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25Time – The Emotional AsymmetryIn Heather Dyke & Adrian Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Wiley. 2013.In this chapter on time‐the emotional asymmetry, the author addresses two questions concerning future‐bias. The first is with respect to the sorts of things are people future‐biased. Do people want all things that they regard as bad to be in the past, or just some of them? Second, are people justified in being future‐biased? The second question has received a good deal of attention from philosophers. The author aims to survey different answers to the question, and to give a sense of how things p…Read more
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2115Why Aren’t I Part of a Whale?Analysis 83 (2): 227-234. 2023.We start by presenting three different views that jointly imply that every person has many conscious beings in their immediate vicinity, and that the number greatly varies from person to person. We then present and assess an argument to the conclusion that how confident someone should be in these views should sensitively depend on how massive they happen to be. According to the argument, sometimes irreducibly de se observations can be powerful evidence for or against believing in metaphysical th…Read more
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11On Myself, and Other, Less Important SubjectsPrinceton University Press. 2009.Caspar Hare makes an original and compelling case for "egocentric presentism," a view about the nature of first-person experience, about what happens when we see things from our own particular point of view. A natural thought about our first-person experience is that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present to me." Hare, however, goes one step further and claims, counterintuitively, that the thought should instead be that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present."…Read more
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23A Puzzle about Other-directed Time-bias 1Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2): 269-277. 2008.Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? ‘Sometimes yes, sometimes no’—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
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74On Myself, and Other, Less Important, SubjectsDissertation, Princeton University. 2003.In this dissertation I spell out, and make a case for, egocentric presentism, a view about what it is for a thing to be me. I argue that there are benefits associated with adopting this view. ;The chief benefit comes in the sphere of ethics. Many of us, when we think about what to do, feel a particular kind of ambivalence. On the one hand we are moved by an impartial concern for the greater good. We feel the force of considerations of the form: 'all things considered, doing...will make things be…Read more
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222Should We Wish Well to All?Philosophical Review 125 (4): 451-472. 2016.Some moral theories tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose an interaction with a …Read more
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103Rationality and the distant needyPhilosophy and Public Affairs 35 (2). 2007.This is my argument for the claim that morality is very demanding indeed. In a nutshell: being consistent is harder than you think.
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8AcknowledgmentsIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. 2003.
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60The Limits of KindnessOxford University Press. 2013.Caspar Hare presents a bold and original approach to questions of what we ought to do, and why we ought to do it. He breaks with tradition to argue that we can tackle difficult problems in normative ethics by starting with a principle that is humble and uncontroversial. Being moral involves wanting particular other people to be better off
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97 Skepticism and HumilityIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 91-98. 2003.
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182 Time- Bias and the Metaphysics of TimeIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 9-18. 2003.
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140Realism About Tense and PerspectivePhilosophy Compass 5 (9): 760-769. 2010.On one view of time past, present and future things exist, but their being past, present or future does not consist in their standing in before‐ and after‐relations to other things. So, for example, the event of the signing of the Magna Carta is past, and its being so does not consist in, or reduce to, its coming before the events of 2010.In this paper I discuss arguments for and against this view and view in its near vicinity, perspectival realism. I suggest that perspectival realism is a bette…Read more
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11IndexIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 111-114. 2003.
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155 A Problem about Personal Identity over TimeIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 57-72. 2003.
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96 The SolutionIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 73-90. 2003.
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213
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144 ClarificationsIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 41-56. 2003.
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31Review of Saul Smilansky, Ten Moral Paradoxes (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5). 2009.
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8NotesIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 99-106. 2003.
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95A puzzle about other-directed time-biasAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2). 2008.Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? 'Sometimes yes, sometimes no'—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
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101 Self- Interest and Self- ImportanceIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-8. 2003.
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10ReferencesIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 107-110. 2003.
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73 Egocentrism and Egocentric MetaphysicsIn On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 19-40. 2003.