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119Skepticism: a contemporary reader (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1999.Recently, new life has been breathed into the ancient philosophical topic of skepticism. The subject of some of the best and most provocative work in contemporary philosophy, skepticism has been addressed not only by top epistemologists but also by several of the world's finest philosophers who are most known for their work in other areas of the discipline. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader brings together the most important recent contributions to the discussion of skepticism. Covering major ap…Read more
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813Contextualism and knowledge attributionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 913-929. 1992.
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2Questioning evidentialismIn Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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22Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 238-241. 1998.
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238The problem with subject-sensitive invariantismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2). 2004.Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of “Assertion, Knowledge and Context” establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for “I know that P” vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the va…Read more
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285Gradable adjectives: A defence of pluralismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1): 141-160. 2008.This paper attacks the Implicit Reference Class Theory of gradable adjectives and proposes instead a ?pluralist? approach to the semantics of those terms, according to which they can be governed by a variety of different types of standards, one, but only one, of which is the group-indexed standards utilized by the Implicit Reference Class Theory
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25Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?Noûs 33 (s13): 385-413. 1999.
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330“Bamboozled by Our Own Words”: Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments Against ContextualismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2). 2006.The best grounds for accepting contextualism concerning knowledge attributions are to be found in how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, nonphilosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as “knowledge” in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others. Contextualists typically appeal to pairs of cases that forcefully display the variability in the epistemic standards that govern ordinary usage: A “low standards” case (henceforth…Read more
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53Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 697-706. 2000.My focus will be on Richard Feldman’s claim that what we epistemically ought to believe is what fits our evidence. I will propose some potential counter-examples to test this evidentialist thesis. My main intention in presenting the “counter-examples” is to better understand Feldman’s evidentialism, and evidentialism in general. How are we to understand what our evidence is, how it works, and how are we to understand the phrase “epistemically ought to believe” such that evidentialism might make …Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Religion |