Stephen R. Palmquist

Palmquist’s Commentary provides the first definitive clarification on Kant’s Philosophy of Religion in English; it includes the full text of Pluhar’s translation, interspersed with explanations, providing both a detailed overview and an original interpretation of Kant’s work. Offers definitive, sentence-level commentary on Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason Presents a thoroughly revised version of Pluhar’s translation of the full text of Kant’s Religion, including detailed notes comparing the translation with the others still in use today Identifies most of the several hundred changes Kant made to the second (1794) edition and unearths evidence that many major changes were responses to criticisms of the first edition Provides both a detailed overview and original interpretation of Kant’s work on the philosophy of religion Demonstrates that Kant’s arguments in Religion are not only cogent, but have clear and profound practical applications to the way religion is actually practiced in the world today Includes a glossary aimed at justifying new translations of key technical terms in Religion, many of which have previously neglected religious and theological implications.

In this chapter, Immanuel Kant's focus is on how members of a (true) church should interpret their Scripture. Not surprisingly, Kant's position on this issue is unequivocal: Scriptures must be given a moral interpretation, if they are to have any relevance to a true church. The first mark of a true church is its universality; through it, a church is grounded in pure religious faith. Kant asks us to choose: (a) Will we interpret religious faith as an attempt to satisfy God by obeying nonmoral precepts, motivated by fear of punishment for service withheld and/or by hope of reward for service rendered? Or (b) Will we interpret faith as a form of assurance based on the practical hope that God will bless those who, though still imperfect, have the sincere conviction to walk the path of continual moral improvement in their lifestyle?.

In this chapter, Immanuel Kant's account of the history of the true (universal) church has a clear progression. It moves from a discussion of Jesus’ radical break with all that was nonuniversal in Judaism, to the tendency of Christians down through the ages to shape their faith into something just as nonuniversal as Judaism. Kant's account concludes with reflections on why we have good reason to be optimistic for the future, because Kant's own interpretation of pure moral religion portrays the message of the coming of God's kingdom in symbolic terms that can be applicable to all good‐hearted people. Kant also focuses on the shortcomings not of Judaism, but of Christianity itself, when interpreted as just another historical faith‐particularly in the hands of biblical scholars.

In Section Two of Second Piece of Religion, Immanuel Kant presents a step‐by‐ step assessment of the biblical account of salvation, starting with the Genesis narrative, proceeding from there to the life and teachings of Jesus, and concluding with his death and resurrection as the source of a new freedom. The main text of the Second Piece then ends with a summary interpretation of the rational meaning of biblical symbols regarding the struggle between good and evil. Kant gives an account of the metaphorical description of the struggle between evil and good‐a description that portrays the struggle through the symbolism of two external powers (Satan and God). The chapter focuses separately on several equally important themes Kant emphasizes in the development of the second experiment.

What makes religion not only possible but necessary for a meaningful human life is the fact that human nature is meant for good but ends up being mired in evil. Religion's task is to solve this problem. We might portray reason as “bumping its head” on the inexorable limits of necessary ignorance when it attempts to answer the two questions: where does moral evil come from? and how can we overcome its powerful influence on us? Immanuel Kant regards good and evil as equal and opposite rational principles. Kant focuses on two key questions: (1) must an example of the archetype be fully human? and (2) could we also rightly regard such an archetype as divine? This chapter also examines the answers Kant proposes along with side comments he makes on various other issues in Christology.

The seven numbered sections in Division One of the Third Piece of Religion present a systematic argument regarding the founding, the establishment, and the implementation of an ethical community. This chapter first examines Immanuel Kant's argument that the idea of such a community has objective reality because it arises out of a universal human duty. Next, it is shown that how he argues that the inability of human beings to fulfil this duty independently, thereby giving rise to the need to assume that God is the community's ultimate founder. What this means is that the ethical community must be a church (an ethical community under God's guidance) in order to succeed. The chapter discusses Kant's claim that the true church inevitably begins with an appeal to revelation even though it is a rational reality. It concludes with an analysis of Kant's account of different types of churches.

We all started out as evil. Immanuel Kant describes and attempts to solve three specific difficulties that arise out of the fact that we are all inevitably corrupted by evil. This chapter presents Kant's treatment of these difficulties as corresponding to three traditional problems in Christian theology: sanctification, eternal security, and justification. That the first difficulty relates to the doctrine of sanctification (how a Christian, following conversion, can become holy) is evident when Kant describes this difficulty in terms of the contrast between human imperfection and God's holiness. Kant provides an overview of how rational religion can come to terms with a practical need: we must be able to access divine grace in some form in order to have a reasonable hope of being sanctified, assured of an eternal destiny with God, and justified in spite of our past evil.

Section IV of the First Piece of Religion accomplishes the first major task of Immanuel Kant's first experiment by explaining what bare reason justifies us to say about the essential condition of human nature. The second half of Section IV fulfils the corresponding mandate of Kant's second experiment by assessing how closely the traditional Christian understanding of evil conforms to this rational standard. After examining these two aspects of his conclusion, this chapter demonstrates how the bulk of Kant's “General Comment”‐the portion that was labeled “Section V” in R1 previews his subsequent argument that a true religion is one that empowers us to overcome the problem that evil poses for human nature. This basic precept of Kantian religion is: ignorance of the exact method God may have of making up for our moral deficiencies is not only acceptable, but “unavoidable”.

Empirical evidence suggests that human nature tends to be corrupt from the very outset of our moral life. In Sections II and III of the First Piece of Religion, Immanuel Kant approaches this theme of the corruption of human goodness in a more direct way. Although our predisposition is good, he argues that all human beings must have a propensity or original inclination that points us in the opposite direction. In Section II, he argues that, if it exists, then its status must be more than just that of an accidental or optional feature of human experience; this propensity must be inevitable. Section III explains how even people who appear to be good may be concealing an evil heart, if we understand the concept of evil in a philosophically appropriate manner. Human evil arises as a perversion of an originally good predisposition.

Immanuel Kant's first way of answering the main question of the First Piece in Religion‐whether human beings are good or evil by nature‐has been to examine the necessary conditions for being human, insofar as these relate “to our capacity for desire”, the rational faculty that governed Kant's considerations in CPrR. As creatures of desire who are “condemned to be free” in the way we use our volition, we are animals who must choose a rational principle to govern our desires. Our original predisposition to good is not a “contingent” possibility; rather, it is necessary for the very possibility of our nature that we desire to remain alive, to compare ourselves with others, and to respect the moral law. This predisposition therefore functions as the first aspect of what (in the three Critiques) Kant would have called the transcendental boundary defining his topic.

In this chapter, Immanuel Kant explains the crucial role played by biblical scholars: true religion must be universal, yet the dogmas that define a historical faith are not naturally universal. He attempts to defend the role of biblical scholars as both necessary and legitimate. Kant then turns to an analysis of why biblical theologians nevertheless tend to have a negative effect on church life and why the traditional linkage between Christianity and Judaism only exacerbates this problem. He relates both the “convoy” metaphor and his redefinition of faith, as grounded in one of two possible principles, to his earlier distinction between true service and pseudoservice. Kant also explores different aspects of how churches tend to be unsuccessful in such efforts and how such failures can be avoided. The chapter concludes with comments on a more affirmative topic, where Kant conveys a principle to assist visible churches in avoiding religious delusion.

Immanuel Kant's Fourth Piece Religion has two main parts that further develop the distinction between two “experiments”. Part One titled “On the Service of God in a Religion Generally” has sections dealing with natural religion and scholarly religion, and the four sections of Part Two titled “On the Pseudoservice of God in a Statutory Religion” focus on themes that alternate between the first and second experiments. Given the importance of immortality to Kant's conception of the highest good, one should not be surprised that, after he interprets Jesus’ gospel as being thoroughly consistent with his moral theory, he devotes a new paragraph to demonstrating that Jesus also acknowledged the “natural” (rational) need for moral persons who have lived this life in a way that requires numerous “sacrifices of happiness” to be able to look forward to a better situation in the afterlife.

In this chapter, Immanuel Kant turns his attention back to the theme that was his earlier focus: the biblical scholars who tend to obscure the natural religion that lies at the heart of Jesus’ teaching. First, he argues that viewing unphilosophical clergy as spiritual guides is bound to promote delusory ways of being religious. Then, Kant claims that true service of God must be guided not by clergy but by conscience. According to Kant, the church leaders portray their preferred tradition in a way that enables them to control people toward nonmoral ends. He states the same basic point in terms of the distinction between virtue and “godliness”. Properly interpreting the latter term, holds the key to unlocking the mystery of how religion can serve as a path to realizing the former, universal human duty. Yet misinterpreting this same term leads straight to idolatry.

At what is arguably the most significant turning point in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Immanuel Kant has just completed his exploration of the safe ground of possible experience and is about to embark on the Transcendental Dialectic’s exploration of the stormy sea of metaphysics, he introduces one of the greatest curiosities in the Kantian corpus: a “table … of the concept of nothing” (A290/B346-A292/B349). The brief passage, which is tacked on to the end of a “Remark” that supplements an Appendix to a weighty chapter exploring “the Ground of the Distinction of all Objects [Gegenstände] in General into Phenomena and Noumena” (A235/B294), appears as an afterthought to an afterthought to an afterthought and is thus easily overlooked by interpreters. Indeed, the passage may seem to be little more than an amusing distraction, perhaps intended as light entertainment before Kant undertakes the real work of demolishing traditional metaphysics; or at best, it might be one of those annoying sections whose only reason for existing is to fill a perceived (but artificial) gap in the completeness of Kant’s systematic conception of reason’s architectonic unity. This chapter takes the argument seriously, notwithstanding its widespread neglect, by unpacking the specific purpose served by each perspective on “nothing” that appears in Kant’s table. Closer analysis shows how the table clarifies Kant’s notion of “something in general” by contrasting it with four distinct opposites. The passage thereby orients us to appreciate how the Critique secures the status of metaphysics as queen of the sciences.

Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers several strategies for critiquing Chung-ying Cheng’s synthesis of Confucianism and Kant. Interpreting Kant’s Groundwork, Cheng argues that the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is too rigid: if the “life principle” is the ultimate root of Kant’s four types of duty, then human inclinations are good; Kant’s perfect duties turn out to be imperfect in some situations, while his imperfect duties such as benevolence turn out sometimes to be perfect. Although Cheng’s synthesis does not satisfy the Groundwork’s universal aim, it does show how to apply Kant’s insights to empirical moral situations.

Kant’s general mode of argument in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, especially his defence of human nature’s propensity to evil, is a matter of considerable controversy: while some interpret his argument as strictly a priori, others interpret it as anthropological. In dialogue with Allen Wood’s recent work, I defend my earlier claim that Religion employs a quasi-transcendental mode of argument, focused on the possibility of a specific type of experience, not experience in general. In Religion, Kant portrays religious experience as possible only for beings with a good predisposition and a propensity to evil. Kant’s theory of the archetype and his theory of symbolism illustrate the same mode of argument. Taking Religion as a sequel to the third Critique more than the second, my perspectival interpretation makes room for a robust view of unsociable sociability without the absurd deception of regarding it as the source of human evil.

Both Kant’s architectonic and the Yijing can be structured as four perspectival levels: 0 + 4 + 12 + = 64. The first, unknowable level is unrepresentable. The geometry of logic provides well-structured maps for levels two to four. Level two consists of four basic gua, corresponding to Kant’s category-headings. Level three’s twelve gua, derived logically from the initial four, correspond to Kant’s twelve categories. Level four correlates the remaining 48 gua to Kant’s theory of the four university faculties, and to four categorially organized domains comprising his philosophical system.

After summarizing the content of Philip Rossi’s book, The Ethical Commonwealth in History: Peace-Making as the Moral Vocation of Humanity, I pose two main questions. First, does politics or religion play a more important role in Kant’s philosophy when it comes to the task of ushering humanity to the realization of its ultimate vocation, the establishment of a lasting peace for human society? I argue that Kant portrays politics as a means to a religious end, whereas Rossi tends to reverse their Kantian order of priority. Second, what concrete details does Kant give in defense of his theory that establishing an ethical community is a universal duty of humankind? As Rossi tends to overlook Kant’s details, I provide an overview. Kant argues that the ethical community can only be established in the form of a church and that the rational content constituting the core of the true church consists of four requirements: universality, integrity, freedom, and unchangeableness. After challenging Rossi’s claim that Kantian hope is necessarily social, I conclude with two minor questions: Is Kant’s theory of human nature dualist or monist? and Must the church create a political form of peace that applies to all human beings?

After reviewing the history of the “affirmative” approach to interpreting Kant’s Religion, I offer four responses to the symposium papers in the previous issue of Faith and Philosophy. First, incorrectly identifying Kant’s two “experiments” leads to misunderstandings of his affirmation of Christianity. Second, Kant’s Critical Religion expounds a thoroughgoing interpretation of these experiments, and was not primarily an attempt to confirm the architectonic introduced in Kant’s System of Perspectives. Third, the surprise positions defended by most symposium contributors render the “affirmative” label virtually meaningless. Finally, if Kant is read as constructing perspectival philosophy, not theology, the compatibility of his positions with Christianity stands.

Kants theories of both general moral decision-making and specifically religious conversion. It is argued that Kantian Gesinnung is volitional, referring to a personconvictionberzeugung (). This is confirmed by a detailed analysis of the 169 occurrences of Gesinnung and cognate words in Religion. It contrasts with what is suggested by translating Gesinnung as, which reinforces a tendency to interpret the notion more metaphysically, and also with Pluharattitude’, which has too strongly psychological connotations

In a recent article in this journal Phil. Math., II, v.4 (1989), n.2, pp.? ?] J. Fang argues that we must not be fooled by A.J. Ayer (God rest his soul!) and his cohorts into believing that mathematical knowledge has an analytic a priori status. Even computers, he reminds us, take some amount of time to perform their calculations. The simplicity of Kant's infamous example of a mathematical proposition (7+5=12) is "partly to blame" for "mislead[ing] scholars in the direction of neglecting the temporal element"; yet a brief instant of time is required to grasp even this simple truth. If Kant were alive today, "and if he had had a little more mathematical savvy", Fang explains, he could have used the latest example of the largest prime number (391,581 x 2 216,193 - 1) as a better example of the "synthetic a priori" character of mathematics. The reason Fang is so intent upon emphasizing the temporal character of mathematics is that he wishes to avoid "the uncritical mixing of ... a theology and a philosophy of mathematics." For "in the light of the Computer Age today: finitism is king!" Although Kant's aim was explicitly "to study the 'human' ... faculty", Fang claims that even he did not adequatley emphasize "the clearly and concretely distinguishable line of demarcation between the human and divine faculties."

Aside from bioethics, the main theme of Ronald Green's lifework has been an exploration of the relation between religion and morality, with special emphasis on the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard. This essay summarizes and assesses his work on this theme by examining, in turn, four of his relevant books. Religious Reason introduced a new method of comparative religion based on Kant's model of a rational religion. Religion and Moral Reason expanded on this project, clarifying that religious traditions cannot be reduced to their moral grounding. Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt offered bold new evidence that Kant, not Hegel, was the philosopher whose ideas primarily shaped Kierkegaard's overtly religious philosophy; both philosophers focused on the problem of how to understand the relation between moral reasoning and historical religion. And Kant and Kierkegaard on Time and Eternity republished ten essays that explore various aspects of this theme in greater depth. I argue that throughout these works Green defends a “paradox of inwardness”: principles or ideals that are by their nature essentially inward end up requiring outward manifestation in order to be confirmed or fully justified as real.