• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Caspar Hare

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    36
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    5
  •  News and Updates
    26

 More details
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
    Professor
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Normative Ethics
  • All publications (36)
  •  28
    Notes
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 99-106. 2003.
  •  210
    A puzzle about other-directed time-bias
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2). 2008.
    Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? 'Sometimes yes, sometimes no'—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
    Temporal Experience, Misc
  •  677
    Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?
    Ethics 117 (3): 498-523. 2007.
    This is about the rights and wrongs of bringing people into existence. In a nutshell: sometimes what matters is not what would have happened to you, but what would have happened to the person who would have been in your position, even if that person never actually exists.
    Social and Political Philosophy, Miscellaneous
  •  422
    Should We Wish Well to All?
    Philosophical Review 125 (4): 451-472. 2016.
    Some moral theories tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose an interaction with a …Read more
    Some moral theories tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose an interaction with a group.
    Aggregation and Consequentialism
  •  27
    References
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 107-110. 2003.
  •  32
    3 Egocentrism and Egocentric Metaphysics
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 19-40. 2003.
    Philosophy of Linguistics
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback