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Matti Eklund

Uppsala University
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  • Uppsala University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
PhD, 2000
CV
Homepage
Uppsala, Uppsala County, Sweden
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Meta-Ethics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
20th Century Philosophy
2 more
  • All publications (126)
  •  15
    The Liar Paradox and Metaphysics
    In Jurgis Skilters & Matti Eklund (eds.), Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects (Proceedings of the First International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication), University of Latvia Press. 2006.
    Liar Paradox
  • Förkastliga värdebegrepp och Karl Marx antimoralism
    Filosofisk Tidskrift 1. 2009.
  •  2658
    Carnap and ontological pluralism
    In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press. pp. 130--56. 2009.
    My focus here will be Rudolf Carnap’s views on ontology, as these are presented in the seminal “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950). I will first describe how I think Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions is best understood. Then I will turn to broader issues regarding Carnap’s views on ontology. With certain reservations, I will ascribe to Carnap an ontological pluralist position roughly similar to the positions of Eli Hirsch and the later Hilary Putnam. Then I tur…Read more
    My focus here will be Rudolf Carnap’s views on ontology, as these are presented in the seminal “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950). I will first describe how I think Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions is best understood. Then I will turn to broader issues regarding Carnap’s views on ontology. With certain reservations, I will ascribe to Carnap an ontological pluralist position roughly similar to the positions of Eli Hirsch and the later Hilary Putnam. Then I turn to some interrelated arguments against the pluralist view. The arguments are not demonstrative. Some possible escape routes for the pluralist are outlined. But I think the arguments constitute a formidable challenge. There should be serious doubt as to whether the pluralist view, as it emerges after discussion of these arguments, will be worth defending. Moreover, there is an alternative ontological view which equally well subserves the motivations underlying ontological pluralism.
    Ontological PluralismCarnap: OntologyVerbal DisputesMetaontology, MiscOntological DisagreementOntolo…Read more
    Ontological PluralismCarnap: OntologyVerbal DisputesMetaontology, MiscOntological DisagreementOntology
  •  187
    Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity
    Philosophical Review 113 (2): 288-292. 2004.
    The basic elements of this framework were elaborated upon and defended at some length in Wright’s Truth and Objectivity —henceforth, T&O—which was a marvelous book. The present volume of essays, almost all previously published and including some that predate T&O, continues to discuss the same themes, and is, in virtue of the significance of the ideas discussed and the high level of the discussion, likewise a very important work. The collection is divided into five parts: Realism Reconfigured, Re…Read more
    The basic elements of this framework were elaborated upon and defended at some length in Wright’s Truth and Objectivity —henceforth, T&O—which was a marvelous book. The present volume of essays, almost all previously published and including some that predate T&O, continues to discuss the same themes, and is, in virtue of the significance of the ideas discussed and the high level of the discussion, likewise a very important work. The collection is divided into five parts: Realism Reconfigured, Replies to Critics, Ethics, Truth, and Response-Dependence and Cognitive Command. The oldest essay in the collection is “Realism, Anti-Realism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism,” in section 1, Wright’s 1987 Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture in Oxford. This essay, as well as “Moral Values, Projection, and Secondary Qualities,” from 1988, predates T&O itself. The only previously unpublished material is the latter part of “Minimalism and Deflationism,” in section 4, an essay edited from material from different sources. Each section of the book begins with an introduction, but the introductions contain only brief summaries of the papers.
    Pluralism about TruthDeflationism about Truth, MiscMinimalism about Truth
  •  1762
    Alternative normative concepts
    Analytic Philosophy 53 (2): 139-157. 2012.
    Moral SemanticsMoral Language, MiscMoral CognitivismMoral Realism and Irrealism, MiscellaneousMoral …Read more
    Moral SemanticsMoral Language, MiscMoral CognitivismMoral Realism and Irrealism, MiscellaneousMoral NonnaturalismConceptual Engineering
  •  134
    Review of Heather Dyke, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11). 2008.
    Metaontology, MiscMethodology in Metaphysics
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