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1611Monty hall, doomsday and confirmationAnalysis 63 (1). 2003.We give an analysis of the Monty Hall problem purely in terms of confirmation, without making any lottery assumptions about priors. Along the way, we show the Monty Hall problem is structurally identical to the Doomsday Argument.
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129Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of ConfirmationPhilosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 207-241. 2010.The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on The Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on The Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, reexamining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
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39Jill’s paper contains several distinct threads and arguments. I will focus only on what I see as the main theses of the paper, which involve the justification or grounding of the microcanonical probability distribution of classical statistical mechanics. I’ll begin by telling the “canonical” story of the MCD. Then I will discuss Jill’s proposal. I will describe one worry that I have regarding her proposal, and I will offer a friendly amendment which seems to allay my worry
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96Let L be a sentential (object) language containing atoms ‘A’, ‘B’, . . . , and two logical connectives ‘&’ and ‘→’. In addition to these two logical connectives, L will also contain another binary connective ‘ ’, which is intended to be interpreted as the English indicative. In the meta-language for L , we will have two meta-linguistic operations: ‘ ’ and ‘ ’. ‘ ’ is a binary relation between individual sentences in L . It will be interpreted as “single premise entailment” (or “single premise de…Read more
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128The Strongest Possible Lewisian Triviality ResultThought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 69-74. 2015.The strongest possible Lewisian triviality result for the indicative conditional is proven
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11Book ReviewDavid Howie, Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , xi + 262 pp., $60.00 cloth (review)Philosophy of Science 70 (3): 643-646. 2003.
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18Hacking Ian. An introduction to probability and inductive logic. Cambridge University Press, 2000, xvii+ 302 pp (review)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4): 506-508. 2003.
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41• Two competing explanations (independence of S i favors R over CB): (CB) there is a coherence bias in a’s S -formation process.
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118Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce’s Argument for ProbabilismPhilosophy of Science 79 (1): 167-174. 2012.In this article, I explain how a variant of David Miller's argument concerning the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's notion of the accuracy of “estimates of numerical truth-values”. This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences should obey the probability calculus.
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Formal Epistemology |