
  •  27
    References
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 107-110. 2003.
  •  108
    The Limits of Kindness
    Oxford University Press. 2013.
    Caspar Hare presents a bold and original approach to questions of what we ought to do, and why we ought to do it. He breaks with tradition to argue that we can tackle difficult problems in normative ethics by starting with a principle that is humble and uncontroversial. Being moral involves wanting particular other people to be better off