Anton Heinrich Rennesland

In this paper, I elucidate Friedrich Nietzsche’s ethics of danger as a development from an ethics of affirmation to posit a practical reading of his ethical theory. Gay Science 341 contains the hypothetical scenario of the eternal return, and the way this is interpreted redirects one’s total reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy. My argument is that there is a vulnerability latent in identifying one’s response to the eternal return through exposing oneself to the danger implicit in this return; from simply affirming it, a more appropriate reaction I argue is the rage that is made explicit. This paper begins with the backdrop of our contemporary situation from the insights of Peter Sloterdijk and Nietzsche, followed by a review of Deleuze’s ethics of affirmation. I present the latter to situate the difficulty of articulating its practicality in the face of such a cynical condition. The last section develops Nietzsche’s ethics of danger. This I directly borrow from Tobias Kuehne, which I expound via other insights from Nietzsche’s philosophy. As a whole, my discussion of his ethics of danger is my attempt to articulate his ethical theory in a practical sense, away from the probable security offered by affirmation.

I re-question the Enlightenment by bringing together Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Peter Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason. The year 2021 celebrates the 240th and 40th anniversary of the respective Critiques, and it is opportune to read the common thread that binds them—the Enlightenment. This essay has three parts: I first read the Critique of Pure Reason in light of Kant’s Enlightenment essay to underscore reason’s ill-fate as found in the public sphere; I then introduce Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason along with his general philosophy, highlighting the cynical state he characterizes reason’s public presence with. In the conclusion, I draw affinities between the two Critiques to form a certain dialogue in the presentation of both philosophers to understand the concept on stage: the Enlightenment.

This paper presents an approach to Filipino Christianity (particularly Roman Catholicism) using the concepts of sákop (reduction) and kagándahang-loób (hospitability). It attempts a critical phenomenology of the Filipino experiences of reduction and hospitality. These two experiences imply a paradox. Since being baptized by the Spanish colonial conquest in 1521, its identity has been in flux. Historically, the Filipino Christian experience was brought about by the reducción system. However, this experience is condensed by claiming kagandánhang-loób as a virtue. Yet, kagandánhang-loób is not enough to articulate the Filipino Faith, evidenced by the experience of Filipino migrants or in questioning the faith’s presence in Philippine politics. This critical phenomenology of religion seeks to interrogate these quasi-transcendental structures of the Filipino Christian experience and locate such structures between the extremes of sákop and kagandáhang-loób.

I present an affirmation of nothingness in the humor of Zhuang Zi 莊子. This essay begins with two images that present a playful transgression of perspectives: the butterfly dream and the discussion over the Hao river. I dwell on these transgressions to highlight the challenge for each to question one’s perspectives and to shift its grounding from epistemic to aesthetic value. Such a sensitivity suggests a mindfulness of the transformation of things 物化. This reinforces reality’s ephemerality, and I, following David Chai, point what lies behind this as the non-being of nothingness 無無. The centrality of the Dao 道 qua nothingness is mirrored by a Daoist who becomes sensitive to the transformation of things and who ultimately undercomes reality, i.e., decenters oneself. This type of existence is what it means to be zhenuinly 真 pretending, which Zhuang Zi does, manifested by the humor in his work.

I re-question the Enlightenment by bringing together Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Peter Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason. The year 2021 celebrates the 240th and 40th anniversary of the respective Critiques, and it is opportune to read the common thread that binds them—the Enlightenment. This essay has three parts: I first read the Critique of Pure Reason in light of Kant’s Enlightenment essay to underscore reason’s ill-fate as found in the public sphere; I then introduce Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason along with his general philosophy, highlighting the cynical state he characterizes reason’s public presence with. In the conclusion, I draw affinities between the two Critiques to form a certain dialogue in the presentation of both philosophers to understand the concept on stage: the Enlightenment.

I present an image of humanity as the will to power expressed in context of affirmationand danger in the eternal return. Nietzsche argues the death of God not as a theological argument but as an existential challenge for humanity to be re-experienced. It is read in light of the eternal return: without ontological references or quasi-transcendentals, how is life to be lived? Deleuze contextualizes Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism qua a typology of active and reactive modes of being, however I go beyond to provide what I consider an anthropological account. I do this by differentiating the will to power from individual willing and present the danger that an affirmation of life entails. Nietzsche challenges us with the eternal return. With this, one is led to realize that she is her own destruction (Untergehen) at the same time as her overture (Übergehen). She has the ability, power, capacity to overcome and self-create. With this realization one ought to remain truthful to this in form of truth-telling (Redlichkeit). Nietzsche projects humanity as a perilous crossing over from nihilism to affirmation with an embrace of an ethics of danger. This crossing over is a mark of life as the will to power. It is an overcoming of nihilism and the assurance amidst nihilism’s farce that the godhead is dead and that the eternal return is a daunting challenge we cannot escape from. With these, we are afforded an image of humanity as the will to power.

I argue how Filipino philosophy is an illusion we have taken as a belief, and that we need to remember again its illusory – but necessary – status for it to flourish. The normativity of this illusion impelled the discourse: what is philosophy? For new directions, the language of Filipino philosophy must be negative that pathologies in thinking be realized; it is a necessary illusion remembered once more: a nihilistic stance for new values to be created. I raise the question of the non-identical character of language, of how nature is far larger than concepts, which makes misrepresentation possible (something evident in society—leaders to population, praxis to theory, philosophy to culture). The non-identicality reifies the illusion into belief which necessitates a decadent type of rationality. The illusory status of the nomenclature (‘Filipino philosophy’) must be remembered again for the dialectic to continue. In seeking new directions for Filipino philosophy, it is not enough that a new breed of thinkers merely accepts the value ascribed to it – along with the numerous errors and nuisances inherited along the way – but to create new value. With a critical stance, I present 5 assumptions that probe into some essential characteristics of the immanent pathologies of Filipino philosophy’s language that occasions the need for such struggle branded as assumptions.

I draw affinities between Nietzsche’s criticisms of modernity and the Anthropocene, showing how this COVID-19 pandemic reflects our failure to dream radically but also our potentiality for a greater tomorrow. The Anthropocene represents society’s unprecedented progress at the cost of a rift between nature and civilization guided by utopias. This meant, in greater terms, society's value for economics while sacrificing ecology. Though a viral pathology, this pandemic exposed societal pathologies ignored for a long time: defects in healthcare, city planning, and sustainable living. Our herd-like response to this crisis stems from a deep-seated homelessness caused by the Anthropocene. Life ought to be altered and Nietzsche’s Eternal Return challenges us: If this is to return, what are our values? This paper is threefold: I first present the Anthropocene and draw affinities with Nietzsche’s critique of modernity. I then proceed by giving several examples of how the pandemic challenges societal values. Lastly, Nietzsche’s challenge of the Eternal Return is a test to our own values to life after the pandemic.