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Matti Eklund

Uppsala University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    126
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    26
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 More details
  • Uppsala University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
PhD, 2000
CV
Homepage
Uppsala, Uppsala County, Sweden
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Meta-Ethics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
20th Century Philosophy
2 more
  • All publications (126)
  •  122
    The liar paradox, expressibility, possible languages
    In Jc Beall (ed.), Spandrels of Truth, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (L) is false. But since this is just what (L) says, (L) is then true. (For it would appear to b…Read more
    Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (L) is false. But since this is just what (L) says, (L) is then true. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if things are as a given sentence says they are, the sentence is true.) So (L) is true. So (L) is both true and false. Contradiction.
    Languages, MiscLiar ParadoxLinguistic Universals
  •  59
    Finzione, indifferenza e ontologia
    Rivista di Estetica 32 (32): 71-92. 2006.
    1 Introduzione Quando i filosofi fanno affermazioni del tipo “gli A sono finzioni”, il più delle volte ciò che dicono è ambiguo in un modo cruciale. Secondo una certa lettura, ciò che viene detto ha chiare implicazioni ontologiche: non ci sono, in realtà, cose come gli F. Ma c’è anche un modo diverso, non ontologico, di leggere tali affermazioni: come se dicessero semplicemente che le A-asserzioni sono avanzate, di norma, in uno spirito finzionale. Chiaramente, si può sostenere che normalment...
    Aesthetics
  •  120
    Schiffer on vagueness
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1). 2006.
    I go through, and criticize, Stephen Schiffer's account of vagueness and the sorites paradox. I discuss his notion of a happy-face solution to a paradox, his appeal to vagueness-related partial belief, his claim that indeterminacy is a psychological notion, and his view that the sorites premise and the inference rule of modus ponens are indeterminate.
    Theories of Vagueness, Misc
  •  159
    Book Review. Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. Eli Hirsch. (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Review. 2011.
    Quantification and Ontology
  •  91
    Review of Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3). 2007.
    ModalityPhysical and Animalist Theories Of Personal IdentityVague IdentityIdentity of IndiscerniblesRead more
    ModalityPhysical and Animalist Theories Of Personal IdentityVague IdentityIdentity of IndiscerniblesCriteria of IdentityIdentity, Misc
  • Paradoxer: en allmän diagnos
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 3. 2002.
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