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41Inconsistent LanguagesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2): 251-275. 2002.The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in truth conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorites paradox
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458Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-FregeanismIn Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford University Press Uk. 2016.
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519Variance Theses in Ontology and MetaethicsIn Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2019.
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492Thickness and EvaluationJournal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1): 89-104. 2017.This is a review essay devoted to Pekka Väyrynen’s The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty. Väyrynen’s book, concerned with thick terms and thick concepts, argues for a pragmatic view on the evaluativeness associated with these terms and concepts. The essay raises a number of critical questions regarding what Väyrynen’s arguments for his view actually show. It deals with, for example, thick properties, the fact-value distinction, what it is for terms and concepts to be (semantically) evaluative, and wh…Read more
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600Incoherentism and the Sorites ParadoxIn Sergi Oms & Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox, Cambridge University Press. 2019.
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799Intuitions, Conceptual Engineering, and Conceptual Fixed PointsIn Christopher Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods, Palgrave Macmillan. 2015.
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482Carnap's Legacy for the Contemporary Metaontological DebateIn Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap, Oxford University Press Uk. 2016.
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538Being Metaphysically Unsettled: Barnes and Williams on Metaphysical Indeterminacy and VaguenessOxford Studies in Metaphysics 6 6. 2011.This chapter discusses the defence of metaphysical indeterminacy by Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams and discusses a classical and bivalent theory of such indeterminacy. Even if metaphysical indeterminacy arguably is intelligible, Barnes and Williams argue in favour of it being so and this faces important problems. As for classical logic and bivalence, the chapter problematizes what exactly is at issue in this debate. Can reality not be adequately described using different languages, some cl…Read more
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386Modesty, Esotericism and Ineffability: Remarks on HofweberAnalysis 78 (2): 291-303. 2018.In his Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics, Thomas Hofweber among other things presents a radical perspective on ontology and metaphysics. In this note, I critically discuss some of the points Hofweber makes.
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342Reply to criticsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5): 535-561. 2020.Reply to Stephanie Leary’s, Kris McDaniel’s, Tristram McPherson’s and David Plunkett’s articles on Choosing Normative Concepts (OUP, 2017) in book symposium in Inquiry.
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234Reply to Bykvist and OlsonUtilitas 31 (3): 347-349. 2019.Reply to Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson's review of Choosing Normative Concepts (OUP, 2017) in Utilitas.
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241The existence of personitesPhilosophical Studies 177 (7): 2051-2071. 2020.Mark Johnston and Eric Olson have both pressed what Johnston has dubbed the personite problem. Personites, if they exist, are person-like entities whose lives extend over a continuous proper part of a person’s life. They are so person-like that they seem to have moral status if persons do. But this threatens to wreak havoc with ordinary moral thinking. For example, simple decisions to suffer some short-term hardship for long-term benefits become problematic. And ordinary punishment is always als…Read more
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677Inconsistency and replacementInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4): 387-402. 2019.The article is an extended critical discussion of Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth. Scharp’s case for the claim that the concept of truth is inconsistent is criticized, and so is his case for the claim that the concept of truth must be replaced because of its inconsistency.
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356Rayo’s MetametaphysicsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (4): 483-497. 2014.In his important book The Construction of Logical Space, Agustín Rayo lays out a distinctive metametaphysical view and applies it fruitfully to disputes concerning ontology and concerning modality. In this article, I present a number of criticisms of the view developed, mostly focusing on the underlying metametaphysics and Rayo’s claims on its behalf.
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246What is deflationism about truth?Synthese 198 (2): 631-645. 2017.What is deflationism about truth? There are many questions that can be raised about this, given the numerous different characterizations of deflationism in the literature. Here I attend to questions about the characterization of deflationism that arise when we carefully distinguish between issues pertaining to concepts and issues pertaining to properties.
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834Making sense of logical pluralismInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4): 433-454. 2020.The article is centered on the question of how best to understand the logical pluralism/logical monism debate. A number of suggestions are brought up and rejected on the ground that they re...
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48Supervaluationism, Vagueifiers, and Semantic OverdeterminationDialectica 55 (4): 363-378. 2001.Supervaluationism, traditionally conceived, is the conjunction of three theses: Vagueness in a language gives rise to there being a multitude of acceptable assignments of semantic values to some expressions of the language, These assignments correspond to possible completions of the meanings of vague expressions, Truth is truth under all acceptable assignments, and falsity is falsity under all acceptable assignments. Supervaluationism has three chief virtues. It preserves classical logic. It pro…Read more
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138Choosing Normative ConceptsOxford University Press. 2017.The concepts we use to value and prescribe are historically contingent, and we could have found ourselves with others. But what does it mean to say that some concepts are better than others for purposes of action-guiding and deliberation? What is it to choose between different normative conceptual frameworks?
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15The Liar Paradox and MetaphysicsIn Jurgis Skilters & Matti Eklund (eds.), Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects (Proceedings of the First International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication), University of Latvia Press. 2006.
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361Carnap and ontological pluralismIn Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press. pp. 130--56. 2009.My focus here will be Rudolf Carnap’s views on ontology, as these are presented in the seminal “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950). I will first describe how I think Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions is best understood. Then I will turn to broader issues regarding Carnap’s views on ontology. With certain reservations, I will ascribe to Carnap an ontological pluralist position roughly similar to the positions of Eli Hirsch and the later Hilary Putnam. Then I tur…Read more
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9Saving the Differences (review)Philosophical Review 113 (2): 288-292. 2004.The basic elements of this framework were elaborated upon and defended at some length in Wright’s Truth and Objectivity —henceforth, T&O—which was a marvelous book. The present volume of essays, almost all previously published and including some that predate T&O, continues to discuss the same themes, and is, in virtue of the significance of the ideas discussed and the high level of the discussion, likewise a very important work. The collection is divided into five parts: Realism Reconfigured, Re…Read more
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2Review of Heather Dyke, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11). 2008.
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132Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical IndeterminacyMetaphysica 14 (2): 165-179. 2013.The topic of this paper is whether there is metaphysical vagueness. It is shown that it is important to distinguish between the general phenomenon of indeterminacy and the more narrow phenomenon of vagueness (the phenomenon that paradigmatically rears its head in sorites reasoning). Relatedly, it is important to distinguish between metaphysical indeterminacy and metaphysical vagueness. One can wish to allow metaphysical indeterminacy but rule out metaphysical vagueness. As is discussed in the pa…Read more
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145What are Thick Concepts?Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1): 25-49. 2011.Many theorists hold that there is, among value concepts, a fundamental distinction between thin ones and thick ones. Among thin ones are concepts like good and right. Among concepts that have been regarded as thick are discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment, treachery, promise, brutality, courage, coward, lie, gratitude, lewd, perverted, rude, glorious, graceful, exploited, and, of course, many others. Roughly speaking, thick c…Read more
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115Trends and Progress in PhilosophyMetaphilosophy 44 (3): 276-292. 2013.This article is in three parts. The first discusses trends in philosophy. The second defends reliance on intuitions in philosophy from some doubts that have recently been raised. The third discusses Philip Kitcher's contention that contemporary analytic philosophy does not have its priorities straight. While the three parts are independent, there is a common theme. Each part defends what is regarded as orthodoxy from attacks. Of course there are other reasonable challenges to philosophical metho…Read more
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