University of California, Los Angeles
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1990
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  407
    “Bamboozled by Our Own Words”: Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments Against Contextualism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 316-338. 2006.
    The best grounds for accepting contextualism concerning knowledge attributions are to be found in how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, nonphilosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as “knowledge” in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others. Contextualists typically appeal to pairs of cases that forcefully display the variability in the epistemic standards that govern ordinary usage: A “low standards” case (henceforth…Read more
  •  2066
    Solving the skeptical problem
    Philosophical Review 104 (1): 1-52. 1995.
  •  227
    Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 193-198. 1996.
    In “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” I argue that advocates of the “Relevant Alternatives” theory of knowledge fall into certain mistakes result if they tie the content of a knowledge attribution, on a given occasion of use, too tightly to what the range of relevant alternatives is on that occasion, and I sketch an alternative approach to the issues involved that avoids such mistakes. In “The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions,” Anthony Brueckner charges that my own account of …Read more
  •  113
    Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 238-240. 1998.
  •  492
    Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys
    Philosophical Studies 156 (1): 81-110. 2011.
    I will here sharply oppose all the phases of the story Schaffer & Knobe tell. In Part 1 we will look at the supposed empirical case against standard contextualism, and in Part 2 we will investigate Schaffer & Knobe’s supposed empirical case for the superiority of contrastivism over standard contextualism.
  •  44
    Plantinga construes the “atheologian” as claiming that “the conjunction of these two propositions is necessarily false, false in every possible world,” while Plantinga “aims to show that there is a possible world in which (1) and (2) are both true.”.