-
378Which worlds are possible? A judgment aggregation problemJournal of Philosophical Logic 37 (1). 2008.Suppose the members of a group (e.g., committee, jury, expert panel) each form a judgment on which worlds in a given set are possible, subject to the constraint that at least one world is possible but not all are. The group seeks to aggregate these individual judgments into a collective judgment, subject to the same constraint. I show that no judgment aggregation rule can solve this problem in accordance with three conditions: “unanimity,” “independence” and “non-dictatorship,” Although the resu…Read more
-
323[This version of the paper has been superseded by "Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework", forthcoming in Economics & Philosophy.] We introduce a “reason-based” way of rationalizing an agent’s choice behaviour, which explains choices by specifying which properties of the options or choice context the agent cares about (the “motivationally salient properties”) and how he or she cares about these properties (the “fundamental preference relation”). Reason-based ration…Read more
-
871Can there be a global Demos? An agency-based approachPhilosophy and Public Affairs 38 (1): 76-110. 2010.Can there be a global demos? The current debate about this topic is divided between two opposing camps: the “pessimist” or “impossibilist” camp, which holds that the emergence of a global demos is either conceptually or empirically impossible, and the “optimist” or “possibilist” camp, which holds that the emergence of a global demos is conceptually as well as empirically possible and an embryonic version of it already exists. However, the two camps agree neither on a common working definition of…Read more
-
175The impossibility of a Paretian republican? Some comments on Pettit and SenEconomics and Philosophy 20 (1): 65-87. 2004.Philip Pettit (2001) has suggested that there are parallels between his republican account of freedom and Amartya Sen's (1970) account of freedom as decisive preference. In this paper, I discuss these parallels from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. I sketch a formalization of republican freedom and argue that republican freedom is formally very similar to freedom as defined in Sen's “minimal liberalism” condition. In consequence, the republican account of freedom is vulnerable to a version…Read more
-
107A model of path-dependence in decisions over multiple propositionsAmerican Political Science Review 98 (3): 495-513. 2004.I model sequential decisions over multiple interconnected propositions and investigate path-dependence in such decisions. The propositions and their interconnections are represented in propositional logic. A sequential decision process is path-dependent if its outcome depends on the order in which the propositions are considered. Assuming that earlier decisions constrain later ones, I prove three main results: First, certain rationality violations by the decision-making agent—individual or group…Read more
-
208On the significance of the absolute MarginBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3): 521-544. 2004.Consider the hypothesis H that a defendant is guilty, and the evidence E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors have voted for H and a minority of k:=n-h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By a formula of Condorcet, the probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror's competence and on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority h-k, but neither on the number n, nor on the proportion h/n. This paper reassesses that result and explo…Read more
-
35One fundamental thesis within the rapidly growing literature on deliberative democracy is that the stability and quality of a democracy depend not only on formal institutions such as the electoral system or the structure of parliamentary representation. They depend also on certain democratic competences of the citizens, especially their capacity for democratic communication. According to this thesis, above all the capacity for democratic deliberation, i.e., for argumentation, evaluation and for …Read more
-
141Social choice theory and deliberative democracy : A response to AldredBritish Journal of Political Science 34 (4): 752-758. 2004.Jonathan Aldred shares our desire to promote a reconciliation between social choice theory and deliberative democracy in the interests of a more comprehensive and compelling account of democracy.1 His comments on some details of our analysis – specifically, our use of Arrow’s conditions of universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives – give us an opportunity to clarify our position. His discussion of the independence condition in particular identifies some ambiguity in our exposi…Read more
-
407Independence and Interdependence: Lessons from the HiveRationality and Society 26 (2): 170-207. 2014.There is a substantial class of collective decision problems whose successful solution requires interdependence among decision makers at the agenda-setting stage and independence at the stage of choice. We define this class of problems and describe and apply a search-and-decision mechanism theoretically modeled in the context of honeybees and identified in earlier empirical work in biology. The honeybees’ mechanism has useful implications for mechanism design in human institutions, including cou…Read more
-
1257The Methodology of Political TheoryIn Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Oxford University Press. 2016.This article examines the methodology of a core branch of contemporary political theory or philosophy: “analytic” political theory. After distinguishing political theory from related fields, such as political science, moral philosophy, and legal theory, the article discusses the analysis of political concepts. It then turns to the notions of principles and theories, as distinct from concepts, and reviews the methods of assessing such principles and theories, for the purpose of justifying or crit…Read more
-
55Democracy in animal groups: a political science perspectiveTrends in Ecology and Evolution 19 (4): 168-169. 2004.This short paper proposes an application of Condorcet's jury theorem to animal group decisions.
-
919The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory reviewSynthese 187 (1): 179-207. 2012.This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probabil…Read more
-
902Aggregating sets of judgments: Two impossibility results comparedSynthese 140 (1-2). 2004.The ``doctrinal paradox'' or ``discursive dilemma'' shows that propositionwise majority voting over the judgments held by multiple individuals on some interconnected propositions can lead to inconsistent collective judgments on these propositions. List and Pettit (2002) have proved that this paradox illustrates a more general impossibility theorem showing that there exists no aggregation procedure that generally produces consistent collective judgments and satisfies certain minimal conditions. A…Read more
-
111Two concepts of agreementThe Good Society 11 (1): 72-79. 2002.This paper develops a distinction between "substantive agreement" and "meta-agreement" and explores the significance of this distinction for democracy and social choice.
-
135Special majorities rationalizedBritish Journal of Political Science 36 (2): 213-241. 2006.Complaints are common about the arbitrary and conservative bias of special-majority rules. Such complaints, however, apply to asymmetrical versions of those rules alone. Symmetrical special-majority rules remedy that defect, albeit at the cost of often rendering no determinate verdict. Here what is formally at stake, both procedurally and epistemically, is explored in the choice between those two forms of special-majority rule and simple-majority rule; and practical ways are suggested of resolvi…Read more
-
80Multidimensional welfare aggregationPublic Choice 119 119-142. 2004.Most accounts of welfare aggregation in the tradition of Arrow's and Sen's social-choice-theoretic frameworks represent the welfare of an individual in terms of a single welfare ordering or a single scalar-valued welfare function. I develop a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's and Sen's frameworks, representing individual welfare in terms of multiple personal welfare functions, corresponding to multiple 'dimensions' of welfare. I show that, as in the one-dimensional case, the existence o…Read more
-
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, MünchenMunich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy
Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of ReligionProfessor -
Munich, Bavaria, Germany