Jeffrey Bloechl

One important approach to the theme of divine revelation proceeds by way of reflection on theophany, the appearing of God. Yet, as Jean-Louis Chrétien has argued, the latter cannot be thought without implying and calling for a conception of theocrypsis, the mystery of God. This appearing that is also a concealing is of interest to phenomenology no less than to theology. Among phenomenologists, Heidegger has thought concealment together with unconcealment most rigorously, showing that being is both concealed and unconcealed by beings. Being, however, is not God, and a careful juxtaposition of the distinct manners in which Being and God appear sheds some light on the task of understanding what is proper to divine revelation.

The experience of surprise involves an encounter with novelty that transforms one’s understanding of the prevailing context and even of oneself, as a participant there. However, in the order of understanding absolute novelty is unintelligible, and absolute transformation would suspend the unity of the one who lives through it. We find indications for these theses in some reflection on Paul of Tarsus.Paul was undoubtedly taken by powerful surprise when on the road to Damascus he heard the voice of Jesus. Yet what we know of his religious practice as an observant Jew suggests a range of conditions that may well have prepared him for what transpired there, and what we know of his subsequent actions suggest a long period of discernment. These considerations outline the possibility of further existential psychological work, without claiming to render Paul's experience fully transparent.

_Philosophy as a Spiritual Exercise_ investigates distinctive contributions to the discipline of philosophy that have arisen out of the Society of Jesus. The essays in the collection span the history of the Society, from its foundation until today, and refer to many of the founding documents and Fathers of the Order. Throughout, there is the question of the relation of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius to philosophy. As a result, the book offers ways to think about how philosophy relates to spiritual development and how spiritual development relates to philosophy.

Phenomenology has attended often to the theme of pain, but less to suffering. Careful study of the latter leads to results that correspond with observations appearing in the philosophy of medicine and in literature. The difference between pain and suffering exposes the fact that in some instances the latter defies conceptions of subjectivity widely accepted in phenomenology. The subject who suffers is a subject who struggles to give meaning to his or her experience, and in some instances loses the capacity entirely. A phenomenological account of these possibilities sharpens the challenge brought to the theology that, under the heading of theodicy, defends the unitary meaning of all experience. The theology that abandons theodicy may thereby recover a strong sense of its own biblical roots, which nurture a love of the God-man who suffers out of love for us.

The thought of Jean-Louis Chrétien is most familiar to those who have taken up the theological turn in French phenomenology, yet it defies reduction to either phenomenology or theology, or for that matter spirituality, literature, or Greek thought. Written in beautiful French prose and argued with unsurpassed erudition, Chrétien’s works defy easy interpretation. One nonetheless finds a center of gravity in attempts to define and then elaborate an original account of human being in terms of call and response, from which there follow penetrating studies of language and body, as well as illuminating approaches to a range of themes including temporality, prayer, and religious reading. This volume gathers original work from leading scholars in the fields of philosophy, theology and poetics, including Chrétien’s collaborators, successors, and Anglophone interpreters. They engage his work along its main lines, at once presenting it in summary fashion and exploring its strengths and weaknesses for our understanding of some of the topics and problems that held his prolonged attention. Readers new to Chrétien will easily find a number of points of access, while more advanced readers will find that their understanding is both deepened and enriched. Contributors: Rudolf Bernet, Jeffrey Bloechl, Emmanuel Falque, Jérôme de Gramont, Crina Gshwandtner, Emmanuel Housset, Stephen E. Lewis, Jean-Luc Marion, Catherine Pickstock, Andrew Prevot.

This paper distinguishes four senses of naturalism: reductive physicalism; a naturalism that departs from what Thompson calls “natural-historical judgments”; a naturalism that recognizes that physical nature is located within the space of reasons; and a phenomenological naturalism that shifts the focus to the “natural” experiences of subjects who encounter the world. The paper argues for a “phenomenological neo-Aristotelianism” that accounts both for the internal justification of our first-order moral experience and the need for a broader grounding in a universalistic account of the goods of agency.

Maclntyre's critique of modern moral theory is supported by a theory of narrative in turn premised on a discontinuous reading of history. Thought through to the end, historical discontinuity redefines objectivity according to the rules of the particular context in which it appears. This claim both founds Maclntyre's intervention in moral debate and troubles that intervention from within. Against his opponents, he claims to have the argument most in accord with the rules of our context; Maclntyre's narra tivity is thus universalistic within the post-Enlightenment context. But contrary to his own tendency and occasional statements, that same com mitment to contextuality deprives him of the possibility of a final, secure position. This tension within Maclntyre's argument better expresses his theory of contextuality than does the specific direction he wishes to take it in: narrativity can be considered to embody an instability essential to not only moral debate but also moral identity. Key Words: Aristotle •. context • Maclntyre • narrative • rationality • relativism • Spinoza • tradition • universalism.

It is true that Paul is not the Messiah, but his prophet. Yet he receives a revelation for which there is not yet either stable understanding or conceptual articulation. As the first theologian of the Church, it is thus Paul who invents Christianity. But before this could be a matter of labor with concepts, it had already been a powerful experience that called for them. The Christianity that Paul invents in his preaching is born first in his heart, and moreover according to a violence that is well known. What could have prepared Paul for the events on the road to Damascus, and how are we able to later understand them? What concepts today, after his singular experience and the urgent preaching gave rise to a worldview, best enable us to hear some of what Paul heard and wished to have repeated in the life of faith? Such questions point beyond, or rather beneath the systematic explanations-dogmatic, speculative-that would have us render the meaning of faith in scientific propositions. Philosophers have their own reasons for contesting the rule of science, and some have appealed to Paul for material support (e. g., Agamben, Badiou). Others, however, have aimed first to simply understand Paul on his own terms (Heidegger, Breton). Which philosophy hearkens most closely to the experience of Paul? And how does its thinking meet the words that pass between the voice heard from on high and the voice in which it is announced?