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993Reply to Guy Kahane and Julian SavulescuRes Philosophica 93 (1): 295-309. 2016.Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu respond to my paper “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability” by arguing that my assessment of objections to the mere-difference view of disability is unconvincing and fails to explain their conviction that it is impermissible to cause disability. In reply, I argue that their response misconstrues, somewhat radically, both what I say in my paper and the commitments of the mere-difference view more generally. It also fails to adequately appreciate the unique epistem…Read more
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422Disability, minority, and differenceJournal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4): 337-355. 2009.abstract In this paper I develop a characterization of disability according to which disability is in no way a sub-optimal feature. I argue, however, that this conception of disability is compatible with the idea that having a disability is, at least in a restricted sense, a harm. I then go on to argue that construing disability in this way avoids many of the common objections levelled at accounts which claim that disability is not a negative feature.
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186Vagueness and arbitrariness: Merricks on compositionMind 116 (461): 105-113. 2007.In this paper I respond to Trenton Merricks's (2005) paper ‘Composition and Vagueness’. I argue that Merricks's paper faces the following difficulty: he claims to provide independent motivation for denying one of the premisses of the Lewis-Sider vagueness argument for unrestricted composition, but the alleged motivation he provides begs the question.
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603Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the PerplexedNoûs 44 (4): 601-627. 2010.In this paper I develop a framework for understanding ontic vagueness. The project of the paper is two-fold. I first outline a definitional account of ontic vagueness – one that I think is an improvement on previous attempts because it remains neutral on other, independent metaphysical issues. I then develop one potential manifestation of that basic definitional structure. This is a more robust (and much less neutral) account which gives a fully classical explication of ontic vagueness via modal…Read more
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245Arguments Against Metaphysical Indeterminacy and VaguenessPhilosophy Compass 5 (11): 953-964. 2010.In this article, I survey some of the major arguments against metaphysical indeterminacy and vagueness and outline potential responses.
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 2007
Charlottesville, Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality |