Ewa Nowak

proving university students’ research skills, research integrity and best standards for scientific excellence is crucial for all disciplines. Marina Klimenko, a senior lecturer at the University of Florida, developed an innovative digital textbook entitled Research Methods in the Social Sciences (2020) with the focus on investigative psychology. The edition was powered by the e-learning portal and published by Sentia Publishing. The author’s own epistemological and research expertise is combined here with her competence in higher education didactics. Klimenko’s textbook seems to be perfectly tailored for prospective researchers – and useful for various disciplines representing the social sciences and humanities.

In this chapter I focus on the relevance of moral emotions in our „perception of something as moral issue” as well as „in the application of moral norms, but also in their grounding…”1. Referring to the statements of philosophy (from Aristotle to Habermas) and developmental psychology (from Piaget to Ekman) I highlight that affectivity needs to be already promoted in the early education. There is a lack of the professional emotional education in the Polish schooling system. Finally I propose a simple training for both teachers and students, in order to strength their skills of understanding facial emotional expressions of others. Mutual respect, trust, and better communicational relationships in the classroom will follow, and, last but not least, the learning processes in pupils will be facilitated too.

AI designers endeavour to improve ‘autonomy’ in artificial intelligent devices, as recent developments show. This chapter firstly argues against attributing metaphysical attitudes to AI and, simultaneously, in favor of improving autonomous AI which has been enabled to respect autonomy in human agents. This seems to be the only responsible way of making further advances in the field of autonomous social AI. Let us examine what is meant by claims such as designing our artificial alter egos and sharing moral selves with artificial humanoid devices as well as providing autonomous AI with an ethical framework modelled upon the core aspects of moral selfhood, e.g., making decisions which are based on autonomous law-giving, in Kantian terms.

Hospitality is „not a concept which lends itself to objective knowledge,” Jacques Derrida assumes. His assumption „provokes” and challenges European hospitability, not only in the Mediterranean area in which „welcoming” and „ingratiating” (in Derrida’s terms) forms of human conduct met together thousands years ago, and an asylum seeker found hospitia. What is hospitality and why philosophize about it today? The paper examines hospitality’s pragmatic, customary, legal and moral aspects in, both, historical and contemporary contexts.

Artykuł rewiduje stworzoną przez Roberta L. Selmana teorię przyjmowania perspektyw przez umysł w kontekście koresponujących z nią tradycji, takich, jak fenomenologia i filozofia umysłu. Uwzględnia implikacje owej teorii w etyce. Przyjmowanie perspektyw to jedna ze zdolności poznawczych, rozwijających się w toku ontogenezy. Autorka broni koncepcji “autonomicznej współzależności”, która pozwala Selmanowi odróżnić interaktywność ludzkiego od zdolności formułowania niezależnych sądów przez podmiot moralny. Elastyczny, interaktywny umysł nie oznacza otwarcia na ekspansję innych; z kolei jego izolacja w formacie „egoligicznym” nie chroniłaby przed taką ekspansją. Przeciwnie: jakość relacji międzyludzkich zależy od tego, jak postrzegamy i rozumiemy innych, uwzględniając owo intersubiektywne poznanie we własnym zachowaniu.

The paper examines the evolution of Marek Siemek’s “dialogical principle.” The early version of this principle, sketched in the essay “Dialogue and Its Myth”, meets several criteria of the phenomenology of dialogue and even hermeneutics. However, Siemek has continued to change his concept of dialogue over the decades. In his recent book, Freedom, Reason, Intersubjectivity, he explores transcendental preconditions of free and reasonable activism, i.e., the Fichtean “limitative synthesis” of I and Non-I and its applications in social interrelations. He no longer considers the empirical, anthropological, and phenomenological aspects of dialogics and mutual recognition. He also replaces mutuality with reciprocity, asymmetry with symmetry, and phenomenology with transcendentalism.