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151The philosophical significance of Stein’s paradoxEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (3): 411-433. 2017.Charles Stein discovered a paradox in 1955 that many statisticians think is of fundamental importance. Here we explore its philosophical implications. We outline the nature of Stein’s result and of subsequent work on shrinkage estimators; then we describe how these results are related to Bayesianism and to model selection criteria like AIC. We also discuss their bearing on scientific realism and instrumentalism. We argue that results concerning shrinkage estimators underwrite a surprising form o…Read more
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130Certain distributivity results for Lukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic Lℵ0..
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743An 'evidentialist' worry about Joyce's argument for ProbabilismDialetica 66 (3): 425-433. 2012.To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad B -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function b — and perhaps even reasons to have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is pragmatically bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not clear whether the DBA pinpoi…Read more
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132REVIEWS-An introduction to probability and inductive logicBulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4): 506-507. 2003.
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1213 Contrastive BayesiansimIn Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy, Routledge/taylor & Francis Group. pp. 39--64. 2013.
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298Pollock on probability in epistemology (review)Philosophical Studies 148 (3). 2010.In Thinking and Acting John Pollock offers some criticisms of Bayesian epistemology, and he defends an alternative understanding of the role of probability in epistemology. Here, I defend the Bayesian against some of Pollock's criticisms, and I discuss a potential problem for Pollock's alternative account
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71By and large, we think Strevens’s [6] is a useful reply to our original critique [2] of his paper on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem [5]. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original paper). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens’s approach to QD.
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176Let L be a sentential (object) language containing atoms ‘A’, ‘B’, . . . , and two logical connectives ‘&’ and ‘→’. In addition to these two logical connectives, L will also contain another binary connective ‘ ’, which is intended to be interpreted as the English indicative. In the meta-language for L , we will have two meta-linguistic operations: ‘ ’ and ‘ ’. ‘ ’ is a binary relation between individual sentences in L . It will be interpreted as “single premise entailment” (or “single premise de…Read more
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218The Strongest Possible Lewisian Triviality ResultThought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 69-74. 2015.The strongest possible Lewisian triviality result for the indicative conditional is proven
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530Accuracy, Coherence and EvidenceOxford Studies in Epistemology 5 61-96. 2015.Taking Joyce’s (1998; 2009) recent argument(s) for probabilism as our point of departure, we propose a new way of grounding formal, synchronic, epistemic coherence requirements for (opinionated) full belief. Our approach yields principled alternatives to deductive consistency, sheds new light on the preface and lottery paradoxes, and reveals novel conceptual connections between alethic and evidential epistemic norms
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59Harman [8] would concede that (1)–(3) are inconsistent, and (as a result) that something is wrong with premises (1)–(3). But, he would reject the relevantists’ diagnosis that (1) must be rejected. I take it he’d say it’s (2) that is to blame here. (2) is a bridge principle [12] linking entailment and inference. (2) is correct only for consistent B’s. [Even if B is consistent, the correct response may rather be to reject some Bi’s in B.].
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65• Two competing explanations (independence of S i favors R over CB): (CB) there is a coherence bias in a’s S -formation process.
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Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
| Formal Epistemology |