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21E confirmsi H1 more strongly than E confirmsi H2 iff c(H1, E) > c(H2, E). [where c is some relevance measure]
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283Bayesian confirmation and auxiliary hypotheses revisited: A reply to StrevensBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2): 293-302. 2005.has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. Some background on Quine–Duhem Strevens…Read more
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53Suppose we have two false hypotheses H1 and H2. Sometimes, we would like to be able to say that H1 is closer to the truth than H2 (e.g., Newton’s hypothesis vs. Ptolemy’s).
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32Review of I. Hacking, An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic (review)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4): 5006-5008. 2003.
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48Here’s what Nicod [23] said about instantial confirmation: Consider the formula or the law: A entails B. How can a particular proposition, or more briefly, a fact, affect its probability? If this fact consists of the presence of B in a case of A, it is favourable to the law . . . on the contrary, if it consists of the absence of B in a case of A, it is unfavourable to this law.
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35Harman [8] would concede that (1)–(3) are inconsistent, and (as a result) that something is wrong with premises (1)–(3). But, he would reject the relevantists’ diagnosis that (1) must be rejected. I take it he’d say it’s (2) that is to blame here. (2) is a bridge principle [12] linking entailment and inference. (2) is correct only for consistent B’s. [Even if B is consistent, the correct response may rather be to reject some Bi’s in B.].
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46A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with ApplicationsPhilosophy of Science 68 (S3). 2001.A Bayesian account of independent evidential support is outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C. S. Peirce. I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of confirmation satisfy some basic desiderata suggested by Peirce for adequate accounts of independent evidence. I argue that, by considering further natural constraints on a probabilistic account of independent evidence, all but a very small class of Bayesian measures of confirmation can be ruled out. In closin…Read more
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48The Automation of Sound Reasoning and Successful Proof FindingIn Dale Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell. 2006.This chapter contains sections titled: The Cutting Edge Automated Reasoning, Principles and Elements Significant Successes Myths, Mechanization, and Mystique.
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71In Bayes or Bust? John Earman quickly dismisses a possible resolution (or avoidance) of the problem of old evidence. In this note, I argue that his dismissal is premature, and that the proposed resolution (when charitably reconstructed) is reasonable.
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Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
| Formal Epistemology |