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122The liar paradox, expressibility, possible languagesIn Jc Beall (ed.), Spandrels of Truth, Oxford University Press. 2011.Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (L) is false. But since this is just what (L) says, (L) is then true. (For it would appear to b…Read more
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59Finzione, indifferenza e ontologiaRivista di Estetica 32 (32): 71-92. 2006.1 Introduzione Quando i filosofi fanno affermazioni del tipo “gli A sono finzioni”, il più delle volte ciò che dicono è ambiguo in un modo cruciale. Secondo una certa lettura, ciò che viene detto ha chiare implicazioni ontologiche: non ci sono, in realtà, cose come gli F. Ma c’è anche un modo diverso, non ontologico, di leggere tali affermazioni: come se dicessero semplicemente che le A-asserzioni sono avanzate, di norma, in uno spirito finzionale. Chiaramente, si può sostenere che normalment...
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120Schiffer on vaguenessPacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1). 2006.I go through, and criticize, Stephen Schiffer's account of vagueness and the sorites paradox. I discuss his notion of a happy-face solution to a paradox, his appeal to vagueness-related partial belief, his claim that indeterminacy is a psychological notion, and his view that the sorites premise and the inference rule of modus ponens are indeterminate.
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159Book Review. Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. Eli Hirsch. (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Review. 2011.
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91Review of Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3). 2007.
Uppsala, Uppsala County, Sweden