James Klagge

Is “good” a family-resemblance concept? Wittgenstein holds it is, since cases of goodness may not have anything in common, but there may be a continuous transition from some cases to others. Von Wright and Hacker argue it is not. They hold that family-resemblance concepts satisfy two conditions that goodness does not satisfy. I assess their arguments and then present a constitutivist account of goodness that Wittgenstein seems to endorse. The constitutivist account is what one would expect if goodness was a family-resemblance concept. Finally, I note that Wittgenstein's nod towards non-descriptivism in the Investigations is paralleled by Stevenson's ethical emotivism.

I formulate and defend a realist theory of the truth of moral judgements according to which moral properties are synthetically but necessarily determined by natural properties of people, actions, or states of affairs. This view can be found in Moore's later ethical writings. The view reconciles two apparently conflicting intuitions: Moral properties supervene upon natural properties, but judgements about moral properties are generally not entailed by any judgements about natural properties. The view is realist in the sense that moral judgements possess a truth-value independently of our means of knowing it. They are true or false in virture of a reality existing independently of us. ;One promising way of understanding this synthetic, necessary connection between moral and natural properties is in terms of the Kripke-Putnam account of natural kinds: Moral properties are type-identical with configurations of natural properties. But this turns out to be unsatisfactory. Another promising way of understanding this connection is on analogy with the connection between the mental and physical. I reject a token-identity theory of the moral and natural, but the analogy itself is helpful in understanding the relationship between the moral and natural. It offers a model for that relationship. ;I distinguish two senses in which supervenience could be understood in morality--ascriptive and descriptive--and argue that ascriptive supervenience depends on descriptive. A realist must defend descriptive supervenience. Moral properties decriptively supervene upon natural properties because moral differences must be explicable and justifiable in terms of natural differences. ;I construct an epistemology for moral properties in which natural properties are criteria, in Wittgenstein's sense, of moral properties. This conforms with the metaphysics of moral properties, and can be reconciled with the phenomenon of moral conflict. Finally, a careful formulation of moral realism is defended against Dummett's objections to realism generally. The moral realist cannot be forced to hold that there are moral truths that humans could not, even in principle, come to know. Yet this is what seems objectionable about realism in other realms. We can know all moral truths in principle, though perhaps not in practice

In 1844 Marx held that labor alienation was wholly eliminable, primarily through the abolition of private property. Work in the context of private property was alienating because it was performed for wages and the production of exchange-value. With such purposes, work was experienced as selfish and forced. With the abolition of private property, work would be performed for the production of use-¥alue, to satisfy human needs. With this human purpose, work would be experienced as a free and fulfilling expression of life.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ and _Philosophical Investigations_ are among the most influential philosophical books of the twentieth century, and also among the most perplexing. Wittgenstein warned again and again that he was not and would not be understood. Moreover, Wittgenstein's work seems to have little relevance to the way philosophy is done today. In _Wittgenstein in Exile_, James Klagge proposes a new way of looking at Wittgenstein -- as an exile -- that helps make sense of this. Wittgenstein's exile was not, despite his wanderings from Vienna to Cambridge to Norway to Ireland, strictly geographical; rather, Klagge argues, Wittgenstein was never at home in the twentieth century. He was in exile from an earlier era -- Oswald Spengler's culture of the early nineteenth century. Klagge draws on the full range of evidence, including Wittgenstein's published work, the complete Nachlaß, correspondence, lectures, and conversations. He places Wittgenstein's work in a broad context, along a trajectory of thought that includes Job, Goethe, and Dostoyevsky. Yet Klagge also writes from an analytic philosophical perspective, discussing such topics as essentialism, private experience, relativism, causation, and eliminativism. Once we see Wittgenstein's exile, Klagge argues, we will gain a better appreciation of the difficulty of understanding Wittgenstein and his work

This collection of essays deals with the relationship between Wittgenstein's life and his philosophy. The first two essays reflect on general problems inherent in philosophical biography itself. The essays that follow draw on recently published letters as well as recently published diaries from the 1930s to explore Wittgenstein's background as an engineer and its relation to the Tractatus, the impact of his schizoid personality on his approach to philosophy, his role as a diarist, letter-writer and polemicist, and finally the complex issue of Wittgenstein as a Jew. Written by a first-rate team of Wittgenstein scholars including two published biographers of the philosopher, Brian McGuinness and Ray Monk, this collection will appeal to anyone with a serious interest in the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century.

An essential resource for students of Wittgenstein, this collection contains faithful, in some cases expanded and corrected, versions of many important pieces never before available in a single volume, including Notes for the 'Philosophical Lecture', published here for the first time. Fifteen selections, with bi-lingual versions of those originally written in German, span the development of Wittgenstein's thought, his range of interests, and his methods of philosophical investigation. Short introductions, an index, and an updated version of Georg Henrik von Wright's The Wittgenstein Papers situate the selections within the broader context of the Wittgenstein corpus and the history of its publication.