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20Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 945-949. 1993.
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18Moore and Wittgenstein on CertaintyPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 238-241. 1994.
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15Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 945-949. 1993.
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14The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2Oxford University Press. 2017.Keith DeRose presents, develops, and defends original solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: skeptical hypotheses and the lottery problem. He deploys a powerful version of contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards for the attribution of knowledge vary with context.
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13The appearance of ignoranceOxford University Press. 2017.Keith DeRose presents, develops, and defends original solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: skeptical hypotheses and the lottery problem. He deploys a powerful version of contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards for the attribution of knowledge vary with context.
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11Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical HypothesesIn John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell. 2004.This chapter contains section titled: Sensitivity Accounts — Direct and Indirect The Attack by Counterexample on Sensitivity Accounts — And Why SCA Seems on the Right Track Nonetheless Sosa's Safety Account Sosa's Account as a Sensitivity Account — and His Counterexamples Safety and the Problem of True/True Subjunctives Other Formulations of Safety Safety and Strength of Epistemic Position Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism Intuitive Complexity: Do We Know that We're Not Brains in Vats?
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9Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 238-241. 1998.
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2Questioning evidentialismIn Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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Solving the Skeptical ProblemIn Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader, Oxford University Press. 1999.
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Knowledge, Epistemic Possibility, and ScepticismDissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 1990.In Chapter 1, I defend contextualism--the view that the standards for knowing that a subject must live up to in order for sentences attributing knowledge to her to be true vary according to various features of the contexts in which these sentences are uttered. ;In Chapter 2, I propose and defend a hypothesis as to the truth conditions of epistemic modal statements; I argue that if it is epistemically possible from a subject's point of view that not-p, then she does not know that p; and, since, a…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Religion |