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87Modal Knowledge, in TheorySouthwest Philosophy Review 28 (1): 227-235. 2012.Some philosophers think that a person can justifi ably believe that p is possible even though she has no theory according to which p is possible. They think, for example, that she can justifiably believe that there could be naturally purple elephants even though she lacks (inter alia) a theory about the factors germane to elephant pigmentation. There is a certain optimism about this view: it seems to assume that people are fairly good at ferreting out problems with proposed modal claims; so, if …Read more
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162Against Blaming the BlameworthyIn Ben Bramble & Bob Fischer (eds.), The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat, Oxford University Press. pp. 185-198. 2015.We tend not to blame those who eat meat--even if they are blameworthy for so doing. Some think that this is a moral failure on the part of vegetarians and vegans. My aim here, however, is to argue that this isn't so. In short, I argue that if it would be unreasonable to demand that someone behave in a particular way, then we shouldn’t blame her for failing to behave in that way. But it would be unreasonable to demand that someone abstain from eating meat. So, we shouldn’t blame her for eating me…Read more
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197Bugging the Strict VeganJournal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (2): 255-263. 2016.Entomophagy—eating insects—is getting a lot of attention these days. However, strict vegans are often uncomfortable with entomophagy based on some version of the precautionary principle: if you aren’t sure that a being isn’t sentient, then you should treat it as though it is. But not only do precautionary principle-based arguments against entomophagy fail, they seem to support the opposite conclusion: strict vegans ought to eat bugs
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227Why Incest is Usually WrongPhilosophy in the Contemporary World 19 (1): 17-31. 2012.I contend that there are strong moral reasons for most adult family members to avoid having sex with one another; indeed, I argue that even among consenting adults, incestuous sex is usually wrong. The argument is simple. Absent compelling reasons, it's wrong to take a significant risk with something that's extremely valuable. But having sex with a family member takes a significant risk with something extremely valuable—namely, a family relationship. And since compelling reasons for taking such …Read more
Rochester, NY, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Animal Ethics |
Well-Being |
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics |
Moral Psychology |
Normative Ethics |